How will Global Warming affect the hair care industry?
Today, global warming is an undeniable fact, which proves that our planet and its climate are in trouble. Global warming affects all areas of our life: politics, economics and a social sphere. As emissions and global temperatures increased the predictions of scientists worsen. Severe weather points to global warming caused by human activities around the world. Industry is one of the main sources of environmental pollution and global warming today. Hair care industry represents a large market with “global sales amounting to US$42.4 billion” (Briney 67). Thesis Politicians and law makers suggest that strict regulations and quality standards, applied to hair care industry and market, is the most effective solution to global warming and environmental pollution.
The importance to apply strict regulations and norms to hair care industry is explained by the fact that it becomes one of the main industries which dump carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide and many others pollutants. According to research results (Houghton 2004) during the last 200 years, there is a significant climate change caused by high level of Carbon Dioxide dumped into the air. “Human induced” theory shows that human activities have a profound impact on greenhouse effect and the level of CO2. Carbon dioxide is big hitter, but there are another four that are also of real concern globally, and which politicians have specified as in need of control. Some greenhouse gases are much better at trapping the heat radiated from the Earth than others. The most famous, carbon dioxide is not actually the best heat-catcher but is present at higher concentrations than the others and so plays a bigger role in global warming. Green house effect is the direct result of burning fossil fuels, agriculture and land clearing. The major greenhouse gases are carbon dioxide, methane (CH4), the halocarbons (CFCs) and nitrous oxide, which causes the destruction of the rainforests. Most air pollution results from combustion (burning) processes. The burning of gasoline to power motor hides and the burning of coal to heat buildings and help manufacture products are examples of such processes (Fired Up with Ideas, 2002).. Each time a fuel is burned in a combustion process, some type of pollutant is released into the air, and ruin ozone layer, which protects the Earth from radiation.
Strict regulations are crucial for hair care industry because the balance of emission and absorption of a gas determines the concentration in the atmosphere, i.e. how much is added relative to that which is taken away. A sink is a reservoir which absorbs a gas released elsewhere in its cycle. A source is the pool from which a gas is released to another part of its cycle. The subsections which follow discuss in turn the sources and sinks of CO2, N2 O, CFCs, CH4 and O3, while their growth potential is the topic of the next section. Carbon dioxide has formed the central concern in the discussion of atmospheric pollution related to climatic change since at least the 1950s (Michaels 47).
While CO2 remains the most important single gas expected to cause increases in global temperature several other gases have been recognized as substantial sources of climate forcing (Michaels 2005). In hair care industry, care must be taken to avoid confusion due to the practice of comparing the role of different GHGs by converting their concentration, accounting for different radiative properties and residence times, into the equivalent amount of CO2 ; this is referred to as the ‘equivalent CO2 concentration’. As will be pointed out, the tendency to regard CO2 as the only gas of concern has lead to incorrect conclusions in economic assessments. Background information is required on a host of gas species in order to understand the potential for anthropogenic impacts on global climate. Cumulative climatic effects of other GHGs are likely to be of comparable magnitude to that of CO2 (Dowd, 1985:767). Figure 2.1a shows warming due to the enhanced Greenhouse Effect during the 1970s for CO2, CFCs, CH4 and N2 O; the latter three are attributed with 35 per cent of the enhanced warming for that period. The IPCC estimated that GHGs excluding CO2 accounted for 45 per cent of radiative forcing over the period 1980-90 (Michaels 98). In calculating these estimates ozone was excluded due to a lack of observational data. The IPCC’s figures for percentage contribution of various gases in the 1980s show a similar pattern to those for the 1970s warming, as can be seen by comparing figure 2.1a with 2.1b. However, the growing importance of a range of CFCs is also evident. CFC releases to date are expected to decrease total stratospheric ozone by several per cent. The resulting decreased absorption of radiation by stratospheric ozone tends to cool the stratosphere, reducing the infrared radiation emitted towards the earth, cooling the troposphere and ground (Avery 2007). The IPCC 1994 report estimated a dominant cooling from loss of ozone over the preceding 15-20 years (Avery58). However, estimating the radiative forcing due to ozone changes is more complex than for other GHGs due to its dependence upon the vertical distribution, which is difficult to estimate and measure.
The theory of “human induced” vividly portrays that hair care industry has a direct impact on global warming (Avery 79). Except air pollution, hair care industrial solid pollutants come into the water and resulted in acid rain which has become an increasingly serious problem caused severe weather. This pollutant forms when moisture in the air combines with nitrogen oxide and sulfur dioxide released by automobiles, by factories, and by power plants that burn coal or oil (Michaels 39). The reaction between the moisture and the chemical compounds produces nitric and sulfuric acids. It also reduces the amount of oxygen that water can hold.
Besides strict regulations, hair care industry should introduce monitoring and control practices which help to reduce pollution and dumping of pollutants into an atmosphere. In most environmental agreements, monitoring begins with data in reports that are submitted by the parties themselves. On-site inspection is rare; independent data that might be needed to verify compliance are seldom sought or used. Some exceptions exist, as in several international wildlife agreements that often make use of independent data (e.g., supplied by NGOs). For example, the independently managed system for European chemical industry under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species— one of the most successful international programs for monitoring compliance with an environmental treaty—is able to identify a small (but growing) fraction of the total number of suspected violations. Filling data gaps “requires either pleading with governments or well-developed networks of nongovernmental organizations that, typically with out legal powers, are able to infiltrate illegal trade activities and gather the needed data” (Houghton 86)
The experience with data reporting under the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer has been largely successful because data are easy to gather and report and developing countries receive compensation for the full cost of data reporting programs; nonetheless, there have been several cases of suspicious data and the international institutions are largely powerless to prosecute them. In none of the multilateral environmental agreements has self-reporting, by itself, resulted in accurate databases of the sort that most experts think will be necessary for a properly functioning emission trading market (Houghton 83). For comparison, the U.S. sulfur dioxide trading program includes a system of continuous emission monitors that provide emissions data that is accurate within a few percent, and government regulators have powerful inspection rights if they need additional information.
Monitoring would not be a severe problem if an emission trading system were restricted to carbon dioxide emitted from fossil fuels. Nearly all fossil fuels are traded in commercial markets and thus in most countries there are multiple, independent data sources already available. The quantity of carbon dioxide emitted during the combustion of fossil fuels is the direct consequence of the well-known quantity of carbon in the fuels themselves; emission factors have been studied intensively and are well known. Different data sets produce consistent emission estimates (Anti-Pollution Hair Care Claims 102). Not only would a system that includes only carbon dioxide from fossil fuels be easy to monitor, it would also be quite effective: that source has been responsible for 70% of the global warming since pre-industrial times and is expected to account for a similar fraction in the future (Michaels 19). Some on-site inspection would still be needed, especially in countries that have poor fossil fuel accounting systems and that consume large quantities of their own fossil fuel production internally (e.g., Russia). Creating such an inspection system would be difficult but probably not impossible.
The Kyoto Protocol restricts emissions of five other greenhouse gases. In addition, it also includes carbon dioxide fluxes that result from changes in land use, for example, growing trees absorb carbon dioxide (half the mass of wood is carbon), and countries can earn a credit for such “sinks.” The logic for a this approach is impeccable: set environmental goals like slowing global warming in the most encompassing terms possible, and “give market actors the flexibility to choose among as many strategies as possible for meeting them” (Michaels 83). The logic, however, ignores reality: expanding the trading system beyond carbon dioxide emitted from fossil fuels hugely complicates the problem of monitoring. Take the case of methane. Measured worldwide, the major anthropogenic sources of methane are uncertain by 20% to 150%. Atmospheric measurements can be used to determine the total net source of methane quite accurately. But accurately determining the different sources—rice paddies, fossil fuel production, cow belching, etc—is more difficult. Moreover, what matters most for determining compliance with international legal agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol are national emissions because commitments are set nation by nation. Yet measurement at fine levels of geographical resolution often raises uncertainty. Ground-level programs, such as sampling at individual coal mines or rice paddies, can help determine the relative magnitude of sources, but sampling is imperfect and emissions often depend heavily on local conditions that cannot be easily and systematically measured worldwide or nationwide (Gelbspan 82).
The ability to monitor hair care industry may actually worsen in the future because the most cost-effective ways to control some emissions will be extremely difficult to monitor. Methane emitted from rice paddies, for example, ‘can be cut by over half with simple changes in the type and timing of fertilizer application” (Horner 198). Simply draining irrigated fields once at midseason can cut emissions by 50%; studies in the United States suggest that multiple well-timed drainings can cut emissions by nearly 90%. These are subtle behavioral changes, for which it is easy to claim credit but difficult for outsiders to verify. Unlike emission of carbon dioxide from fossil fuels—where there is an easily measured proxy (quantity of a particular fossil fuel sold) and easily measured emission factors—for most fluxes of methane and nitrous oxide there is no easily measured proxy for emissions and emission factors vary widely In principle, including methane and nitrous oxide in a trading system would be valuable—together, these two gases account for about one-quarter of human-caused global warming. But including them comes at high cost to the integrity of a trading system (Ruddiman, 48).
Studies have shown that hair care firms falsify data and attempt to cheat when international commitments require behavioral changes that are costly and difficult to verify (Horner 198). For example, international rules to regulate discharges of oil from tankers simply barred high discharges and relied on tanker captains’ logs for monitoring; they failed because there was no way to verify compliance and the captains rarely incriminated themselves. Far more effective were rules requiring tanker owners and manufacturers to install particular equipment to limit oily discharges. The equipment rules succeeded by ensuring that required changes were easy to verify, difficult to reverse, and needed to take place only once
Within hair care industry, self-interested rule making is inevitable. Every regulatory system requires technical decisions that affect interests, inevitably. Those decisions can become politicized. It is especially worrisome, however, that the first efforts to develop technical rules and procedures for monitoring are taking place just at the time when the existence of the Kyoto Protocol makes countries both aware of the huge sums at stake and especially keen to twist rules to their own advantage. Perhaps industry NGOs will have a stronger interest in enforcing compliance with an emission permit system. If enforcement is poor, the value of their property rights will degrade (Anti-Pollution Hair Care Claims 104). However, each permit holder, individually, would be harmed only a small amount by any particular instance of noncompliance. One could imagine that permit-holders’ associations would emerge to overcome this problem of collective action—just as firms often create collective lobbies to advance their interests. But many potential members of such a lobby will be wary of strong, intrusive enforcement and reluctant to join—in general, permit holders will also be emitters and therefore could benefit from poor enforcement. The main problem, however, is collective action. A truly global permit market would diffuse the benefits of enforcement (Houghton 34-36).
Even if environmental groups and permit holders could somehow realize their collective interest in enforcing the permit system it is unclear what they could achieve. Some of the data that they would need to prosecute violations—such as emission estimates—are internal to countries and firms and could be difficult to obtain and challenge (Horner 109). In many countries, hair care industry regulations are weak or corrupt and thus there is no way to impose enforcement actions on deviant emitters (Horner 1980. The country in that situation— which may include most nations on earth—could find that its private actors have collectively violated the country’s international obligations by emitting more than the country’s permit holdings; yet the government could find it difficult to hold any emitter individually responsible and impossible to bring the country as a whole back into compliance. Governments could help the enforcement process by creating institutions that could scrutinize a country’s “internal” policies and create accurate data sets on behavior. But the countries that are least likely to accept international jurisdiction are those whose behavior is most likely to require international intrusion—“so-called “illiberal” countries that have the least transparent, weakest, and most corrupt governance systems” (Horner 109).
If pollution problems are to be seriously tackled then economic activity will need to change fundamentally. That is, countries striving for industrial development will need to avoid the five times world average levels of per capita energy consumption found in North America, or even the two-and-a-half average European levels, which means de-coupling energy from economic growth (Horner 27). In terms of positively changing patterns of energy consumption the turnover in capital stock provides a serious constraint and the incentive for ‘business as usual’.
Advocates also suggest that seller liability could increase buyer confidence and lead to a less fragmented and more active and efficient market. Having bought from a homogenous world pool of permits, the new permit owner need not worry that his permit could become suddenly worthless if the particular country of origin did not actually implement the emission controls that yielded the permit issued by the originating country. Seller liability will fail because it is a fiction in international law. The problem with international law is precisely that it cannot efficiently and reliably impose any significant liability on sellers that are most likely to default. Most sellers are likely to be countries where national legal institutions are weakest—they are least likely, on their own, to enforce the integrity of the permit system and most likely to arouse suspicion of cheating (Houghton 84). If seller liability is the rule then the game for every devious country will be to stretch the law as far as possible. That stretching point is likely to be quite far because the penalties that can be imposed under international law are cumbersome to apply. Indeed, seller liability encourages sellers to overshoot as wildly as possible— to earn as much as feasible before withdrawal or sanction. Architects of a trading system might try to offset this problem by creating onerous review procedures to approve a country’s issuance and sale of permits, but that approach only partially solves the problem and introduces regulatory uncertainty and other transaction costs that, as in the CDM, will undermine the incentives to trade. Seller liability eliminates one of the few penalties that is available under international law: expulsion from a treaty. Ejecting a party once it has sold its permits has no effect on the party that has already sold its heritage, and it would merely worsen the twin problems of leakage and permit inflation. Having sold and squandered its earlier allocation, the disgraced country would demand a new supply of permits as compensation to re-enter the system (Environmental Enemy 67).
The most strategic nations probably would cycle inside to outside, inflating the world’s permit supply and skimming the surplus as they exit. Thus the chief attraction of seller liability—that a purchaser need not worry about the origin of permits once it has bought them—could easily yield a trading system that unravels quickly when pulled at an open margin. Because seller liability is a weak incentive for compliance, it would accelerate the need to merge regulations on Greenhouse gases with other powerful international institutions—namely, the GATT/WTO trade regime—to deter bogus sellers from defection. That merger is inevitable but will not be easy to arrange. But that problem is neither novel nor avoidable. Markets for government bonds price country risks every day (Houghton 72). And country risk is an important discipline because it dampens the inflationary incentives to oversell and withdraw that could appear in a hair care seller liability system. With hair care buyer liability, governments nearing default on their emission permit stocks would earn lower prices than those where management has been more prudent. Buyer liability enforces compliance through rule-based markets, whereas seller liability requires weak and politicized international institutions to identify and penalize sellers that have not complied
The precise impacts of global warming are often hard to predict because the world’s climate system is so complicated. One effect may cause another, resulting in a cascade of problems. Hair care industry has such inventory programs in place or under advanced development to decrease level of emissions and pollutants. Many studies and numerous real-world projects show that strict regulations in hair care industry is one of the cheapest ways to manage atmospheric carbon and global warming. The problem is that at the national level of resolution, which is what matters for commitments under international legal agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol, many countries are unable to monitor all industries. That a major threat to human activity can be so easily put to one side raises several questions over the conduct of research and the role of scientific information.
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