A Review on the Battle of the Kasserine PassDuring the series of engagement on Tunisian Campaign in World War II, the American First Armored Division suffered their first defeat near the Algerian border at the Kasserine Pass in Africa, a gap of three kilometer or two mile wide found in the Grand Dorsal Atlas Mountains ranges at West Central Tunisia. Between February 14 and 25, 1943,a battle between the Axis forces of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, the commander in chief of the combined German and Italian Panzer Army, together with the Fifth Panzer Army headed by General Hans-Jurgen Von Arnim, against the American and French Allied troops occurred and was noted as a significant part of history.It started with a visit by General Clark in a submarine to make contact with French Deputy Commander of the French XIX Corps, General Charles E.
Mast, that was stationed back then in Algiers, North Africa. This visit discovered that support of French in North America to the Anglo-American cause would indeed be established, thus resulted to mistrust between the two representatives. However, Mast did not greatly support the actual invasion of North Africa and was therefore regarded as a traitor. Mast was forced to hide; however, French loyalist units construct firm primary resistance to the Allied landings.
Under the British Army headed by Lieutenant-General Kenneth Anderson, the Allied forces in the battle at Kasserine pass consisted of the II Corps of the U.S. Army and were commanded by Major- General Lloyd Fredendall. It was on the 8th of November 1942 that the Operation Torch of British and American forces landed in Algiers by Eastern Task Force commanded by Major General Charles W.
Ryder, Center Force commanded by Major General Lloyd Fredenhall in Oran, and Western Task Force headed by Major General George S. Patton in Casablanca. This was said to be a great failure by U.S.
forces under Brigadier General Dwight D. Eisenhower, however, immediately learned of his mistakes (Gardner,2007).The defense in the western desert was actually less systematic, even with landings of the Allies that was code-named as Operation Torch. It is said that no effort was made by Allied forces, both naval or air force, to prohibit the Germans to move into Tunis.
The members of the Allied forces, established contact with the Germans in a very slow manner as the latter negotiate with local French commanders. Excellent defensive terrain only permitted the German and Italian troops, but very small in number, from entering in Tunis in November to December of 1942.On January 23, 1943, British General Bernard Montgomery’s Eigth Army took Tripoli. As a result, Rommel’s main supply base was cut.
Rommel, however, had planned to block the southern part approaching Tunesia from Tripoli. A set of extensive defense fortification which was known as the Mareth Line was occupied. The said line, which was fixed on the west by the Atlas Mountains and Gulf of Sidra on the eastern part, was intentionally built to prevent Italian attack from Libya. This great defense fortification line held Allied forces off even with only a small number of German and Italian troops (Gardner, 2007).
The Allied forces, on the other hand, already passed the Atlas Mountains and set up their base in the eastern foothills of the mountain range, an outstanding position to prevent Rommel’s troops in southern Tunisia. On Januray 30, 1943, however, Fifth Panzer Army of von Arnim already reached the eastern Atlas Mountain range. The entrances to the coastal lowlands were blocked and the Allies were trapped in the interior of the mountain range, nonetheless, was only of little concern by Rommel. He and other Axis commander, debated on their next plan for the two weeks as they headed north, however, resulted to costly delay.
On February 9, 1943, German Commander in Chief of Southern Europe, Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, then put the combined forces of General Commanders of Rommel and von Arnim to come up with an excellent plan against the Allied forces. Though the two despised each other, they planned an attack against the Americans and eventually prevent the British and French forces in the process. The enthusiasm of Rommel on the plan increased; however, he still needs the full cooperation on von Arnim’s forces to execute the possibilities of the plan.General Anderson was given notice regarding the planned attack of the Axis forces in North Africa.
This was according to a very reliable source in London, however, the information lacks the place of attack. Anderson preferred the attack to be located in the north, though without the exact knowledge of the opposition’s target. This decision, therefore, did not reinforce II Corps in the south, the actual site of attack. The assault split into two: Rommel through Gafsa and approached Kasserine three days later, and the other through Faid with Von Arnim.
It was also planned that the U.S. actions can be further disrupted by attacking two U.S.
supply bases in the west of the Mountain in Algeria. This action of Rommel enhanced their supply situation further. The 21st Panzer Division moved towards west on February 14, 1943 attacking Sidi Bou Zid. The Allied forces defeated due to poor U.
S. armor and insufficient defensive terrain and manpower. The Allied forces signaled withdrawal so that new lines can be planned at the Kasserine pass (Grant,2007).On one side of the pass, February 19, 1943, General Buelowius signaled the battle.
He was confident to catch the enemy through the pass. He was confident of his approach was to assault the Kasserine pass by German artillery fire with infantry and armor, but the Germans just withdrew as they were harassed and fell around the two Bofors guns from the American forces. Rommel studied the situation and launched an attack by recently formed 10th Panzer Division, on the next day. The assault continued towards the north through the Sbiba gap, as he expected to get the supply dumps.
It is said that conflict occurred between the German and Italian plans. In due course, this was coordinated to move towards their objective, as the attack on Sidi bou Zid ignited (Zaloga, 2007). But since U.S.
allied forces tanks, unfortunately were already outnumbered, were even lost in the battle and their counterattacks were still a failure. The German equipment owned were heavier, such as the M3 Lee and M3 Stuart tanks, and thus, were far better than light guns and inferior tanks used by the Allied forces like M3 Lee and Grant tanks. The tank includes a 75 mm gun directly to its hull resulting to a limited traversing ability while the M3 was only equipped with relatively small, 37 mm gun. Though the M4 Sherman tank, which was employed by the Allied forces during the battle, was of definite improvement, it still did not match the T 34 of the German forces.
In addition to this, the American soldiers in North Africa were poorly trained and less experienced in armored warfare. They planned to arrange, however, counterattacks, as the U.S. Commanders radioed for artillery barrage.
But still, the action was useless and resulted to mauled Combat Commands.During the battle, the German forces then split into two groups as they advanced west of north heading out of the pass. The main group of the 10th Panzer Division headed north of the two roads which was accompanied by Rommel, who went towards Thala. On the other hand, merged Italian-German force army headed Haidra as they took the southern road.
The remaining Combat Command was still unable to stop the advance on February 20, 1943. With this, the Allied troops started to pull back and they leave their equipment in the field which was then already within their reach. It is also on this day that Rommel passed out to the west and north through the Kasserine pass. On the other hand, von Arnim’s attack on the north failed, which signifies lack of support from the latter’s part.
As a result, Rommel retired from his position in Mareth and finish his offensive (Gardner,2007).On February 23 1943, as hastened by German retreat, an enormous air attack from the United States on the Kasserine pass occurred and it lasted until February 25, 1943. The pass was then clear, the Germans were gone, and the battle was over. Though the Americans suffered from casualties in the battle, they were still able to drive the Germans out the pass.
Near Cape Bon on May 12, 1943, the German-Italian troops surrendered to the Allies. Kasserine pass witnessed a series of engagements and the first defeat of the U.S. Army forces.
However, in this event, U.S. commanders quickly learned their lessons and which further gives challenge on the next Axis attack that met stronger and well commanded opponents on the Kasserine Pass.The major reason for the American defeat in the Kasserine pass is the Senior Commanders’ lack of competence and wide imagination during that time.
Being involved in the French and Arab politics, Eisenhower was not able to visit the troops before the German assault and was also late to found out that the American forces were already hopeless with the strength of the only mobile reserve. On the other hand, II Corps Commander General Fredenhall only stayed in the headquarters and lacked significant visits in their front before the attack of the Germans. His subordinate has no confidence on him as their commander due to his actions. He was then proven to be an incompetent commander and, somehow, can be that he had the tendency of becoming overconfident during the battle.
In addition to this reason, conflicting and poor command relationship resulted to confusion. For example, British General Anderson was assigned in the entire front only three only three weeks before the German attack, whose designation could actually be done earlier prior to the attack. It also a confusing fact for the Allied troops when Field Marshall Harold Alexander, a British, commanded the Allied forces while the battle is in action. At the same time, Major General Lucian Truscott served as temporary deputy of Fredendall as he was relieved and sent by Eisenhower to non-combat assignment during the actual span of the battle.
Ineffective and conflicting command led to great disorder in the command structure resulting to a disaster and defeat. It was then realized the necessity of restructuring and reorganization of the Allied command as new headquarters were created to hasten the control on operations of corps and armies and further improve their coordination (Grant,2007). On the aim of improving the performance of the army, Major General George Patton was assigned in command of II Corps, and Brigadier Leroy Irwin, was regarded as an efficient and succesful commander of the 9th Division Artillery. In addition, commanders were also given the power to make decisions without asking higher command for them to be more efficient.
However, while there are commanders being promoted, there are those who were removed in position.The U.S. forces learned to concentrate firepower, air support in particular and were able to practice a new strategy on improving air forces.
Neglecting one-on-one battle tanks and recognizing the necessity of concentrating artillery and fire tank were showed by the African Corps.On the other hand, Rommel has seen the defeat of the Americans as he observed their weaknesses, their inferior equipment and fighting ability. However, at some point, there are still few units who fought well, and Rommel commended the few U.S.
units including the 2nd Batallion, and the Orlando Ward’s First Armored Division.ReferencesGardner, R. (2007). Revisiting Kasserine Pass.
Retrieved December 09, 2007 from http://radarsite.blogspot.com/2007/07/revisiting-kasserine-pass.htmlGrant, R.
(2007). Up From Kasserine Pass. Journal of the Air Force Association.90, 72- 78.
The Battle of Kasserine Pass. (2007). The Hammer of Hell. Retrieved December 09, 2007 from http://www.
skylighters.org/hammer/chapter4.htmlThe Battle of Kasserine Pass. (2007).
This Day in History, History.com. Retrieved December 09, 2007 from http://www.history.
com/this-day-in-history.do? action=tdihArticleCategory&id=6712http://everything2.com/index.pl?node_id=1Zaloga, S.
(2007). Campaign 152: Kasserine Pass 1943, Rommel’s Last Victory. Retrieved December 09, 2007 from http://www.missing- lynx.com/reviews/other/cam152_fdesisto.html
