Summary Now that the worst of the economic crisis is over, the balance can be made up for Peru as well. GDP growth will fall to 1% in 2009, a steep drop from the 9. 8% registered in 2008. However, in comparison to its peers, this can be considered a good result. Monetary and fiscal stimuli have supported growth so far. However, with regard to the fiscal stimulus, the bottom of the treasury chest is in sight.
On the back of higher spending and falling revenues, the budget deficit will deteriorate sharply to -3.
4% of GDP this year. Inflation, however, is not a concern at this time, as the contraction of domestic demand and investment will drive down inflation to 3. 2% by the end of this year. However, Peru continues to face structural impediments to growth. Exports are recovering, with demand from Asia being an important driver, but remain hinged on primary exports.
As exports are growing more rapidly than imports, the current account will improve to a deficit of 0.
6% of GDP. The downside is that the currency will appreciate as a result. This hurts trade and hampers the recovery. With regard to its external solvency, Peru is in a good position. Foreign debt is low and the level of FX-reserves is still high at USD 28bn. On the political front, President Alan Garcia is losing popularity and authority on the back of the continuing social opposition by part of the population.
His approval rating has dropped to 20% and it will be a difficult task to regain popularity before the 2011 elections. A rapid economic recovery would make this task easier. Things to watch: • • • • Shape and speed of economic recovery Deteriorating fiscal situation Currency appreciation Political environment in face of public unrest Erwin Blaauw Country Risk Research Economic Research Department Rabobank Nederland P. O.
Box 17100, 3500 HG Utrecht, The Netherlands +31-(0)30-21-62648 E. R. [email protected] rabobank. nl Rabobank Economic Research Department Page: 1/8 Author: Contact details: November 2009 Country report PERU Peru National facts Type of government C apital Surface area (thousand sq km) Population (millions) Main languages Main religions constitutional republic Lima 1,285 28. 7 Spanish Quechua Roman C atholic (81. 3%) Evangelical (12. %) Foreign trade (2008) Head of State (president) Head of Government Monetary unit Economy (2008) Economic size Nominal GDP Nominal GDP at PPP Export value of goods and services IMF quotum (in mln SDR) Economic structure Real GDP growth Agriculture (% of GDP) Industry (% of GDP) Services (% of GDP) Standards of living Nominal GDP per head Nominal GDP per head at PPP Real GDP per head bn USD 127 246 35 638 2008 9. 8 8 27 53 USD 4385 8458 3518 % world total 0. 21 0. 36 0. 18 0. 29 5-year av. 6. 5 9 27 53 % world av. 45 76 44 Openness of the economy Export value of G&S (% of GDP) Import value of G&S (% of GDP) Inward FDI (% of GDP) 28 27 3. Alan Garcia Perez Alan Garcia Perez nuevo sol (PEN) Main export partners (%) US C hina C anada Japan Gold C opper Fishmeal Zinc Main import products (%) Intermediate goods C apital goods C onsumer goods 51 32 16 18 14 7 6 Main import partners (%) US C hina Brazil C hile 24 10 7 5 18 24 6 5 Social and governance indicators Human Development Index (rank) Ease of doing business (rank) Economic freedom index (rank) C orruption perceptions index (rank) Press freedom index (rank) Gini index (income distribution) Population below $1 per day (PPP) rank / total 79 / 179 62 / 183 57 / 179 72 / 180 108 / 173 49. 4. 2% Main export products (%) Source: EIU, CIA World Factbook, UN, Heritage Foundation, Transparency International, Reporters Without Borders, World Bank. Economic structure and growth With 28. 7 million inhabitants and nominal GDP of USD 127bn, Peru is classified as a lower-middle income country by the World Bank. However, Peru’s is near the upper band of this category. In the past 20 years, Peru has made significant steps up the development ladder. GDP per capita more than tripled, from USD 1,355 in 1990 to USD 4,385 today. In PPP terms, GDP per capita rose to USD 8,340 in 2009.
Agriculture provides 8% of GDP, industry 27% and the services sector the remaining 53% of GDP. At first glance it seems as if the agricultural sector is very efficient, as it employs only 0. 7% of the labor force according to official figures. However, large differences exist between the modern, large-scale agricultural production in the coastal areas and the small-scale, subsistence agricultural production in the mountain region. The driver of Peru’s economic success is its development-through-growth model with a special focus on foreign investment.
Investor friendly policies in combination with Peru’s vast amount of natural resources have led to rapid economic growth. Peru is endowed with many types of mineral resources of which gold, copper and zinc are the most important. Peruvian waters offer great fishing grounds and, as a result, fish and related products provide a significant part of exports. On the back of the commodity boom, annual GDP growth averaged a staggering 8. 8% in the past three years. Investment were the main engine of growth, grew strongly at an average of 26% a year.
However, higher incomes and easier access to credit made private consumption the second important growth engine. On average, consumption grew by nearly 8% annually. However, from the last quarter of 2008 onwards the growth outlook has changed drastically. The global economic crisis led to lower demand for the country’s mineral and agricultural commodities and to increased risk aversion among investors. As a result, growth will fall sharply to 1% in 2009. Most noticeable is a 17% contraction of fixed investment this year.
November 2009 Rabobank Economic Research Department Page: 2/8 Country report PERU Moreover, private consumption growth will slow to 2. 3%. Government consumption, on the other hand, will increase by 8. 7% on the back of anti-crisis spending, which will be sufficiently to keep GDP growth in the plus. As the world starts to recover from the crisis in 2010, investment, exports and consumption will recover slowly. Nonetheless, GDP growth will remain far below potential at 3%. Trade liberalization policies are opening up the economy but trade still amounts to a moderate 55% of GDP.
All of Peru’s main exports are commodities, which leaves the country vulnerable to international commodity price fluctuations. Historically, the US is Peru’s most important trade partner, supplying 24% of total imports and taking in 18% of total exports. In the past years, the importance of China as a trade partner has been strengthening at the cost of the position of the US. In 2008, China imported 14% of Peru’s exports and provided 10% of its imports. To open up the full potential of Peru’s mining and agricultural potential, investment in infrastructure are needed.
Progress in this field is hampered by the quality of institutions. Especially lower governments lack the knowledge to carry out large and long-term investment projects. Chart 1: Income level 16000 14000 12000 10000 8000 6000 4000 2000 0 1990 Peru Chart 2: Growth performance USD USD 16000 14000 12000 10000 8000 6000 4000 2000 0 12 8 4 % change p. a. % change p. a. 12 8 4 0 -4 -8 04 05 06 07 Private consumption External demand 0 -4 08 09e 10f 2000 2009 1990 (ppp) Brazil 2000 (ppp) 2009 (ppp) Chile Inventory changes Government consumption Gross fixed investment Overall economic growth Colombia Source: EIU
Source: EIU According the supervisory authority for the banking sector, the direct effect of the credit crunch on Peruvian banks has not been severe. Banks remain well capitalized and liquid. Provisions exceed non-performing loans in all credit segments. The challenge lies in achieving an orderly deepening of credit markets. At the moment, private sector credit amounts to only 24% of GDP, implying that there is ample room for growth. In the past years, credit growth was buoyant, growing with 28% in 2008. Part of this growth was supplied by new entrants to the market, such as microfinance institutions.
Dollarization of the banking system has been decreasing steadily during the past years and fell sharply in the first half of 2008. The level of dollarization is negatively related to the value of the neuvo sol and positively related to economic uncertainty. This implies that dollarization is primarily a strategy to preserve wealth and has no speculative reasons. Around 46% of the banking system is currently dollarized (see chart 6). Political and social situation Democratic rule in the Republic of Peru is becoming more and more established. Presidential and Congressional elections are held every 5 years.
A black page in Peru’s political history is the highly fraudulent 2000 elections, when incumbent Presidential candidate Alberto Fujimori tried to secure a controversial third term in office. Fujimori won the elections, but was quickly removed from power. New elections were held in April 2001, in which Fujimori’s main rival, Alejandro Toledo, was victorious. The 2006 elections primarily illustrated the country’s divided population. Independent, pro-business candidate Alan Garcia eventually won the elections in the second round, but only after a close run-off against nationalist candidate Ollanta Humala in the second round.
In some of the poorer departments in the South of Peru, where the majority of the population is indigenous, Humala managed to secure more than two-thirds of the votes. In Ayacucho and Apurimac (where the poverty rate is very high), his Union for Peru party obtained all of the available seats. The next elections will be held in April 2011 and its outcome will determine Peru’s development path. November 2009 Rabobank Economic Research Department Page: 3/8 Country report PERU Current President Garcia is ineligible to run. Therefore, Humala will be one of the main contenders.
Other prominent candidates are Keiko Fujimori, the daughter of former President Fujimori and Lourdes Flores, who came out third in the 2006 elections. The outcome will partly depend on just how well the current government copes with Peru’s main political challenge in the coming year and a half. Given the fact that Garcia’s approval rating is at a record low, Humala might have a good chance of winning. If that happens, the current successful economic policy framework is under serious threat to be replaced by leftist oriented policies such as seen in Venezuela and Ecuador today. Chart 3: Income distribution 00% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% 1990 1996 2000 2006 Income share held by lowest 20% Income share held by third 20% Income share held by highest 20% Income share held by second 20% Income share held by fourth 20% Chart 4: Poverty and income inequality 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% 60 % % 60 40 40 20 20 0 1990 1996 2000 2006 0 Peru, Poverty headcount ratio at $1. 25 a day (PPP) (% of population) Peru, GINI index, Index Source: World Bank Source: World Bank Humala’s popularity lies in the fact that the Peruvian population is strongly divided among geographical, economical and even ethnic lines.
The coastal areas of Peru are dominated by the mestizo and white ethnic groups. The mountain and the jungle regions in the south of Peru are dominated by the indigenous Amerindian population. Their income level is low and many live from subsistence agriculture. Education levels are low and healthcare is not available to all. The benefits of the Peru’s economic success during the past 20 years have clearly failed to trickle down to them. This is demonstrated by the fact that both poverty and income inequality are currently higher than they were in 1990.
Economic policies friendly to foreign companies are a particular cause for grief, as these companies often operate in the habitats of indigenous groups. This has led to severe public unrest and violent protests. In June this year, clashes between protestors and police resulted in tens of casualties on both sides. The problem is not new. In the past decade, the government has been taking steps to enhance the trickle-down effect of economic prosperity and reduce poverty. These policies have been successful, as the poverty rate had fallen to 4. % and income inequality, measured by the Gini-index is now below 50. However, much more needs to be done before the public frustration will ease. We can expect that the government will increase poverty reduction efforts and invest more in infrastructure. However, implementation is hampered by structural problems, such as the low quality of institutions. Therefore, the issue will remain pressing and public unrest is set to continue in the coming years. International relations remain focussed on enhancing trade and investment relations. Free-trade agreements play a prominent role.
FTA’s with the US and China, Peru’s main trade partners, are in place and negotiations with many other countries, such as the EU and Mexico are underway. In 2010, Russia, India and Australia will also be approached. Relations with Peru’s neighbours are generally good, although there are some minor grievances with Bolivia and Chile regarding territory issues. Economic policy Economic reforms carried out since the 1990’s have benefited the Peruvian economy. From 2001 onwards the policy framework has been counter-cyclical, prudent and is becoming more and more transparent.
Under President Garcia the prospects for economic stability improved further, as he gave his economic advisors a carte-blanche with respect to the design of the economic policy November 2009 Rabobank Economic Research Department Page: 4/8 Country report PERU framework. He had only one demand. Keeping inflation low would be the main priority, as Garcia did not want to relive his previous term in office (1985-1990) when Peru experienced hyperinflation. Overall, economic policies are aimed at improving the business climate to stimulate private investment, thereby reducing poverty as the economy grows.
During the period of high commodity prices, which ended in 4Q2008, Peru saved part of the windfall revenues in its Fiscal Stabilization Fund (FSF). In 2008, the fund had accumulated around USD 3. 3bn. As a result, the government is now able to spend on anti-crisis measures. Government spending will increase by nearly 9% this year and continue to grow by around 7% in 2010. At the same time, revenues will fall by 14% in 2009 due to the growth slowdown. As a result, the budget balance shall deteriorate sharply from a 2. 2% of GDP surplus in 2008 to a 3. 4% of GDP deficit in 2009. Revenues will pick up in 2010.
Consequently, the budget deficit will narrow to around 1. 3% of GDP in 2010. Because a large part of the stimulus burden is carried by the FSF, public debt will increase only slightly by USD 3bn to a total of USD 33bn in 2009. However, by end-2009 the FSF will be all but depleted. Therefore, if the recovery does not take hold next year, public debt is set to increase more rapidly. Chart 5: Public finances % of GDP % of GDP Chart 6: Dollarization 4 50 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 04 % % 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 25 2 0 0 -25 -2 -50 04 05 06 07 08 09e 10f Public debt (l) Budget balance (r ) -4 05 06 07 08 09 10 Dollarisation of banking system
Source: EIU Source: Reuters EcoWin Implementation of planned capital expenditures by lower governments is problematic. This affects not only the anti-crisis spending, but hampers Peru’s economic development in general. The problem is that the quality and expertise of the lower level governments is simply too low. Given the substantially higher wages in the private sector, the majority of skilled Peruvians choose to work in the private sector rather than for the government. The quality of investment plans is therefore often insufficient and, as a result, many plans are not approved by the central investment authority.
The ramifications are immense. Around 50% of the taxes from companies that exploit natural resources are transferred to local governments. These transfers can only be spent on investment projects. This means that 70% of total potential capital expenditures in Peru are in the hands of local governments. The lack of quality therefore costs the Peruvian economy dearly. Monetary policies are transparent and aimed at containing inflation. During most of 2008, inflation was running too high for comfort, averaging 5. 8%. However, in 2009 inflationary pressures started to abate rapidly.
This allowed the Central Reserve Bank of Peru to lower the policy interest rate from its peak of 6. 5% in December 2008 to 1. 25% today. As inflation will average 3. 2% in 2009, the negative real interest rate should provide a welcome boost to the economy. In the second half of the year, however, inflation will undershoot the Central Bank’s target of 2% (±1%). This signals a further decrease of inflation to an estimated 2. 3% in 2010. However, the Central Bank has announced multiple times that a further easing of monetary policies is not likely. Lending practices by banks have become conservative in the past year.
While growing nearly 29% in 2008, yearly domestic credit growth will fall to a mere 0. 5% in 2009 and recover slightly to 8% in 2010. The exchange rate floats freely, but the Central Bank intervenes from time to time. Recently, the Central Bank directly intervened in FX-markets in order to halt the appreciation of the nuevo sol November 2009 Rabobank Economic Research Department Page: 5/8 Country report PERU (PEN). The currency appreciated to around 2. 9 PEN/USD on the back of stronger exports. We expect the PEN to stabilize around 3. 1 PEN/USD in the next year.
Chart 7: Inflation and interest rate 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 03 04 05 Policy interest rate Chart 8: Exchange rate 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 points points 3. 5 3. 3 3. 1 2. 9 2. 7 2. 5 04 05 06 07 08 09 nuevo sol per US dollar 3. 5 3. 3 3. 1 2. 9 2. 7 2. 5 06 07 08 Inflation 09 Source: Reuters EcoWin Source: Reuters EcoWin A number of structural reforms are needed. The tax system needs improvement, especially on the field of tax collection. Tax evasion outside of Lima is high, as indicated by the fact that VAT tax collection amount to 6% of GDP. The official rate, however, is 19%.
Also, the cost of doing business should be further brought down by reducing the regulatory burden. Improvements have been made by the general government, but due to policies of lower governments the burden remains too high. Moreover, the legal system, although fair, is in need of reform, as cases often take a long time to be resolved. Improving Peru’s institutional quality is perhaps the most pressing need. This would speed up all other reform processes, but is likely to take years to accomplish. Balance of Payments By end-2008, the current account balance shifted into the red on the back of a deterioration of the trade balance.
Due to a sharp fall in demand for commodities worldwide since the last quarter of 2008, the volumes and prices of Peru’s commodity exports plummeted. Annual export growth figures were therefore subdued by the poor performance of the last quarter. Peru’s main imports are intermediate, capital and consumer goods. As economic activity remained strong in 2008, imports increased steeply last year. As the surplus on the trade balance narrowed from 7. 7% of GDP in 2007 to 2. 4% of GDP in 2008, the current account registered a-3. 3% deficit last year. In 2009, exports will continue to perform poorly.
However, the weaker economic activity will drive a decline of imports. As a result, the trade balance will remain steady in 2009 and show a surplus of 2. 2% of GDP. The current account deficit, however, will narrow to 0. 6% of GDP. The improvement is almost entirely due to the 50% decrease of the deficit on the income account, as profit repatriation and returns on local assets declined on the back of the economic slowdown. Foreign investment (FDI) is holding up better than expected in 2009. In spite of the global turndown, FDI inflows will fall only slightly from USD 4bn to USD 3. bn. Chart 9: Current account 16 12 8 4 0 -4 -8 -12 04 Transfers Chart 10: Financing requirement % of GDP % of GDP 16 12 8 4 0 -4 -8 -12 bn USD bn USD 20 15 10 5 0 -5 -10 04 05 06 MLT-repayments due 20 15 10 5 0 -5 -10 07 08 Current account 05 Income 06 07 Services 08 Trade 09e 10f Current account 09e 10f Short-term debt Financing requirement November 2009 Rabobank Economic Research Department Page: 6/8 Country report PERU Source: EIU Source: EIU In the coming years, FDI inflows will steadily increase again, as the local and global economic situation improves.
Portfolio inflows, however, will plummet to USD 273m in 2009, down from nearly USD 2. 1bn in 2008. Although a slight recovery of portfolio inflows will also take place in the coming years, its level will remain substantially below the 2007/2008 peak levels. In addition, the normal net debt inflow will be replaced by a net outflow of debt in 2009. This will further weaken the capital account in 2009. External position Following years of strong economic performance, prudent economic policies and strong export performance, the external position of Peru is sound. Total foreign debt amounts to only USD 30bn, equal to 23% of GDP.
By end-2009, 10% of the total debt will consist out of short-term debt and about 80% of the medium-and long-term debt is in the hands of the public sector. Short-term debt will fall by 50% this year as a result of a weakening economy and particularly the slowdown in trade. Commercial bank loans will show a sharp decrease, falling by around USD 4bn to USD 950m. The financing requirement will fall from its record high of more than USD 15bn in 2008 to USD11bn in 2009. In 2010, a further decrease to around USD 9bn is anticipated, as the record high level of short-term debt taken on in 2008 is paid off.
This implies that the debt-service ratio will fall to 22% of external revenues in 2010, against 38% this year. Chart 11: Foreign debt bn USD bn USD Chart 12: External liquidity 40 40 16 14 months % 1000 800 600 400 200 0 30 30 12 10 20 20 8 6 10 10 4 2 0 04 Public MLT 0 05 06 Private MLT 0 04 05 Import cover (l) Debt service cover (r ) 07 08 IMF debt 09e 10f 06 07 08 09e 10f Short-term debt Short-term debt cover (r) Total foreign debt cover (r) Source: EIU Source: EIU, Rabobank The liquidity position of Peru is very strong. In the past years, Peru has accumulated around USD 30bn of reserves.
In 2009, due to the deterioration of the balance of payments, FX-reserves will decline by USD 1. 5bn. This will not present a problem, as Peru will still have USD 28bn of reserves left. In 2009, due to lower imports, the FX-reserves will cover 17 months of imports. Moreover, the FX-reserves cover 95% of the total foreign debt this year and will cover more than 100% of the foreign debt in 2010. It is therefore no surprise that Peru’s liquidity ratio is very strong at 146%. November 2009 Rabobank Economic Research Department Page: 7/8 Country report PERU Peru
Selection of economic indicators Key country risk indicators GDP (% real change pa) C onsumer prices (average % change pa) C urrent account balance (% of GDP) Total foreign exchange reserves (mln USD) Economic growth GDP (% real change pa) Gross fixed investment (% real change) Private consumption (% real change) Government consumption (% real change) Exports of G&S (% real change) Imports of G&S (% real change) Economic policy Budget balance (% of GDP) Public debt (% of GDP) Money market interest rate (%) M2 growth (% change pa) C onsumer prices (average % change pa) Exchange rate LC U to USD (average) Recorded unemployment (%) Balance of payments (mln USD) C urrent account balance Trade balance Export value of goods and services Import value of goods and services Services balance Income balance Transfer balance Net direct investment flows Net portfolio investment flows Net debt flows Other capital flows (negative is flight) C hange in international reserves External position (mln USD) Total foreign debt Short-term debt Total debt service due, incl. short-term debt Total foreign exchange reserves International investment position Total assets Total liabilities Trade balance (% of GDP) C urrent account balance (% of GDP) Inward FDI (% of GDP) Foreign debt (% of GDP) Foreign debt (% of XGSIT) International investment position (% of GDP) Debt service ratio (% of XGSIT) Interest service ratio incl. rrears (% of XGSIT) FX-reserves import cover (months) FX-reserves debt service cover (%) Liquidity ratio 31559 2769 5366 12176 -27278 21204 48483 4. 3 0. 0 2. 3 45 190 -39. 1 32 9 14. 9 227 146 28933 3208 6277 13599 -26288 24962 51250 6. 6 1. 4 3. 2 36 131 -33. 1 28 8 13. 5 217 145 28460 3011 7020 16733 -24816 31977 56794 9. 7 3. 1 3. 8 31 96 -26. 9 24 6 13. 5 238 150 32154 5806 10314 26857 -29762 46626 76388 7. 7 1. 1 5. 0 30 92 -27. 7 29 6 16. 4 260 152 33854 6477 12168 30272 -30083 46056 76138 2. 4 -3. 3 3. 2 27 85 -23. 6 31 3 12. 8 249 132 2. 2 -0. 6 3. 0 23 100 n. a. 38 3 17. 0 254 146 30040 3310 11340 28770 n. a. n. a. n. a. 2. 2 -1. 7 3. 2 23 90 n. a. 22 2 16. 415 154 30400 3610 7380 30670 n. a. n. a. n. a. 19 3004 12809 9805 -732 -3686 1433 1600 -423 1601 -371 2426 1122 5260 17336 12076 -834 -5076 1772 2580 74 1471 -3736 1510 2854 8986 23830 14844 -737 -7580 2185 3467 -1746 -611 -701 3264 1220 8287 27882 19595 -1187 -8374 2494 5343 2432 4935 -3585 10345 -4180 3091 31529 28439 -1929 -8144 2803 4079 3036 1235 -701 3470 -820 2770 23070 20300 -1600 -4520 2520 3790 70 -3920 -630 -1500 -2320 2920 25730 22810 -1680 -6190 2630 4250 100 300 -420 1900 -1. 0 44 3. 8 3 3. 7 3. 4 8. 8 -0. 3 38 4. 0 17 1. 6 3. 3 7. 6 2. 1 33 5. 3 12 2. 0 3. 3 7. 5 3. 2 30 5. 8 23 1. 8 3. 1 6. 9 2. 2 24 7. 3 23 5. 8 2. 9 8. 1 -3. 26 1. 3 12 3. 2 3. 1 9. 0 -1. 3 26 1. 3 10 2. 3 3. 1 8. 7 5. 0 4. 5 3. 6 4. 1 15. 2 9. 6 6. 8 8. 9 4. 6 9. 1 15. 2 10. 9 7. 7 26. 5 6. 4 7. 6 0. 8 13. 1 8. 9 26. 1 8. 3 4. 5 6. 2 21. 3 9. 8 25. 9 8. 7 1. 8 8. 2 19. 9 1. 0 -16. 9 2. 3 8. 7 0. 4 -15. 6 3. 0 2. 2 2. 7 7. 2 3. 2 4. 1 5. 0 3. 7 0. 0 12176 6. 8 1. 6 1. 4 13599 7. 7 2. 0 3. 1 16733 8. 9 1. 8 1. 1 26857 9. 8 5. 8 -3. 3 30272 1. 0 3. 2 -0. 6 28770 3. 0 2. 3 -1. 7 30670 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009e 2010f Key ratios for balance of payments, external solvency and external liquidity Source: EIU Disclaimer This document is issued by Cooperatieve Centrale Raiffeisen-Boerenleenbank B. A. ncorporated in the Netherlands, trading as Rabobank Nederland, and regulated by the FSA. The information and opinions contained herein have been compiled or arrived at from sources believed to be reliable, but no representation or warranty, express or implied, is made as to their accuracy or completeness. It is for information purposes only and should not be construed as an offer for sale or subscription of, or solicitation of an offer to buy or subscribe for any securities or derivatives. The information contained herein is not to be relied upon as authoritative or taken in substitution for the exercise of judgement by any recipient. All opinions expressed herein are subject to change without notice.
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Cite this Country Report PERU Pestle
Country Report PERU Pestle. (2018, Jul 17). Retrieved from https://graduateway.com/country-report-peru-pestle/