This article concerns the reasons why the South lost the Civil War, and, as a related question, what could have been done differently to prevent a loss. Ultimately this essay argues that, for the latter questions, most of the South’s weaknesses were inherent to its political structure and political culture. Hence, the South was basically doomed to fail, though this is argued only with some reservations.
This paper will deal with two closely related but independent concepts: the reasons the South lost the Civil War and second, what they could have done differently to win it. There is a huge literature out there on this topic, and this brief paper can only deal with a small amount of it. But one of the constant themes of this literature is the differing definitions of “win.” For the South, all they needed to do is make the war expensive for the North, defending their territory. The north had to invade the south and forcibly bring them back to the union. Hence, the north had a more difficult job.
The first set of issues is the reasons why the South lost the war. These normally follow a standard list, making copious references to the South’s lack of infrastructure and inferior grades of industrial production. Low population and lack of international recognition are also cited normally as important reasons why the South lost the Civil War. To repeat these would be tiresome, and further, these do not, in themselves, show that the southern loss was inevitable. There are more subtle and less commonly cited reasons as to why the South lost that deserve our attention and these offer a better explanation for the Southern defeat and why the South could do little about them.
The basic reasons for the South’s defeat are, first of all, the lack of finished supplies. The Southern inferiority in industry hurt them greatly. It has been estimated that the North had roughly nine times that capacity as the south, including almost three times the level of population. In addition, the South also suffered from a railroad track deficit of almost three to one. These were the main causes.
However, it should be noted that history is saturated with examples of smaller, industrially weaker states winning over larger ones. The Danish rebellion against the Spanish, the American loss in Vietnam, the Serbian victories over Austria early in World War I are examples of this. The fact is that these economic reasons, widely cited, do not, in themselves, show that the South lost because of them. This is compounded by the fact that the South could have easily won a defensive war with fewer resources. According to the Amsterdam gold markets at the time, the major traders in southern bonds held that there was a 43% chance of victory for the South in 1862, after Vicksburg, that went down to 13%.Hence, more details need to be uncovered to make sense out of this.
In an early work by Lawrence Gipson, he makes the claim that a lack of morale and leadership were the real causes for the war to be lost. He holds that, first, the southern leadership did not inspire confidence, something that all states need to win wars. Second, that there was no concerted appeal to the righteousness of the southern cause or of the southern people. Propaganda was lacking from the South. Third, the final end and its justification should have been made crystal clear to the general population, something he claims was really never done. Lastly, Gipson holds that there was a substantial percentage of the southern population that was opposed to the war, or at least, was unaware of the real reasons for fighting it. The southern population, he says, was not behind the war fully.
But the most interesting piece on the failure of the South during the war is a 1983 piece by Stanley Labergott, who holds that the south, like Gipson holds, were not behind the war, and hence, they withheld supplies for the Confederate States (CSA) in times of need. They did this not so much out of a lack of patriotism, but that their commercial interests came first. Even the elite of the plantation class took their economic position more seriously than the war. This is a rather complex argument that should be dealt with in detail, since it gets to the heart of the matter: the CSA’s problems were internal and not ultimately a matter of strategy.
First, the CSA did not divert sufficient resources to assist the war effort. The commercial goals of the planter class were not to be sacrificed to the war effort, and hence, the CSA was endlessly short of supplies. Labergott holds that the supply problem so common in the literature was really not the main problem, but the fact that the private sellers of these supplies treated the army and navy as only one consumer out of many. Supplies were being traded even with the north and Europe while the army suffered.
Secondly, one of the most important causes, says Labergott, was that the main cotton growers were not willing to curtail production and export for the sake of making the British come to terms. Since England was the CSA’s best customer, it is argued here that a curtailment of supply overseas would have forced the British to back the South. But since the major cotton planters refused to do this, and refused to take any cut in their profits, the CSA suffered.
The use of slaves for the CSA’s war effort is another important cause for the lack of supplies, says Labergott. The fact is that there were many commanders who needed slave labor for short times, and were refused due to the planter’s need for this labor. But even here, the cotton crop could not be curtailed, and hence, major reserves of manpower were drained off to work in the fields, and hence, were not available for the war. This is the main cause of conscription and hence, another reason why white opinion turned against the war.
He also makes the claim that southern taxes were too low, and even these were protested by the planter class. The percentage of the military budget raised by taxes was a paltry 1%, according to Labergott, while the North’s was over 30. But the financial problem was exacerbated by the fact that few loans were ever floated both with the population and abroad. The CSA had no sense of financial acumen, and their financial inferiority to the North was not so much the problem, but the inability to use what they had. Southern merchants would not invest in their own bonds.
The North traded with anyone they could find in the South who was wiling to do so and brought them into the Northern economic orbit. Unfortunately for the CSA, there were many, and as the war progressed, the terms upon which Washington would trade with the southern states got better and better. This was a powerful tool to turn many merchants against the CSA and throw in their lot with the North. The CSA did not attempt to reciprocate this technique.
Regardless, the fact is that Labergott’s powerful article shows some subtle and interesting reasons for the southern loss. It was not their inferior position relative to the North, but their inability to have faith in their own war, or their own cause. The planter and merchant classes refused to support the CSA financially. Hence, it seems that the thesis of Gipson turns out to be correct, and that the psychological causes for the South’s loss also had a concrete, financial aspect. Some of these points have been also mentioned by Davis in his Look Away!
A History of the Confederate States of America, where he makes the claim that the southern populations were too jealous of their freedom to give any of it away to state centralization during the war, something that may have cost the South the military cohesion they needed but did not have. Divined command, says Davis, is one of the worst blunders of the southern military forces under Jefferson Davis.
Furthermore, in his 2002 piece, Richard Di Nardo makes the claim that a secondary, yet still important, reason for the South’s fall were the inferiority of the CSA’s military staffs. In good southern tradition, he holds, these staffs were loosely held together and largely did what they pleased. While other northern generals had tightly bound staffs who acted not on their own accord, but rather, as the arms and eyes of the general himself. This is important, though only rarely mentioned in the literature.
But equally as interesting are the means by which the CSA could have won the war. What did they do wrong? Some things were irreversible, such as the loss of the master strategist “Stonewall” Jackson early on in the war, in 1863 was a huge blow to southern morale. The loss of Stuart during Gettysburg was another issue, in that his absence from Lee’s headquarters led to an attack without proper intelligence background, all of which was with Stuart, who was 60 miles away in Chambersburg at the time. Some might hold that the Mississippi River needed to be held at all costs in that it was valuable for supplies, and the fact that it was necessary to keep Grant distracted in the west while Lee functioned in the east. With the fall of the river, it permitted Grant to focus entirely on the East.
One might make the point that the South relied too heavily on the traditional, frontal assault warfare common in the 19th century. This is an argument made by Daniel Sutherland, though he holds that the guerilla operations were supported, they were not supported enough, and Davis sought to utilize only traditional warfare.
The point is that since the CSA only needed to defend its territory, forcing the North to invade (which takes far more resources and men), unconventional forms of warfare that utilized the knowledge of the southern home turf could have harassed the Union sufficiently to turn Northern opinion against the war itself. Even more generally, the constant use of a defensive strategy might have delayed the northern ability to occupy the South, and gave the CSA more time to play on the increasing pacifism of northern public opinion.
Both Davis and Sutherland agree that the very nature of the southern political culture harmed the cause of the CSA. Both make reference to the endless bickering among state and local governments, state and federal governments, as well as commanders in the field. Both writers hold that the southern cause was harmed terribly by these endless divisions. It seems as if all these arguments are drawing together in the conclusion that the south lost the war because the southern mentality was too localist and individualist to bring a large state to victory in a concerted effort.
To summarize up to this point, it seems that the back approach to what the South could have done differently is tactical, in terms of guarding railroads and the Mississippi. This is simple enough to digest. But in addition, it also seems that elements of the South’s defeat were also intangible: a basic lack of interest in the war, especially when it came to the financial self interest of those involved.
Could the South have freed its slaves? This is a conceivable way to disarm the north, create a loyal black population and match the mobilization of Lincoln’s 300,000 black soldiers in the Union forces. But it is inconceivable given the number of planters who would have balked at this.
The Davis administration had not the political will to make this happen. In addition, one might make the argument that the CSA declared its independence too soon. One might use hindsight to make the claim that the declaration of secession should have occurred until the full weight of the CSA’s manpower (and importantly, seapower) was mobilized and ready for action. But even here, the government of the CSA was at the mercy of the states who made it up, again, leaving the South divided and based on local self interest rather than any sense of nationalism.
In fact, all of these are points made by Freehling in his (2001) work, South versus South: How Anti Confederate Southerners Shaped the Course of the Civil War. This work holds that the southern populations were not supportive of the secessionist movement, especially in border states such as Maryland and even Virginia, and hence, the North had a fifth column right within the CSA, a fifth column that they worked to the hilt.
But what could the CSA itself do about this? Very little, and hence, it is not really something that South could have done differently. But this is the case in nearly every point brought up in this paper: the weakness of the South was in its very nature, its own structure, and hence, not really of a military nature. This is the problem for historians now, and for CSA officers back then.
Hence, in conclusion, one might be tempted to hold that only a strictly defensive strategy, fortifying the major forts throughout the south and using guerilla warfare, could have worn down the North so the latter would sue for peace. In many ways, this essay itself holds that this is the really only tactical difference the Davis administration could have promoted. Make every inch of southern territory saturated with guerilla fighters, booby traps and localized units of resistance.
The only real purpose would be to delay the northern advance rather than stop it. The only way the CSA could have “won” is by grinding down the North in a war of attrition that would have northern opinion turn against the war itself. This paper has shown that the CSA did not have the power, the will or the support of the people for the war, and this is the greatest cause of the failure of the South. Little could have been done about this. The political power was not there, and the military command, especially after the loss of Jackson, was too loosely organized. Supplies were scarce not because of a lack of supplies, but the lack of the will to deliver the goods to Richmond.
Southern elites were not going to let the war get in the way of their slaving profits. If southern people wanted independence bad enough, the slaves would have been freed, treated as loyal southerners, and armed against the north. Butt this is a fantasy that was not going to happen. The south lost the war because of its own internal problems and lack of will. Jefferson Davis or Lee could do nothing about that.
Bibliography
- Bevin, Alexander. How the South Could Have Won the Civil War. Random House, 2007
- Davis, William. Look Away: A History of the Confederate States of America, Simon and Schuster, 2002.
- Di Nardo, Richard. “Southern by the Grace of God, Prussian by Common Sense: James Longstreet and the Exchange of Command in the American Civil War.” Journal of Military History, 66, 2002, 1011-1032
- Freehling, William. South versus South: How Anti Confederate Southerners Shaped the Course of the Civil War. Oxford University Press, 2002
- Gipson, Lawrence “The Collapse of the Confederacy.” The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 4, 1 1918 437-439
- Jelveh, Zubin. “Could the South have Won the War?” Portfolio, November 5, 2007
- Labergott, Stanley, “Why the South Lost: The Commercial Purpose in the Confederacy 1861-1865.” Journal of American History 70, 1983, 58-74
- McPhereson, James “Could the South Have Won.” New York Review of Books. June 13, 2002
- Southerland, Daniel. “Guerilla Warfare, Democracy and the Fate of the Confederacy,” The Journal of Southern History, 68, 2002, 259-292
