Train and Railway Safety Essay

 

 

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Abstract

The questions of the safety regulations acquire more and more importance in the last years - Train and Railway Safety Essay introduction. The scientific and technical progress propose permanently new methods and solutions for the needs of the railway transport. And simultaneously demands new safety conditions of the passengers and the staff of the railway companies. Besides, the processes of globalization in the world should be followed with the unification of the safety regulations and standards. That is why to understand current safety regulation existing in various railway companies in the world. The attempt of studying approach to the safety regulation practices used in two big railway companies from the various countries of the world was used in this research.

 

Introduction

In this research it was tried to analyze systems of safety regulations in two big railway companies, representing two biggest railway networks in the world, – the Amtrak Corporation from the USA and the Russian Railways from the Russian Federation. These two corporations have much in common: they represent two countries with the most widespread railways network, they operate in the big territory in several climatic zones, and they are government-owned companies.

The more interesting is to reveal specific features of each company regarding safety regulations issues. The existing differences as to safety providing are conditioned with different systems of legal regulations in the USA and the Russian Federation, with distinctions in historical development of the railroads systems these two largest transport states.

In the course of this research’s preparation it analyzed only matters connected with the protection of the passengers and the employees of the transport companies from the negative impacts outgoing from trains as sources of heightened danger. Therefore, it wasn’t taking into account danger sources and accordingly safety providing measures connected with it, which outcome from conscious illegal actions of third persons. Such issues, especially measure of defends from terroristic activity, belong to the field of security issues and should be distinguished from the safety ones.

A separate place in this work was set for the analysis of recent resonance railways accidents with the participation of two companies, which were the subjects of research in this essay. When providing an analysis of the accidents, we paid the special attention to the factual circumstances and to the causes of the accidents, having resulted in them. It was very important to get an understanding, what improvements of the safety systems should be accomplished for non-admission of similar situations in the future.
Safety regulation at Russian Railways

The Open Joint Stock Company “Rossiyskiye Zheleznye Dorogi” (hereinafter also referred to as the “Russian Railways”) is an operator of infrastructure of the Russian rail trackage, one of the largest transport companies in the world. Russian Railways is one of the biggest railway companies in the world, operating 85,500 km of track and employing 1,2 million people. Russian Railways carries nearly 1,3 billion passengers each year and accounts for over 3.6 % of Russia’s GDP, handling almost 80% of all transportation in Russia and shipping 1.3 billion tons of freight per annum (www.rzd.ru). As to the form of corporate ownership, Russian Railways is a 100% government-owned company.

System of safety regulations at Russian Railways goes out of understanding railway safety as an element of general safety determined with dangers and threats intrinsically to a railway transport. Thus railway safety as a system has internal and external dangers and threats stability of its state.

One of dangers is an insufficiency of the administrative and legal regulations of functioning of railway transport. For years of railways’ existence in Russia a considerable experience in the field of safety providing of railway transport is accumulated. A huge amount of normative acts, organizational documents, technological processes and standards are developed. On the whole system of safety regulations at the Russian Railways has a three-level structure.

The first level of the administrative and legal regulation of safety on the railway transport makes a federal legislation. The basic sources are the Federal Law “On the railway transport in the Russian Federation” from the 10th January, 2003 and the Federal Law “The Charter of the On the railway transport of the Russian Federation” from the 10th January, 2003. However in them it is enough full and plenary powers of federal organ of executive power are expressly set in area of railway transport in the field of railway safety. Main lacks of the above mentioned acts are an abundance of common and declarative norms and insufficiency of direct action norms in the texts of the laws.

In accordance with the Article 4 of the Federal Law “On the railway transport in the Russian Federation” a government control in the area of the railway transport of common use is carried out “for providing integral, effective, safe and high-quality functioning of railway transport of common use, and also its complex development” (A Russian Federal Law “About railway transport in Russian Federation, 2008, p. 112”).

As a material basis for implementation safety mission in the railway transport serves a presence of necessary corporate and management infrastructure of the company, a safe rolling-stock, a professional staff.

Obviously, that regulation of railway safety is directed into three large components, providing the steady and safe functioning of railway transport:

·         hardware and technologies;

·         organizational procedures, providing safety of motion;

·         participants of transport process (actually personnel of railway transport organizations).

The technical regulation of safety is one of elements of government control. The safety of hardware and technological processes are stipulated with the Federal law “On the technical regulation” from the 27th December, 2002. That law was elaborated and adopted in the process of entering by the Russian Federation the World Trade Organization (WTO). The mentioned act put into operation among others the notion “safety of transportation”. It says that “safety of products, processes of production, exploitation, storage, transportation, sale and utilization (hereinafter referred to as “safety”) is the state, at which an impermissible risk, related to infliction of harm to life or health of citizens, property of individuals and legal entities, state or municipal property, environment, life or health of animals and plants, is absent” (“The Russian Newspaper”, 2002, #245). The law stipulates that obligatory requirements to the products and to the process of its production, exploitation, storage, transportation, sale and utilization are to be specifically written in technical regulations (“technical reglaments”), which taking into account the degree of risk of infliction of harm should establish necessary requirements, providing different safety minimums.

Some provisions of the Federal law “On the technical regulation” created new problems because of their contradictory and discrepant character. The law enacted 7-years transitional period for adjusting local technical norms, rules and standards to demands of WTO. Thus, it is set in the law, that obligatory requirements to the products and processes of production, exploitation, storage, transportation, realization and utilizations which are not changed or altered during indicated term will expire and lose their force. By that, state executive bodies will have right to publish technical regulation acts only of recommendation character. Essentially, these provisions leave all existing normative legal base of technical control and regulation without any management.

The second level of safety regulation in railway transport at the Russian Railways comprises of the acts of the state (federal) executive bodies, such as the Ministry of Transport Communications, the Federal Service of Supervision in the field of Transport (“Rostransnadzor”) other organs of the federal power. One of the most significant acts of this level is “Rules of technical exploitation of railways of the Russian Federation” the Order of the Ministry of Transport Communications from the 3rd July 2001. These rules set substantive provisions on technical exploitation of railways and order of actions of workers of railway transport during exploitation of the rail tracks, basic sizes and norms of maintenance of major buildings, devices and rolling stock and requirements to them, system of organization of motion of trains and principles of signaling.

Another Order of the Ministry of Transport Communications “On the measures for safety of railway transport” No 15-B from 15th June, 2002 gives a classification of safety of motion breaches. As a basis of classification of transport incidents serves a severity of consequences – harm to life and health of people, ecology, to property of individuals and legal entities to a transport infrastructure, rolling-stock of railways.

Transport incidents (hereinafter referred to as “incidents”) on the railway transport depending on the degree of weight of the inflicted harm are subdivided into the followings categories:

–        Wrecks (crashes);

–        Accidents;

–        Incidents on the railroad crossings;

–        Incidents, caused harm to people with the rolling-stock;

–        Incidents at transportation of dangerous loads;

–        Cases of defects in work.

A wreck (crash) is a transport incident, arisen because of trains collision or derailment, which resulted in fatal outcomes or severe damages to many people, or substantial harm of ecology, or material damage to the railway infrastructure in a total equivalent no less than 1,5 million Russian roubles (about $50 000).

An accident is a transport incident, arisen because of trains collision or derailment, which resulted in severe damages to people, substantial harm of ecology, or material damage to the railway infrastructure in a total equivalent no less than 800 thousand Russian roubles (about $26 600).

This classification for the first time established weight of consequence of a transport incident, allowing to estimate an incident from the point of insurance consequences. Besides, there are numerous other regulation acts of the executive bodies in the field of safety of railway transport in Russia. Among them such as: Technical regulations “On the safety of infrastructure and rolling-stock of high-speed railway transport, approved by the Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation from 28th December 2007, Technical standards of the Ministry of Transport Communications “On the safety of railway lines”, “On the safety of the railway rolling-stock”, “On the safety of the systems of signalling, centralizations and blocking”, “On the safety of the railway stations”, and others, on the whole more than 8,5 thousand of acts.

The third level of safety regulation in railway transport at the Russian Railways is inner safety regulations and rules of the Russian Railways. Thus, in March 2006 the Board of Directors of Russian Railways adopted the Concept of increase of safety of motion, based on application of the multifunctional complex systems of trains’ traffic regulation. The main reason for elaboration of that Concept is that existing devices of safety, set in locomotives, do not hinder travelling on red light. Some engine drivers disconnect these devices quite, trying to perform train schedules, and by that increase risks of crashes. The statistics showed that so called ‘human factor’ was the basic reason for infringements of trains traffic regulation.

Picutre 1. The reasons of crashes

Picture 2. Cases of passing by engine-drivers inhibiting signals, from 1995 to 2005

 

The common problem on Russian railways is the technical systems of safety, a lot of which became out of date. For example, the system of electric centralization even theoretically did not foresee information transfer to a locomotive at manoeuvring that promotes to travelling at inhibiting signals, wrecks and crashes.

The Concept defined requirements to introduction of the safety systems on the rolling-stock. They foresee a complex connection of microprocessors. That allows to have a common database aboard a locomotive with common principles of its forming on rail lines.
Case of the train accident with Russian Railways trains

A large railway catastrophe happened at night near 3 AM on the 26th of January 2000 on the railroad crossing of Torbino-Mstinsky Most. A passenger train, following to Petersburg from Velykiye Luki, crashed into the rear part of the freight train, loaded with forest. As a result, five freight cars, a locomotive and two passenger cars derailed and turned over. The engine driver assistant perished. The main engine driver of the passenger train was delivered to the hospital with numerous damages and injuries. 16 persons were got by wounds and injuries, three of them were hospitalized.

The total number of passengers in the passenger train No 612 was 156. According to the evidences of the engine driver of the passenger locomotive, which he gave in the hospital, some days after the accident, the night was very dark and the train-operating crew could not see the freight train ahead. Therefore the locomotive hit the last freight car almost without diminishing its speed. The speed of the fast train was at the moment of the accident about 80 km ph, and the speed of the freight train was only 5 km ph, because the locomotive driver of the freight train began to execute the braking, after he had seen the inhibiting signal of the signal post.

The representatives of the Federal Service of Supervision in the field of Transport (Rostransnadzor) organized the investigation on the accident site. According to the report of the court of inquiry, the accident could be caused with the failure in the system of signalling on the freight train. The locomotive driver and his assistant did not see not only the manoeuvre of braking, being executed by the train ahead, but they saw no train at all until the time when the train was only at some meters distance.

The failure of the signalling systems in its turn could happen from nipping frosts: at night in that locality an air temperature fell down to -38º C. The locomotive driver of the freight train began to brake reacting to the red light of the signalling post, but the locomotive drivers of the passenger train could not see the braking signal on the rear-end car, the lantern did not burn at all.

The pictures below show the accident site (www.train-photo.ru).

Picture 2. Train accident in Russia

Picture 3. Train accident in Russia

The employees of the Federal Service of Supervision in the field of Transport did not reveal any defects in the equipment of the passenger train. The actions of the train-operating crews of the both trains were adequate in accordance with usual practices.

The main safety recommendation outgoing from the incident may be divided into two groups. The first one refers to the technical standards and the state of the rolling-stock. Signalling electric system on the cars of the freight train was not meant for operation in temperature conditions below 30º C, which are usual in the northern regions of Russia. Therefore there should be climatic demands and standards for cars, locomotives and other rolling-stock, which should vary in dependence from the climatic zone.  The existing standards of the Russian railways do not take into account such climatic diversification.

The second recommendation refers to the problem of trains’ routes management. The dispatchers of the local district should not have allowed a scheduled running of two trains on the same track with a distance between them only some kilometres. Such situation may be charged, when a train leaves one dispatcher district and enters another one. The dispatchers of the neighbouring districts do not always inform each other timely on the changes in the trains’ routes and movement. Therefore, an automatic information system should be implemented.

 
Safety regulation at American Railways

The National Railroad Passenger Corporation, which is more known under as Amtrak, is the biggest passenger railroad corporation in the USA and one of the biggest railroad companies of that kind in the world. The Amtrak is 100% government-owned company. This company started operating in 1970 and was created with the special purpose to improve the situation with safety on American railroads. Amtrak employs 19,000 people and operates about 22,000 miles (34 000 kilometres) of railway tracks connecting 500 destinations in 46 states plus some routs in Canada. In fiscal 2008 year Amtrak served 28,7 million passengers. In a difference from Russian Railways, which is a monopolist, Amtrak is leading American railway company has the next statistics of passenger miles since 1991:

Picture 4. Millions of passenger miles

What about safety and safety rules, Amtrak is the first company which used centralized controllers systems of railway movement management in 1980th. Those systems created a possibility to manage about one hundred thousand kilometres of railway tracks from the controllers’ centre and that was a new mention of the railway safety. Amtrak is a well-known as a company which works hard on passengers and crew safety during the railway transportations.

On the whole, the Amtrak uses in its activity the safety regulation acts of three levels. At first, one should say about the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970. This Act is also known as “Amtrak Act” because the Company itself was incorporated as the result of adopting the Act. The Rail Passenger Act defines general conditions of Amtrak’s activity and paseengers’ transportations in the USA. Besides, there are separate parts of the United States Code, for example, Title 49 of the United States Code is dedicated to the safety issues (Chapter 51 – Transportation of Hazardous Material, Chapter 201- General, Chapter 203 – Safety Appliances, Chapter 205 – Signal Systems, Chapter 207 – Locomotives, Chapter 209 – Accidents and Incidents, Chapter 211 – Hours of Service, Chapter 213 – Penalties). Secondly, Amtrak should follow numerous safety regulations of the Federal official bodies. The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) place the leading role in this process. Each year FRA issues annual Safety Bills. Each Safety Bill contains conclusions of the FRA as to the state of safety at railroad transportation. Other Federal organization which controls safety issues is Occupation Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). According to the information from official OSHA web-site, Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, employers are responsible for providing a safe and healthy workplace for their employees. OSHA and its state partners have approximately 2100 inspectors, plus complaint discrimination investigators, engineers, physicians, educators, standards writers, and other technical and support personnel spread over more than 200 offices throughout the country.

In accordance with Part 211 of Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), notice is hereby given that the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) received from the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) a request for waiver of compliance with certain requirements of 49 CFR Part 213: Track Safety Standards. The organs which control the safety of railway transportations are Occupation Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the Federal Railroad Administration. They provide new safety standards and one of such new rules is to create new automatic system of passengers’ and crew safety till 2015.

Third level of safety regulation is Amtrak’s own Safety Regulation Policy. The employees of Amtrak elaborate Company’s safety standards and rules which are used by their workers. In principle statistical information on Amtrak’s demonstrate a positive enough dynamics. Based on statistics information for 2004, Amtrak’s norm of accidents (2.8 for the million miles of train) was considerably below than average of the industry where the relevant figures made up over four accidents on million miles. Vice versa to the tendency of industry, accidents, caused with a human factor fell substantially for the last two years, achieving only 20 percent of Amtrak’s accidents in 2004. One of main reasons for this improvement was the program, that Amtrak, accepted two years ago, with FRA’s of encouragement, to define root reasons of main operating violations. In addition, norms of damages of workers, especially in the department of Amtrak’s improved in 2004 and are 15% lower than in the previous year.

The official web-site of Amtrak provides the following information about the safety rules:

Onboard Safety

·         Use seat backs and handrails while walking through the train.

·         Watch your step when boarding and leaving the train.

·         Watch your step moving from car to car while the train is in motion, as the vestibules can be slippery.

·         Be sure to step over the gap between the train and platform.

·         Leave personal food items and baggage at your seat.

·         Wear shoes at all times and use caution when wearing shoes without rubber soles.

·         Never attempt to board or exit a moving train.

·         Make sure you familiarize yourself with the safety card found in most seat backs.

Safety at the Station

·         Arrive at least 30 minutes before your train is due to depart.

·         Check-in early to arrange for pre-boarding if you need extra time or assistance.

·         Watch your step on station stairs, escalators, and train platforms.

·         Please stand back from the edge of the platform.

·         Help children when boarding and leaving the train.

·         Take care when crossing the gap between the train and platform.

·         Use only Red Cap agents to help you with your baggage.

·         Please report any suspicious behavior to police, Amtrak Police or station personnel.

It is a well-known fact that a lot of train accidents take place because of safety rules violation. Thus, to prevent a numerous events of rules violation by passengers themselves and members of a train crew, a Federal Railroad Administration decided to enlarge the penalties for violations and to make the transportation safer.  Federal Railroad Administration Office of Safety Analysis provided Ten Year Accident/Incident Overview by Railroad for Amtrak company, which can be found in their official page.
Case of the train accident with Amtrak trains

On the 18th of April, 2002, the passenger train of Amtrak company with 446 passengers aboard came off the rails not far from Crescent City, state Florida. As a result of the accident 4 people perished, 142 men were got by wounds and damages of different degree of weight.

The two locomotives and the first two passenger cars did not derail and, but the next fourteen passenger cars and the first 7 of the total twenty-three auto rack cars came off the rails (Washington post, 2002). The train left the tracks during implementation of the left turn, moving at the speed of about 60 miles per hour. The event had a big social resonance (see the photo below).

Picture 5. Train accident in the USA

The representatives of the National Safety Transportation Board (NSTB), which is responsible for control over safety on the transport in the United States, came to the site of the accident. As the result of the investigation as to the reasons of the derailment, the representatives of the NSTB published the Railroad Accident Report “Derailment of Amtrak Auto Train P052-18 on the CSXT Railroad Near Crescent City, Florida April 18, 2002”.

According the mentioned report, a possible cause for the crush could be a track buckle that could arise in the result of inadequate CSX Transportation track-surfacing operations, including disadjustment of the track curve, a bad track restraint.

The investigators organized a hearing of the witnesses of the accident and the employees of the Amtrak Company. In accordance with the evidences of the crewmembers, the train had been assembled before they boarded. Before starting, the carmen executed the initial terminal inspection, an air brake test, and a two-way end-of-train (EOT) device test, as it is demanded by the Federal Railroad Administration. The crew held a job-briefing before departure. According to the words of the engine driver that until the accident all the systems of the equipment operated normally.

Coming close to Seville, Florida, the train was “out of time”, therefore the engineer accelerated speed to 60 mph, the maximum permissible speed for the curve ahead, but the speed indicator showed not more than 57 mph during the motion. In the process of the turning the engineer noticed the breach in the line of rails. Though the two rails were parallel to each other, they were bent approximately 10 inches aside from the direction of the curve. According to the event recorder information the emergency brake application was used and then the EOT device (approximately after 15 seconds), but the 3rd car derailed and dragged other cars.

According to the results of the postaccident tests and inspections no defects in the Amtrak train equipment were revealed, therefore the equipment was not the cause of the accident. The crew of the train acted in accordance with the accepted practices and procedures.

The accident was caused with the track buckle, which in its turn could arise in result of passing the same track by the previous train, loaded with coal shortly before the passenger train. Because of the big weight of the freight train (95 coal-loaded cars, about 139 tons each) and relatively slow motion of the train (35 mph), multiplied with the hot weather conditions in Florida at that day (80,6º F), could develop such buckle (“kink”) of the track.

The investigation showed that the track maintenance activity in the site, the roadbed width on the curve, the rail anchoring and other factors connected with the state of the rail track did not only prevent from the arising the accident, but promoted to it. The direct fault of it belongs to the CXS Corporation, which is the owner of the CXS Transportation railroad (CSXT).

The regulations of the CXS Corporation do not have specific roadbed width maintenance requirements. Besides the ballast of was not adequate to the norms of the CSXT, and many rails anchors were missing. Although CXS Corporation established its own rail anchoring standards, but the regulations of the company do not demand all local teams of the company to follow these standards.

One more negative factor, promoting to the accident was a relatively long time period (15 seconds) between activating by the engineer the air brake system and the EOD device. In fact, activating the EOD device 15 seconds after beginning the crash was unnecessary and useless because of the development of the derailment. At the first glance the cause of this is a low level of the professional training of the Amtrak engineer. But on the whole, the human behaviour in the conditions of the stress situation hardly can be trained in full. Therefore an implementation of the automatic EOT devices activation could be the best advice to avoid such situations in the future.

Another revealed problem was incapacity of the Amtrak administration to inform the precise number of passengers aboard the train to emergency services, which created problems in aiding to injured people and exposure of all people who may need help. The survival of the persons in the train in such situation depends often on detailed information concerning the travel. “Since issuing Safety Recommendation R-94-7 nearly 9 years” before the accident near Crescent City, the NSTB has investigated nine similar accidents, in which Amtrak passengers recording system was far from being sufficient. So implementation of an accurate accounting system by the Amtrak administration on its trains and in its offices would be very important.

 

 

 
Comparison between Russian Railways and Amtrak

Appendices A and B attached in the end of the present report show the general situation with safety issues at Amtrak and Russian Railways. Some of the most important figures are used are in Appendix C in the separate table where the first figure shows Amtrak’s data and the second figure shows Russian Railways’ data.

One should note that not all figures show the realistic picture because safety regulations in Amtrak and Russian Railways has different meaning of the accidents, incidents and other results of unsafe activity. It is remarkable that although the total number of accidents by Russian Railways is much lower than by Amtrak, the difference in fatalities numbers is not so big. The reason of such situation is that number of labour injures and fatalities by Russian Railways is higher than by Amtrak and Russian Railways’ statistics does not take into account labour accidents as accidents in general. Moreover, the number of transportation mileage by Russian Railways is much higher so the figures connected with negative statistics should be lower in the same proportion.

When saying of the differences in safety regulation matters, one should say that these differences may be explained by the traditions of the legal regulation existing in each country. So, the Acts of the second level prevail in the activity in the Russian Railways. They are very numerous (more than 8,5 thousand documents) and chaotic. The regulations of the second level are also present in the Amtrak’s activity, but on the whole Amtrak is more independent choosing safety regulations and standards compared to the Russian Railways.

Amtrak pays attention to elaboration of the safety rules for passengers and for informational activity. The Russian Railways pays attention more to the technical issues as to the safety regulation. Besides, another problem of Russian Railway safety regulation norms that many of those norms were adopted for a long time ago and they should be updated and changed. This is crucial for the Russian Federation because of the process entering the WTO.

Another specific feature of the safety regulation at Amtrak is the presence of the special safety organisations which execute supervision over the activity of the Company. But we should say that OSHA works on labour safety questions that’s why their recommendations are really useful but they can be used for a part of the safety issues.

As far as it was understood, the statistics of Amtrak and Russian Railways can not be compared because these two companies from two different countries use different parameters and norms of their statistics. Thus, to find out what exactly safety regulation system is better, it would be more effective to pay attention on the regulation processes, norms and their control. From this point of view, surely, the better safety regulation is in Amtrak because the USA historically has better hard- and software which helps to control the safety rules completion. What about Russian Railway, a lot of safety measures are not automated, what make easier to violate them. A poor technical base is a common problem of a lot of Russian activities and sometimes makes impossible the centralized control. From this point of view, Amtrak has better safety regulation system with a good technical and control base.

 
Conclusion

In this research the questions of the safety regulations and rules have been studied in regard to the commercial activity of two leading railway companies in different countries of the world, – the Amtrak corporation (Amtrak) from the United States of America and the Russian Railways from the Russian Federation.

In the course of the research’s preparation it was revealed that two mentioned companies have common features in regard to the safety regulation issues. So, they both operate under conditions of the three-level safety regulation systems.

The first level is presented by the general normative acts, adopted by the Supreme Legislative Bodies of the countries where the companies operate, – the Acts of the Congress of the USA and the Laws of the State Duma of the Russian Federation. These Supreme Legislation Acts are dedicated to the regulation of the railway transportation in general and only touch some separate issues of safety regulations. But these Acts outline main vectors of the safety regulation in the railway transport which may not be changed but other state Bodies or commercial entities.

The second level of the safety regulation system is presented by the Acts of the State Bodies responsible for the supervision and control over the activity of the railroad companies. These normative acts define the state standards, limits and norms in regard to the safety issues which should be fulfilled by the companies.

Inner safety regulations of the railway companies are at the third level. Mostly, these regulations are adopted by the companies for implementation of the higher-level acts, part of them are designed for the needs of the companies’ employees to secure the reliable traffic of the trains and the safe labour conditions.

Parallel with the process of the technical progress, safety regulations should be updated and changed. They should also take into account climatic and geographical specific features of the transportation.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Appendix A. Amtrak’s Ten Year Accident/Incident report

Category
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
% Change
From Last Year
% Change
From
1998
***TOTAL ACCIDENTS/INCIDENTS***
1,341.0
1,265.0
1,602.0
1,629.0
1,458.0
1,507.0
1,530.0
1,340.0
1,463.0
1,582.0
8.1
18.0
Total a/i rate (events per million train miles)
37.9
35.0
44.4
42.2
36.8
38.1
39.0
35.4
38.3
40.0
4.4
5.6
—Total fatalities
120.0
105.0
131.0
139.0
126.0
118.0
128.0
122.0
118.0
129.0
9.3
7.5
—Total nonfatal conditions
1,180.0
1,161.0
1,412.0
1,527.0
1,484.0
1,346.0
1,373.0
1,243.0
1,314.0
1,559.0
18.6
32.1
Employee on duty deaths
2.0
.
.
1.0
.
1.0
.
1.0
.
1.0
.
-50.0
Nonfatal EOD injuries
831.0
899.0
901.0
862.0
807.0
719.0
672.0
506.0
434.0
370.0
-14.7
-55.5
Nonfatal EOD illnesses
9.0
15.0
19.0
18.0
17.0
71.0
153.0
144.0
159.0
112.0
-29.6
1144.4
Total employee on duty cases
842.0
914.0
920.0
881.0
824.0
791.0
825.0
651.0
593.0
483.0
-18.5
-42.6
Employee on duty rate per 200K hours
3.9
4.0
4.0
4.1
4.2
4.2
4.3
3.5
3.3
2.7
-19.0
-31.3
Cases with days absent from work
596.0
693.0
756.0
651.0
611.0
543.0
507.0
398.0
305.0
284.0
-6.9
-52.3
Trespasser deaths, not at HRC
67.0
51.0
70.0
67.0
78.0
64.0
77.0
71.0
67.0
65.0
-3.0
-3.0
Trespasser injuries, not at HRC
30.0
25.0
18.0
37.0
28.0
22.0
26.0
28.0
26.0
20.0
-23.1
-33.3
***TRAIN ACCIDENTS***
89.0
85.0
147.0
150.0
112.0
111.0
111.0
112.0
103.0
84.0
-18.4
-5.6
Train accidents per million train miles
2.5
2.4
4.1
3.9
2.8
2.8
2.8
3.0
2.7
2.1
-21.3
-15.5
— Train accident deaths
.
.
.
1.0
4.0
1.0
2.0
1.0
.
.
.
.
— Train accident injuries
28.0
41.0
106.0
151.0
226.0
18.0
78.0
104.0
28.0
137.0
389.3
389.3
> Human factor caused
27.0
23.0
37.0
33.0
31.0
22.0
20.0
19.0
23.0
18.0
-21.7
-33.3
> Track caused
29.0
38.0
75.0
65.0
41.0
42.0
42.0
38.0
40.0
24.0
-40.0
-17.2
> Motive power/equipment caused
11.0
5.0
19.0
26.0
17.0
30.0
35.0
34.0
31.0
20.0
-35.5
81.8
> Signal caused, all track types
.
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
.
.
.
.
1.0
.
.
> Signal caused, main line track
.
1.0
1.0
.
1.0
.
.
.
.
1.0
.
.
> Miscellaneous caused
22.0
18.0
15.0
25.0
22.0
17.0
14.0
21.0
9.0
21.0
133.3
-4.5
> Collisions
4.0
3.0
8.0
8.0
4.0
3.0
7.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
0.0
-25.0
> *** Collisions on main line track
4.0
3.0
3.0
5.0
3.0
1.0
6.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
0.0
-50.0
> Derailments
55.0
46.0
79.0
77.0
57.0
45.0
43.0
35.0
43.0
29.0
-32.6
-47.3
> Other types, e.g., obstructions
30.0
36.0
60.0
65.0
51.0
63.0
61.0
74.0
57.0
52.0
-8.8
73.3
Accidents with reportable damage > $100K
6.0
10.0
14.0
11.0
10.0
14.0
9.0
17.0
11.0
8.0
-27.3
33.3
*** Percent of total
6.7
11.8
9.5
7.3
8.9
12.6
8.1
15.2
10.7
9.5
-10.8
41.3
> $500K
2.0
5.0
6.0
6.0
5.0
4.0
1.0
5.0
3.0
2.0
-33.3
0.0
*** Percent of total
2.2
5.9
4.1
4.0
4.5
3.6
0.9
4.5
2.9
2.4
-18.3
6.0
> $1,000,000
2.0
4.0
3.0
5.0
2.0
3.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
0.0
-50.0
*** Percent of total
2.2
4.7
2.0
3.3
1.8
2.7
0.9
0.9
1.0
1.2
22.6
-47.0
Train accidents on main line
46.0
40.0
71.0
72.0
60.0
61.0
70.0
79.0
64.0
56.0
-12.5
21.7
Rate per million train miles 1/
1.4
1.2
2.1
2.0
1.6
1.6
1.9
2.2
1.8
1.5
-15.7
8.3
Accidents on yard track
41.0
37.0
72.0
72.0
51.0
46.0
40.0
32.0
35.0
23.0
-34.3
-43.9
Rate per million yard switching train miles
19.7
17.8
34.6
34.9
25.1
22.3
19.2
15.4
16.8
11.0
-34.3
-43.9
HAZMAT RELEASES
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
— Cars carrying hazmat
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
— Hazmat cars damaged/derailed
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
— Cars releasing
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
***HIGHWAY-RAIL INCIDENTS***
170.0
181.0
202.0
162.0
142.0
149.0
146.0
130.0
133.0
135.0
1.5
-20.6
Rate per million train miles
4.8
5.0
5.6
4.2
3.6
3.8
3.7
3.4
3.5
3.4
-2.0
-28.9
— Highway-rail incidents deaths
50.0
52.0
56.0
69.0
42.0
52.0
46.0
45.0
49.0
59.0
20.4
18.0
— Highway-rail incidents injuries
125.0
146.0
90.0
84.0
93.0
125.0
64.0
86.0
99.0
108.0
9.1
-13.6
Incidents at public xings
145.0
158.0
168.0
140.0
118.0
129.0
130.0
108.0
110.0
117.0
6.4
-19.3
*** Percent of total
85.3
87.3
83.2
86.4
83.1
86.6
89.0
83.1
82.7
86.7
4.8
1.6
***OTHER ACCIDENTS/INCIDENTS 2/***
1,082.0
999.0
1,253.0
1,317.0
1,204.0
1,247.0
1,273.0
1,098.0
1,227.0
1,363.0
11.1
26.0
— Other incidents deaths
70.0
53.0
75.0
69.0
80.0
65.0
80.0
76.0
69.0
70.0
1.4
0.0
— Other incidents injuries
1,027.0
974.0
1,216.0
1,292.0
1,165.0
1,203.0
1,231.0
1,053.0
1,187.0
1,314.0
10.7
27.9
Employee hours worked
43,480,510.0
45,399,073.0
45,840,150.0
42,956,762.0
39,450,311.0
37,801,336.0
38,039,779.0
36,831,282.0
36,105,500.0
36,286,415.0
0.5
-16.5
Total train miles
35,414,704.0
36,160,704.0
36,080,704.0
38,575,104.0
39,652,480.0
39,519,448.0
39,246,704.0
37,855,704.0
38,164,704.0
39,547,096.0
3.6
11.7
Yard switching miles
2,080,704.0
2,080,704.0
2,080,704.0
2,065,104.0
2,028,480.0
2,060,448.0
2,080,704.0
2,080,704.0
2,080,704.0
2,082,096.0
0.1
0.1
Passengers transported
21,246,203.0
21,544,160.0
22,985,354.0
23,525,230.0
23,320,755.0
24,594,785.0
25,215,344.0
25,076,496.0
24,548,275.0
26,550,910.0
8.2
25.0
Passengers kld in train accs or crossing incs
.
11.0
.
1.0
4.0
.
1.0
.
.
.
.
.
Passengers inj in train accs or crossing incs
28.0
46.0
68.0
114.0
203.0
54.0
44.0
103.0
66.0
190.0
187.9
578.6
Passengers kld in other incidents
1.0
2.0
3.0
1.0
.
2.0
1.0
2.0
.
2.0
.
100.0
Passengers inj in other incidents
154.0
45.0
226.0
302.0
295.0
303.0
283.0
296.0
407.0
610.0
49.9
296.1
1/ Rate of accidents on mainline divided by total train miles – yard switching miles
2/ Other accidents/incidents are events other than train accidents or crossing incidents that cause physical harm to persons
TOTAL ACCIDENTS IS THE SUM OF TRAIN ACCIDENTS, CROSSING INCIDENTS, AND OTHER ACCIDENTS/INCIDENTS
Other accidents/incidents are events other than train accidents or crossing incidents that cause physical harm to persons
 

 

Appendix B. A number of accidents and crushes of Russian Railways’ tracks in 1996-2007
Appendix C. Comparison of some parameters by Amtrak & Russian Railways

 

References

2008, Russian Railways official web-site. Available from: <www.rzd.ru>

December, 27, 2007. Federal law “On the technical regulation”

December, 31, 2002. The Russian newspaper, #245

2008. Federal law “About railway transport in the Russian Federation”, Moscow, 112 p.

2007, The Rules of technical using of railroad of the Russian Federation. Novosibirsk, Publishing house of the Siberian University, 109 p

2002, Order of the Ministry of Transport Communications “On the measures for safety of railway transport” No 15-B, “The Russian Newspaper”, No 119

Topol. S, Romanov P, 2000. The fast train crashed into the freight. Commersant-Daily, No 11

2009. Federal Railroad Administration Office of Safety Analysis (Ten Year Accident/Incident report). Available from: <http://safetydata.fra.dot.gov/officeofsafety/publicsite/Query/tenyr1a.aspx>

2007. Transport safety and technologies, No 1. Available from: <http://www.securpress.ru/issue/Tb/2007-1/articals/108.html>

49 Codes of Federal Regulations 238.313

2002, Railroad Accident Report “Derailment of Amtrak Auto Train P052-18 on the CSXT Railroad Near Crescent City, Florida April 18, NTSB/RAR-03/02, 2002, Washington DC, page 58.

2009, official web-site of Amtrak. Available from: www.amtrak.com

 

 

 

 

 

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