Get help now

Case Studies — War Makes the State, and the State Makes War

  • Pages 9
  • Words 2222
  • Views 783
  • dovnload



  • Pages 9
  • Words 2222
  • Views 783
  • Academic anxiety?

    Get original paper in 3 hours and nail the task

    Get your paper price

    124 experts online

    This essay is first concerned with the Charles Tilly’s principle around by histhe famous saying: War makes the state, and the state makes war. Meanwhile, I will explain the relationship between the state and its four activities: War Mmaking, State Mmaking, Protection, Extraction. The filiation of state and war will be illustrated later. I will use Palestine region will be used as the main case study to demonstrate this essay and I will try to use this example to explain more clearly with the relationship between war and the state.

    What kind of Oorganizational structure the Palestine Liberation Organization ( PLO) was and its functions will be discussed in the case study. Moreover, armed struggle will be introduced and its consequences resultedact on the state will be listdescribed. HowThe effect of armed struggle onaffect the functions of PLO will be discussed as wellthe same time. Finally, a term called intifada and its forms will be explained.

    Principles. Charles Tilly wrote an argument in War-Making and State-Making as Organized Crime, ‘Power holders’ pursuit of war involved them willy-nilly in the extraction of resources for war making from the populations over which they had control and in the promotion of capital accumulation by those who could help them borrow and buy. War making, Extraction, and capital accumulation interacted to shape European state making. Power holders did not undertake those three momentous activities with the intention of creating national states-centralized, differentiated, autonomous, extensive political organizations.

    Nor did they ordinary foresee that national states would emerge from war making, extraction, and capital accumulation’ (Tilly, 1985). Alternatively, these power holders enjoy the advantages of power within a guaranteed or expanding territory. In order to make war more effectively, they try to locate more capital either in short term by conquest or in long term by impose taxation regularly. As the process continued, state makes found difficulties in collecting taxes to make their long run interest. Thus, violence appeared.

    In the early state-making process, many parties use violence to accomplish their goalsends. At later eighteenth century, monarchs inthrough the most of European countries controlled permanent, professional military forces that competed those of their neighbors and any other organized armed force within their own territories. ‘The state’s monopoly of large-scale violence was turning from theory to reality’ (Tilly, 1985). Charles Tilly also mentioned that the agents of states characteristically carry on for different activities:, ‘

    1. War making: Eliminating or neutralizing their own rivals outside the territories in which they have clear and continuous priority as wielders of force; 2. State making: Eliminating or neutralizing their rivals inside those territories; 3. Protection: Eliminating or neutralizing the enemies of their clients; 4. Extraction: Acquiring the means of carrying out the first three activities – war making, state making, and protection’ (Tilly, 1985). These four activities were interdependent.

    A war lord made war to become dominant in a territory, but that war making let to rose extraction of the means of war – men, arms, food, lodging, transportation, supplies, and the money to buy them – from the population within that territory. The extrication capacity increased with the developing of the war-making capacity. If successful, extraction would entail the elimination, neutralization, or cooptation of the great lord’s local rival; thus, it led to state making. In another way, extraction created organization in tax collection agencies, police forces, courts, exchequers, account keepers; thus it again led to state making.

    War making also led to state making through the increased capacity of military organization, as a standing army, the armswar industries, supporting bureaucracies and institutesschools grew up within the state apparatus, the states’ managers formed alliances with specific social classes. ‘The members of those classes loaned resources, provided technical services, or helped ensure the compliance of the rest of the population, all in return for a measure of protection against their own rivals and enemies’ (Tilly, 1985).

    This analysis has two implications for the development of national states. First is that the popular resistance to war making and state making made a difference. Secondly, the relative balance among war making, protection, extraction and state making dramatically affected the organization of the states that emerged from the four activities. Therefore, war became the normal condition of the international system of states and the normal means of defending or enhancing a position within the system. George Modelski notes that ‘Global power…strengthened those states that attained it elatively to all other political and other organizations. What is more, other states competing in the global power game developed similar organizational forms and similar hardiness: they too became nation-states – in a defensive reaction, because forced to take issue with or to confront a global power, as France confronted Spain and later Britain, or in imitation of its obvious success and effectiveness, as Germany followed the example of Britain in Weltmacht, or as earlier Peter the Great had rebuilt Russia on Dutch precepts and examples.

    Thus not only Portugal, the Netherlands, Britain and the United States became nation-states, but also Spain, France, Germany, Russia and Japan. The short, and the most parsimonious, answer to the question of why these succeeded where “most of the European efforts to build states failed” is that they were either global power or successfully fought with or against them’ (Modelski, 1978). Case Study- Palestine Palestine is a region between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea, situated at a strategic location between Egypt, Syria and Arabia.

    It is also the birthplace of Judaism and Christianity. Thus, this region has a long and tumultuous history as a crossroad for religion, culture, commerce, and politics. Palestine has been controlled by numerous different peoples, including Ancient Egyptians, Canaanites, Israelites, Assyrians, Babylonians, Persians, Ancient Greeks, Romans, Byzantines, the Sunni Arab Caliphates, the Shia Fatimid Caliphate, Crusaders, Ayyubids, Mameluks, Ottomans, the British and modern Israelis and Palestinians.

    According to this, the boundaries of this region have changed throughout history, and were first defined in modern times by the Franco-British boundary agreement (1920) and the Transjordan memorandum of 16 September 1922, during the mandate period. (Agoston and Masters, 2009) The Jewish and the Arab both consider Palestine as inherent territory, which was the one of the reasons led to Israeli- Palestinian conflict. Thousands on both sides died since the war,this had led to the creation of the Jewish state in Palestine and to the mass exodus of the Arab population in 1948. (?????????) The Palestinian national movement, was established with the express aim of liberating Palestine through armed struggle, had proved unable in the intervening years to liberate any part of its national soil by force and had finally accepted the Oslo negotiated compromise, whose terms ran counter to virtually all the principles and aims it had espoused for so long’ (Sayigh, 1997). The armed struggle provided the main driving force power around leading towhich Palestinian nation building took place. The establishment of Israel in 19848 took the Palestinians of the national base in territory, economy, and society.

    This catastrophe ended the hope for the emergence of a Palestinian nation-state. Since there is no single territorial, economic and social base, common political arena cannot be found. This means no agreed modes of competition and structure for the selection of a new generation of leadership. Therefore, Palestinians join Arab opposition parties and hope new Arab leaders could destroy Israel and liberate Palestine. However, the host government responded either by isolating the Palestinian refugees or by inhibiting the emergence of social and political organizations.

    Thus, grass-roots level was operated, which was often channeled into Arab parties espousing radical national, social, or religious agendas. ‘One component consisted of students, either newly returned from universities abroad or the graduates of the three West Bank universities established in the early 1970s at Bir Zeit, Bethlehem and Nablus. A second came from the ranks of the trade unions which represented the growing number of men finding work either in the burgeoning Palestinian economy or in Israel.

    And a third, which overlapped with the first two, was made up of those Palestinians who had passed through Israeli prisons, where interaction with their fellow prisoners had increased their nationalist consciousness while allowing the creation of activist networks as they were selectively released’ (Owen, 2004) Yezid Sayigh estimated that about 230-250,000 Palestinians had passed through Israeli interrogation centres and experienced at least 24 hours of detention by 1981, which was enough to create not only a militant leadership but also a plentiful supply of activities to take their leaders’ places. Robinson, 1997) The growing disillusionment of the Arab politics in the early 1960s showed that the Palestinians had not been politically incorporated in any meaningful way by host governments. In 1964, Arab heads found the PLO – Palestinian Liberation Organization. From its inception, the PLO began to shape itself as a non-territorial equivalent state. This included building up a relationship with Palestinian society, which allowed it to stand above it, to control it and to shape its nationalist agenda. However, the PLO founder exceeded his mandate and presented the Arab leaders with a fait accomplish.

    Such as creating a state like body with a constitution, executive, legislative assembly, “government” departments, army, audited budget, and internal statutes. ‘The PLO even imposed limited taxes and conscription on the Palestinian population in the Gaza Strip with Egyptian assistance and requested similar facilities in other Arab state’ (Sayigh, 1997). As a result, the PLO failed. This defeat inflicted by Israel on the Arab states weakened them both physically and politically. Thus, making it difficult to against the Palestinian guerrilla groups appeared on the scene.

    Soon, the PLO wasere displaceds by the guerrilla. Its espousal of armed struggle and adoption of grass-roots organization enabled it to mobilize the Palestinian constituency as well as the last translate ‘potential politicization into political action’ (Norton, 1987). The Palestinian guerrilla movement kept a modest force of combat strength and military effectiveness. ‘Even in their heyday in 1968-70, the guerrillas had numbered fewer than 10,000 and their attacks against Israel were never more than an irritant’ (Sayigh, 1997).

    More important was the contribution made by the armed struggle to the Palestinian nation building. It led to four consequences. Firstly, it led to confirmation of Palestinian national identity, which had started to be remade with the social reconstruction of the 1950s. ‘The launch of the armed struggle in 1965 became a reassertion of Palestinian autonomous will, evidence of determination to pursue an independent course’ (Sayigh, 1997). The armed struggle gave the heroic imagery and language to the imagined community of the Palestinians, who regard themselves as a revolutionary people.

    Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Ji-had), for example, noted that the armed struggle, ‘a central, comprehensive and multidimensional process,’ is ‘how we have proceeded to rebuild our people and reassert its national identity, in order to achieve its aims of return and liberation of the land. We understand [the armed struggle] as an integrated process involving three dimensions: organization, production, and combat’ (Sayf, 1985). Secondly, the consequence was to give institutional embodiment to this Palestinian national identity through the takeover of the PLO by the guerrilla movement in 1969.

    It also permitted the guerrilla leadership to assume the mantle of diplomatic recognition already accorded to the PLO and to operate on a larger regional and international stage. The third consequence was that armed struggle produces a common political arena, which the broad constituency could be mobilized. Meanwhile, it provided the channels through which mass participation in national politics could take place. The last consequence of the armed struggle was the most central and enduring.

    It involved a process akin to state building, which also demonstrated the degree to which the restoration of national identity, reaffirmation of the imagined community, and institutionalization of the representative entity had progressed. The armed struggle had successfully remade national identity and given substance to the PLO as the representative entity of the Palestinians. Military action became one of the policy instruments serving a broader diplomatic strategy. The role of armed struggle was now to preserve the PLO’s status virtually as a state actor.

    From a Palestinian point of view, they provide one of the main organizational foundations of the next act of sustained resistance, the Intifada. In Meron Benvenisti’s West Bank Data Project’s 1987 report, he wrote, ‘[Palestinian] violence is largely carried out in broad daylight by individuals who spontaneously express their feelings, undeterred by the consequences. ’ Intifada soon became a general confrontation with the Israeli occupation on many forms, which involved novel forms of organizations and resistance.

    Forms included street demonstrations, strikes and boycotts, also coordinated stone-throwing attacks on Israeli patrols, encouraged and supported by local action committees, and under a system of general guidance exercised by the United National Leadership (UNL) from the main political organizations including the Palestine Communist Party. (Schiff and Ta’ari, 1989) Conclusion In thismy essay, I showed the relationship between the state and its four activities. I used Palestine as a case study to prove the relationship between war and the state.

    I also have also explained what were the PLO and its functions. I also illustrated the term – armed struggle and discussed its consequences on the state. Moreover, I have discussed how armed struggle affect the functions of the PLO and used Meron Benvenisti’s West Bank Data Project’s 1987 report to explain the terminology ofwhat is intifada. Forms of intifada were also been listdescribed. All the references cited above were used to demonstrate and prove Charles Tilly ‘s famous saying: War makes the state, and the state makes war.

    This essay was written by a fellow student. You may use it as a guide or sample for writing your own paper, but remember to cite it correctly. Don’t submit it as your own as it will be considered plagiarism.

    Need a custom essay sample written specially to meet your requirements?

    Choose skilled expert on your subject and get original paper with free plagiarism report

    Order custom paper Without paying upfront

    Case Studies — War Makes the State, and the State Makes War. (2017, Jan 23). Retrieved from

    Hi, my name is Amy 👋

    In case you can't find a relevant example, our professional writers are ready to help you write a unique paper. Just talk to our smart assistant Amy and she'll connect you with the best match.

    Get help with your paper
    We use cookies to give you the best experience possible. By continuing we’ll assume you’re on board with our cookie policy