The Cold War, the lengthiest war that the United States has ever engaged in and a war with limited actual combat, can be comprehended as an escalated dispute between two adjacent nations. It originated from a conflict over the favored building material for their respective yards’ fences: wood or metal.
One neighbor, President Truman, desired Democracy, while the other, Stalin, sought Communism. The issue was that both had legitimate justifications for their preferred fencing method, and neither was prepared to compromise. It is crucial to note that the Soviet Union had faced several invasions in recent decades, including two from Germany, their neighbor to the east.
In an effort to safeguard his country, Stalin sought to exert influence over neighboring governments such as Poland, Northern China, and Germany. This was achieved by establishing Communist regimes, which, contrary to popular belief, may not be as dreadful as it is portrayed. The fundamental principle of Communism is that power should be vested in the working class rather than a select few at the top, a concept that many Americans may currently perceive as advantageous. Nevertheless, integrating Communism into a viable society proves arduous and nearly unattainable.
In spite of the flaws and cruel dictatorship of Stalin’s Communist government, it is important to acknowledge that Democracy is not always flawless either. The reality is that no government is without imperfections, making it challenging to determine the right and wrong sides in a moral society. According to historian Arnold Offner, Truman should be held responsible for initiating the Cold War, while historian John Lewis Gaddis believes that blame lies with Stalin and the Soviets. This essay will compare both viewpoints and present my own perspective based on the information provided in the two essays.
According to Arnold Offner, Truman’s presidency was marked by his parochial and narrow-minded nationalism, which prevented the United States from moving away from conflict and towards a better future. Offner asserts that Truman relied on threats and power to confront enemies and achieve his goals. Offner also argues that the Soviet Union, under Stalin, aimed to restore its 1941 boundaries, establish influence in border states, secure against a recovered Germany, Japan, or hostile capitalist states, and seek compensation for the damages of war (Arnold 215).
Truman’s determination to rapidly make decisions and adopt a confrontational approach hindered his ability to reconcile and comprehend the Soviets’ intentions. Truman firmly declared that the United States would achieve peace on its own conditions. His government held the belief that Germany held the pivotal role in maintaining equilibrium in Europe, hence, they commenced a process of uniting the three zones of Germany under Western Allied control. Unsurprisingly, Stalin perceived this as a direct threat to his standing, fearing that he was no longer regarded as an equal among the major nations.
Arnold (222) states that Stalin believed the West would dominate Western Germany and Eastern Germany would join the Soviet Union. However, Truman’s leadership in the United States gave them an advantage due to possessing the atomic bomb, which increased tensions with the Soviets. Furthermore, Truman rejected Russia’s appeals for industrial reparations and withdrew from the Yalta accords. Arnold argues that Truman’s oversimplified comparisons, excessive confidence in American superiority, and lack of comprehension of global affairs worsened conflicts with both the Soviet Union and China.
Arnold argues that Truman’s choice at the Potsdam Conference to engage in “atomic poker” against the Soviets in Europe and Asia influenced his rejection of any proposals to refrain from using atomic bombs on Japan. Truman feared that if Russia obtained Greece and Turkey, it would eventually gain control over Italy, France, and even extend its influence to western Ireland and the United States through the “iron curtain”. However, Arnold believes Truman’s concerns were exaggerated, as Stalin never opposed the Truman Doctrine or questioned Western supremacy in Turkey and Greece, both of which were under U.S. military guidance.
According to Arnold, Stalin did not offer much support to the Greek rebels and advised Yugoslavia’s leaders to cease their aid in 1948 because the United States would prevent the Greek Communists from winning and disrupting Anglo-American influence in the Mediterranean (221). Arnold contended that President Truman frequently limited his choices rather than expanding them. Truman’s insecurity also strengthened his tendency to perceive conflicts in simplistic terms, dividing nations into either free or totalitarian, vilifying his adversaries, and disregarding the intricacies of historical national disputes.
In summary, Truman’s presidency ended with disarray, with military spending sky-high, McCarthyism spreading unchecked, and the United States fully engaged in the Cold War at home and abroad. John Lewis Gaddis, however, presents a contrasting viewpoint on the origins of the Cold War. He argues that while Truman blamed the communists, Stalin’s aspiration for authority was a small concern compared to his imperial ambitions. As other colonial powers relinquished control over their colonies in a shifting world, Stalin bucked the trend and sought to expand his influence instead.
Western leaders were concerned about whether the Soviets would expand their influence beyond the occupied land. According to Gaddis, Stalin had indicated that the Soviet Union would impose its social system wherever their armies could reach. However, Stalin was committed to avoiding another destructive war unless assured of victory.
Gaddis agrees with Truman’s policy of being tough and not appeasing the Soviets. According to Gaddis, the Soviets were never willing to challenge the United States or Great Britain when they clearly expressed their interests. Gaddis believes that Truman should have acted sooner, but overall, he supports Truman’s policy. Like Arnold, Gaddis argues that Stalin knew the United States and Great Britain would not allow their influence in the Mediterranean to be compromised.
In his argument, Gaddis states that the Soviets did not hastily pursue extending their influence until Stalin deemed it feasible. Additionally, Soviet intentions were not initially evident, resulting in a lack of opposition towards their expansionism at first. Unlike Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union as expansionist powers, the United States did not view authoritarian regimes as a significant security concern.
The attack on Pearl Harbor by Japan made the United States realize that they could be attacked within their own borders. Truman and other Americans recognized that as military technology progressed, their homeland could potentially become a target. Gaddis was pleased that the United States successfully combined their initial concept of a worldwide order founded on collective security with a subsequent idea aimed at offsetting the growing power and influence of the Soviet Union.
Two essays by Arnold Offner and John Lewis Gaddis have made me realize that there is no simple answer of who is right and who is wrong. Gaddis believed that the concept of containment, which was formally instilled in the Marshall Plan, would restore geopolitical stability in Europe. He argued that if time could work against the Soviet Union and favor the West, as long as Stalin had no vision of victory, he would never attack. This policy of containment would be sustained by the next several presidents following Truman.
At the beginning, the war can be perceived as an escalated dispute between two neighboring parties concerning their preferred fence model for their yards. Despite acknowledging that Stalin is not an ideal role model, it is crucial to acknowledge his humanity and the fact that his country has experienced the repercussions of war in recent years. If my neighbor had assaulted my house twice, I would definitely take measures to protect my property when given the opportunity. However, the United States had recently become involved in two worldwide conflicts and had concerns about getting embroiled in another one.
Both the United States and the Soviet Union had prior encounters with Hitler that instilled fear in them regarding potential expansion by the other country. However, they were also preoccupied with economic development and augmenting their influence. Truman possessed evidence indicating that the Soviet Union was trying to expand its control over autonomous nations. Similarly, Stalin had evidence implying that the United States was engaging in comparable expansionism, which was corroborated by recent historical occurrences.
While I support the Marshall Plan and Truman’s containment policy, my concerns lie in how it was executed under the Truman administration. It is crucial, in my viewpoint, that every country has the freedom to determine its own economic and governmental systems based on its unique needs. However, instead of granting nations this autonomy, Truman’s containment strategy aimed to prevent the Soviet Union from spreading communism elsewhere. In an ideal world, Stalin would also have the right to resist any forced imposition of democracy or capitalism by the United States.
Arnold suggests that peaceful coexistence can be attained through diplomatic approaches, such as FDR’s appeasement or negotiations from both parties. He credits Harry Truman’s actions and decisions for the United States’ current position of power. Though I personally disagree with Truman’s use of the atomic bomb and confrontational stance towards the Soviet Union, it cannot be denied that he elevated the United States to a significant role in international affairs. Whether this outcome is advantageous or requires further analysis is a separate issue.
