In Defense Of Instinct Essay
& # 8211 ; Hobbesian Egoism Essay, Research Paper
In Defense of Instinct & # 8211 ; Hobbesian egoism1. What is Hobbesian egoism? First, allow me explicate what I mean by Hobbesianegoism. Egoism is of class the position that the onlything we ought to make is function our ain opportunism. Hobbesian indicates _what is regarded to be in ourinterests_ : physical endurance, stuff amenitiess, abundant sexual satisfaction, etc. Hobbesian egoismmay be productively contrasted with the egoism ofAristotle or Rand, which hold that what constitutesour opportunism is much richer and deeper. Rand implicitly contrasts her position with that of Hobbeswhen she writes that It [ the endurance of adult male qua adult male ] does non intend a _momentary_ or simply _physical_survival of a mindless beast, waiting for another bruteto crush his skull. It does non intend the momentaryphysical endurance of a creeping sum of muscleswho is willing to accept any footings, obey any thug andsurrender any values, for the interest of what is knownas endurance at any monetary value, which may or may non last aweek or a twelvemonth. Man s survival qua adult male means theterms, methods, conditions and ends required for thesurvival of a rational being through the whole of hislifespan & # 8212 ; in all of those facets of being whichare unfastened to his pick. Partially, Rand is saying thatwe should look to our _long-term_ instead than our_short-term_ involvement ( which the Hobbesian egoistwould non needfully differ with ) , but partially she isstating that e.g. merely a rational, purposeful, anddignified being can _constitute_ our opportunism. What practical difference does this differentiation do? For one, the Hobbesian egotist would remorselesslykill or enslave another individual if the hazards were lowand the addition were big. For the Randian egotist, nevertheless, this predatory life style would conflict withour involvement in being productive, independent, andjust persons. The Hobbesian egotist, likewise, would merrily steal if the addition were big and thepunishment were little ; but the Randian egotist wouldrefrain. 2. The PuzzleThe behaviour counselled by Hobbesian egoism iswidely condemned by most historical moral codifications. The mystifier that I see is that it is neverthelessextremely common. Belief in Christian moralss couldexplain why Christians would seek to slay Muslims oratheists ; but how Christian moralss would justifyenslaving or enserfing other Christians is hard tosee. And yet, throughout the full period ofChristian laterality in Western civilization, bondage andserfdom and wars of conquest upon chap Christianswere highly common. Of class some civilizations moral codifications endorsedslavery and wars upon aliens. The mystifier, as Isee it, is that this sort of behaviour has been extremelycommon in about _all_ historical societies, irrespective of their proclaimed moral positions. Therefore, while Marxist theory could easy warrant murderingmillions of people with a businessperson background, it isunclear how Marxist theory would warrant comfortablelifestyles, limosines, and caviar for the opinion elite. And yet, every Marxist absolutism that I ve everheard of fleetly developed the latter. Primitivedespotisms of China or Egypt justified the swayer s lifeof comfort and luxury by reasoning that the swayer wasdivine ; but comfort and luxury for swayers seemscommon in societies with proclaimed egalitarianvalues. Why is people s behavior so similar whentheir witting strong beliefs vary so widely? Why, inshort, is selfless moral theory about alwaysaccompanied by lip service? My reply is merely that we have an inherent aptitude, aninnate sensitivity, towards Hobbesian behaviour. Why do I think that it is unconditioned? ( 1 ) Hobbesian behaviour is common in human beingsin all societies and times. To turn out this would take agreat trade of work ; a good start is _The ColumbiaHistory of the World_ , which inside informations mankind s sordidhistory of utilizing one another as animals of burdenwhenever it was convenient. ( 2 ) Hobbesian behaviour is common regardless of asociety s cultural background. Crude Mongols moral values likely did non deter them fromkilling and enslaving Christians ; but Christians moralvalues likely did deter them from making so. And yet, both of them did it, and it is barely clear thatChristians did so less thirstily than anyone else. ( 3 ) Most significantly, there is our evolutionarybackground. Animals which don t attempt to last tendto decease off, go forthing no progeny. Animals which do tryto last tend to populate longer and go forth moreoffspring. Every other carnal species seems to havedeveloped this self-interested inherent aptitude highly good ; and certainly with animate beings at least, their behavior isinstinctive. Why should this inherent aptitude, this innatepredisposition, be any weaker in human existences? This is particularly clear when we note that the primaryexception to pure self-interested behaviour is the carethat animate beings and worlds give to their blood relations ; and it is exactly this exclusion that evolutionarytheory would foretell. ( See Dawkins _The SelfishGene_ . ) 3. Answering Eyala. Eyal references that if my position were true, thenprimitive societies would concentrate _more_ onsurvival ( and their blood-related s endurance ) than modernWestern people do. And so, I think this is so: crude people worked far harder to last ( often16 hours per twenty-four hours, I ve read ) than we do, and spent
much less clip on leisure. Possibly they worked sohard because they had to merely to last ; but that ishardly grounds that they were less concerned abouttheir endurance than tungsten
e are. But I can make my point much more clearly. Whowould find it more difficult to murder a stranger for apound of gold or enslave someone if it were legal orrape a defenseless woman? A primitive tribesman, ora member of modern Western culture? The maindifference is that the tribesman does sounreflectively, while if the modern does it he violateshis announced moral views. b. Eyal argues that if people were really interested intheir self-interest, then they would not have riskedtheir lives to enslave and kill other people. Well,frequently the risks were very low and the gain wasvery great. The Spanish conquered one-and-a-halfcontinents and got a lot of gold and slaves at verylittle risk to themselves. Similarly, most slave-holdersthroughout history had about as little to fear fromslave revolts as we do from auto accidents. Eyal is right that some kinds of wars are high risk, lowgain (for most of the participants). Holy wars,proletarian revolutions, and wars of nationalliberation seem to qualify. But I think that theseresult from people s _conscious convictions_ ratherthan any Hobbesian instincts. Wars with abstract (ifirrational) motivations like these are a fairly latedevelopment in human history. Incidentally, one can interestingly see mankind scultural development from instinct to acquiredconviction in the Bible. The early books appeal to thematerial rewards and many offspring that Jehovah willgive to the Jews if they obey Him; we have to wait forthe later books to see any attempt to motivate theJews out of love of God or justice. c. Eyal argues that almost all historical societies,from the primitive to the Christian, have held someversion of altruistic morality. Well, I just have todisagree. Did pre-Christian barbarians or Mongolhordes loot and enslave weaker peoples out of moralconviction? Or did they just see a chance to livecomfortably at other people s expense? Do muggersmug out of a belief in altruism, or because they wantto get easy money and don t care about the rights ofothers?Moreover, while Rand is perfectly correct thataltruistic morality _sometimes_ justifies murdering alot of people (e.g. Christians should go murderMuslims, or Bolsheviks should murder the kulaks), it_sometimes_ would seem to require _not_ murderingother people. While Christianity might justify Vlad theImpaler s war against the Muslim Turks, it is hard tosee how it justifies killing fellow Christians to get moregold from them. Why then, I wonder, haven tsocieties with an altruistic cultural background livedup to their avowed precepts in _both_ respects?d. Eyal reminds me that Rand thought that ouremotions are either determined by our consciousconvictions (if we choose to think), or by default bycultural osmosis (if we don t choose to think). This isa perfectly fair description of her view; and it _does_seem to deny that human beings have any instincts inthe sense of _innate desires and emotionalresponses_. However, I agree completely with Eyal s point thatimmoral behavior is rooted in the volitional avoidanceof the effort of thinking. But what I am saying is thatin additional to the need to question what our_culture_ tells us, we must also question what our_instincts_ tell us. Admitting that we have instinctsno more commits us to genetic determinism thanadmitting that we have a culture commits us tocultural determinism. 4. Commenting on Brian SchwartzI think you would enjoy Dawkins _The Selfish Gene_,which sheds light on both of your questions. I woulddoubt that there is any strong tendency towardspromoting the interests of our race, simply becausethe odds that a person shares a significant number ofour genes in virtue of sharing our race is very, verylow. Wolves that seek the interest of wolf-kind ratherthan the interests of closely related wolves will tendto have few offspring and die off. I would say thesame for people. The danger is that abstract ideologies will takeadvantage of familial instincts and turn them tohorrible ends. Nationalist and racist movementssuggest that ideologies that try to build upon ourinstincts can be very successful. Probably becausethe leap to family loyalty to national loyalty is (asRand pointed out) a sufficiently simple ideology thateven very stupid people can understand it. 5. To Mike HardyYou are quite right that for most philosophers, _tabularasa_ refers to no innate _knowledge_. However, Ithink that Rand used the concept more expansively. Indeed, in The Objectivist Ethics Rand writes that: Man is born with an emotional mechanism, just as heis born with a cognitive mechanism; but at birth,_both_ are tabula rasa. It is man s cognitive faculty,his mind, that determines the _content_ of both. 6. ConclusionWhile I am on the topic, let me mention some otherinstincts. Many of the emotional differences betweenmen and women are, I think, instinctive. Forexample, men s inclination to promiscuity is, I think,instinctive; just as women s inclination to domesticityis. Women s greater concern for the welfare ofchildren is probably instinctive. There is a wonderfulprogram on the Learning Channel, Desmond Morris _The Human Animal_, which provides grist for furtherspeculation. Against an irrational age, Rand pointed out that weare _rational_ animals. All I am pointing out is thatwe are rational _animals_, and that we canunderstand mankind far better if we recognize thatlike all other animals, we possess instincts, i.e.,innate desires and emotional responses.