Khe Sanh, located in the northwest corner of South Vietnam, served as a vital base and airstrip for the U.S. Marine Corps. Its key role was to gather intelligence on movement along the Ho Chi Minh Trail due to its strategic position at the meeting point of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, and Laos. The Communists also acknowledged Khe Sanh’s significance as a potential gateway into Southern Vietnam.
General Westmoreland, upon his arrival at Khe Sanh, immediately recognized the significant role it would play in future battles. It was only in the spring of 1967, nearly five years after American troops had been stationed there, that Khe Sanh truly gained importance.
Communist Ho Chi Minh saw the natural value of Khe Sanh, making it an attractive target. By capturing the area, he could control the Ho Chi Minh Trail and advance towards the coast, effectively isolating South Vietnam’s northern provinces. This would divert American forces away from urban areas, thus weakening their defense. The objective was to replicate the success of Dien Bien Phu, a significant Vietnamese victory led by Vo Nguyen Giap that ultimately ended France’s presence in Indochina (Bowman).
Many individuals, including Westmoreland, recognized the significance of this region and grew suspicious when Special Operation Forces observed heightened traffic activity on the Ho Chi Minh Trail during the early spring. In April 1967, a Marine Corps Patrol was ambushed near a hill in the vicinity of Khe Sanh. Subsequently, from that point until May 12, 1967, the Marines launched numerous significant attacks and executed a bombing campaign aimed at the three hills surrounding Khe Sanh that were under the control of the communist North Vietnamese Army.
The American forces engaged in intense close combat resulting in 160 marines killed and 700 wounded (American History). However, they managed to defeat a People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) regiment and a significant artillery location. This victory provided General Westmoreland with confidence that U.S. outposts could withstand larger enemy numbers, as long as they had sufficient resources. As a result, he made efforts to sustain and expand these outposts, particularly the one located at Khe Sanh.
General Westmoreland’s plan had significant repercussions, as the NVA forces would launch a more potent attack the next winter. Intelligence reports on January 20, 1968, indicated the accumulation of two NVA divisions and the 304th division, which had previously been involved in the battle at Dien Bien Phu. Additionally, two artillery regiments were supposedly stationed “across the border in ‘neutral’ Laos” (Marrin).
Ho Chi Minh aimed to transform the siege of Khe Sanh into another Dien Bien Phu, as both sieges shared similarities and served the purpose of demoralizing the Americans. Initially, his strategy proved effective for the first two months of the second siege. During this time, the North Vietnamese Army (NAV) launched brutal attacks against American forces while also impeding their resupply operations through a NVA rocket and artillery attack. The consequences were dire – on January 21, only the second day of battle, the marines’ ammunition dump was destroyed.
Despite this devastating blow, which had garnered significant media attention and made the situation at Khe Sanh a focal point in news broadcasts, the morale of the American troops remained resilient. Drawing lessons from the infamous French defeat at Dien Bien Phu, General Westmoreland was determined to maintain strength and declared that Khe Sanh would not end up like its predecessor. Addressing his soldiers, Westmoreland emphatically stated, “We will not be defeated at Khe Sanh.”
I will not tolerate any talking or even thinking that goes against this. Operation Niagara was initiated and it aimed to resupply the marines at Khe Sanh through aerial methods. The execution of this operation was challenging due to unfavorable weather conditions and strong defense from the North Vietnamese Army (NVA). The defenses were so intense that the aircrafts participating in the operation had to abandon landing on the airstrip and instead deliver their cargo through low-flying parachute drops (Caputo).
Despite good intentions, the operation highlighted the significant decline in morale among US leaders. On January 23, a resupply plane delivered four large crates addressed to the ‘Fifth Graves Registration Team, Khe Sanh’, containing 4,000 pounds of body bags. This made it clear that both American leaders and troops were in need of a morale boost. Recognizing this, Commander William H. Dabney, who was in charge of an outpost during the siege, and his men made the decision to raise the American flag as a defiant act against the enemy.
Commander Dabney recounts that every day at precisely eight o’clock, the enemy would target them with mortar and artillery fire, and they would raise the flag. They had well-protected holes next to the flagpole which took about twenty-five seconds to raise the flag, matching the flight time of the artillery round. Lieutenant Matthews, a bugler, would play a somewhat hurried version of the colors on his bugle, although it often caught shrapnel.
Despite the regular PAVN rocket attacks and small attacks on new Marine Corps positions around Khe Sanh, a gesture of defiance helped boost the soldiers’ spirits. Between January 21 and February 5, these attacks resulted in the death of seven Marines. However, the defenders managed to retake the position and stay strong. Unfortunately, by mid-February, they were ultimately overrun, resulting in the death of twenty-one Marines and injuring twenty-six more (American History).
On March 6, 1968, the communists initiated their withdrawal from Khe Sanh. The final siege, known as Operation Scotland, concluded on April 1 of that year, officially ending the battle. The U.S. forces subsequently evacuated the Khe Sanh base on June 26, 1968. The outcome of the second battle of Khe Sanh, and which side emerged as the victor, remains a subject of debate. Additionally, the intentions behind the NVA’s attack, whether it served as a mere distraction, are still unclear.
Both Caputo and American History recognize that General Vo Nguyen Giap, a NVA leader, claimed that capturing Khe Sanh was not the objective of the attack. Instead, it was meant to divert American forces from other regions. However, evidence contradicts this view as the siege led to significant losses for the North Vietnamese Army. Despite conflicting opinions, the numbers clearly demonstrate the magnitude of the battle’s impact.
According to Brush, the official casualty count for the Americans was 205 killed, 1,668 wounded, and 1 missing, totaling less than two thousand. However, there was an astonishing estimate of ten to fifteen thousand total casualties for the North Vietnamese. This difference in perspective is significant – General Giap considered the battle a victory, while for the Americans it was one of their most satisfying victories (American History).
Works Cited
The Battle of Khe Sanh occurred during the Vietnam War and is referenced in multiple sources. It is discussed in both the ABC-CLIO American History book (2013) and the “Vietnam War” article in Facts About American Wars (1998). Peter Brush from Vanderbilt University’s Jean and Alexander Heard Library (n.d.) also mentions this battle in 1968.
The source of this information is a book called “10,000 Days of Thunder” written by Philip Caputo. The specific page range where the information can be found is from page 70 to page 73. The book was published by Byron Press Visual Publications, Inc. in the year 2005.
The citation for “America and Vietnam” by Albert Marrin is provided as:
Marrin, Albert. America and Vietnam. New York: Penguin Group 1992 * PBS.PBS, n.d. Web. 08 Feb. 2013
