Introduction
The ability of an army to succeed in the war is dependent on the ability to maintain effective ideology for the war, maintain the necessary personal and military supplies and provide the needed leadership. Though Continental Army suffered great shortage of qualified men and supplies, new recruitments, use of militia groups and states commitments provided the needed supply of men and food while equipments were developed in the few local industries, stolen from the British military and others bought from Europe.
Many scholars’ conclusions consider Revolutionary War as a conflict undercut by great commitment and patriotism which saw United States emerge as the global force in the 18th and subsequent century. They argue that the ultimate success was built on the key acceptance of the inferiority that United States suffered in comparison to the highly experienced opponents (British Army)[1]. How then did the Continental Army succeed despite their many raw inexperienced men? What were the supply problems during the war? How did Washington’s inexperience contribute to poor supplies? How did the Congress help or hinder the war effort? It is from the above consideration that this paper provides an in-depth evaluation of the Continental Army and its application that saw America emerging victorious from the revolution.
A brief analysis of Continental Army and Revolution War
Continental Army was formed as a theoretical and philosophical underpinning on American Revolution which saw United States freedom from the British rule and laying the basement towards the formation of the American Army. John Locke’s ideology on political thinking on people’s rights to overthrow leaders created the force to rebel against misrepresentation of the local people in the British government system in the new England presently United States[2]. Particularly, the Americans established the ideal of “republicanism” which strongly criticized British model of governing its colonies. In 1775, Continental Congress established a resolution that created the Continental Army[3]. Under the leadership of George Washington as the Commander-in-Chief, the Army sought to consolidate militia groups and troops in individual states to fight against the British forces[4].
As the Revolution War intensified, the Continental Congress increasingly assumed the status of a sovereign state; but fears reigned of possible evolution of Continental Army into a permanent army[5]. Notably, the Army went through key reforms that were carved out of renewed efforts by Britain to defeat the revolution, American support by Prussian and French troops, and Congress near bankrupt status towards the end of the war. This army was succeeded by the American Army that was ultimately derived from the cumulative experience. Historians appear in agreement that this army was highly primitive both in command, constitution and overall planning; a factor that makes their success at times to be credited to other forces that lent a hand to them such as militia and French troops[6][7].
What were the effects on the Continental Army by having so many raw recruits compared to the British Regulars?
(a) Hard to maintain the necessary discipline
Analysts argue that large numbers of raw recruits in the army had both positive and negative implications. To begin with, it was hard to maintain the needed discipline of the forces that facilitates cooperation at all levels. With realization of the critical lack of the needed infrastructure especially weapons such as guns, canons, chemicals such as gun powder and the correct attire, Washington’s ideology and actions were completely tied-up and he had to uptake the existing militias into the army. Notably, the raw recruits subscribed to differing prior commands and therefore constant difficulties in making them adhere to the same codes of communication and discipline. In December of 1975 more than 5,000 men were recruited to boost the existing numbers which was already becoming feeble[8][9][10]. Taking into consideration of the poor communication mechanisms employed in the army, great fragmentation was inevitable. Troops in the battle ground were not in harmony with the overall demands and provisions of the congress. Consequently, they differed from their immediate generals who they considered to fail in securing their needed bounties and weaponry. On 6th December of 1975 Connecticut troops resolved to leave their camp from their differences with their general[11].
Washington’s view of a continental army though immediately opposed by the congress was correct. A fragmented raw recruitment was a major threat to the revolution’s ideology. At this point, Non-Massachusetts recruits equally viewed themselves as outsiders and therefore took longer before they could assimilate the whole ideology of military discipline and working as a team. Upon empowerment by the congress; a factor that saw greater coordination of recruitment at the state level, regiments took a greater centralized focus which ultimately transformed into the United States Army[12]. However, under the ideology that the fight was theirs, their families and therefore a patriotic liberation, it is critical to identify with the recruits who though poorly skilled, marched with determination to win the revolution that marked the platform of the American supremacy.
(b) Poor supply of military requirements
Military analysts often underscore the logistics involved in maintaining an army in war in the context of American Revolution. In any army, success depends on the ability to get the necessary supportive personal and weaponry demands. Continental Army’s raw recruits saw a very large number which though had the advantage of outdoing the skeleton British Forces, created great supplies shortage. Notably, the feeble congress by the time of the revolution lacked a clear military supplies production system; a factor that made the army use crude models such as stealing those belonging to the British and imported others from the Caribbean. Of particular consideration was the great deficit of gun powder that saw large numbers of raw recruits operate in a guerilla style only with the tradition weapons. Equally in small quantities were small arms and shells which reduced the overall effectiveness of the army against the precise British Army[13].
The large number of raw recruits further created a great shortage of military attire as both funds and materials were greatly limited. In what authors see as a desperate move by the army, some of the men resulted to taking their clothes and shoes to their families for mending. Therefore, a comparison with modern armies with highly organized supplies for periods well longer than anticipated session of wars, continental army supplies was a big joke[14]. As indicated earlier, Congress realization of the need for greater supply upon the establishment of the Continental Army was perhaps the most effective decision that saw importation of some supplies from France which made latter battles being more effective[15].
(c) Buildup of greater confidence in the Army and
While the large entry of raw recruits was perhaps one of the greatest tests for Washington’s military leadership, one cannot fail to give credit to them for commitment that was driven by patriotism for their nation. Over the years, British had used the simple model of divide and rule tactic that saw various states highly deficient in both the necessary ideology to outdo its army and the critical supplies. As a result, the notion of a combined force from different states took the colonial power by surprise. Large numbers of raw recruits created a central confidence among the troops on their noble task to liberate their nation. Taking advantage of the power in numbers, it was hard for Thomas Cage, the Massachusetts British Governor to administer the Intolerable Acts against the large numbers of new troops[16][17]. As the British forces sought to destroy the military supplies store in Massachusetts, it was the large numbers of the Continental Army that made it possible to relocate them and therefore progressed with their assault on British Strongholds as planed[18].
What was the impact of short enlistment periods?
(a) Lack of ample training time
Unlike other professions, military operations are perhaps the only ones that demand the greatest precision both in intelligence and combat applications. Short enlistment period of one year for the Continental Army therefore created a major shortage of the necessary skills for application of intelligence especially in espionage and spying. With British Army having great experience especially in radio communication, short enlistment in the Continental Army was very perilous to the Congress vision. It is estimated that between the years 1975 to 1983 a total number of about 400, 000 men were enlisted in the Continental Army of which about 164, 000 were members of different militias[19]. The war against the highly qualified British Forces was therefore a traditional one as poor training saw uptake and employment of militia tactics as opposed to well coordinated operations[20]. While their skills cannot be under-looked especially from the great commitment that they were executed with, it makes the whole credit be pegged partially to them as opposed to the congress.
(b) Poor consideration of joint operation expected in the military
A comparison of the Continental Army with other operations such as the World War II and recent war on mass destruction points at the former poor focus on joint operations. Any military operation that fails to emphasize on effective joint-operations like the Operation Eagle Crow of 1979 in Iran, risks great failure and surprises[21]. Short enlistment periods therefore lacked this critical component a consideration that could easily have led to unexpected failures. However, how applicable was joint operation in this case? Analysts indicate that short enlistment was like adding a problem to the already existing ones as it created major discontinuities as opposed to consolidating acquired skills. By giving the Army a longer enlistment period, it could have been possible to build on the existing regular men codes and upgrade militia mode of application to harmonize attacks and counterattacking the enemy; a platform that could have facilitated easier and faster winning of the critical war[22].
(c) High departure rate from the military and loss of acquired skills
The concept of military operations is a deeply theoretical based undertaking which requires extended support that anchors perseverance and ultimate achievement of the main objective. As indicated earlier, the concept is indeed hard to get and therefore the need to retain military troops for longer sessions. As a result, the one year enlistment in the military was a major cause of high departure rates and therefore loss of critical skills to counter the highly qualified Britain Army. At the fall of 1976 as more support from French forces was entrenched into the continental army, the need for longer enlistment was cited by Washington to be very critical in the emerging challenges from the British forces. During the siege of New York, the number of men had dropped to about 20, 000 as it continued shrinking after every recruitment session[23][24][25].
What were the supply problems Washington experienced with food, cloths, and arms and if supplied with the right men and equipment, could the war have been won earlier?
(a) Quartermasters logistic issues
An army with poor supplies is no better than a defeated force in that though it may have the correct ideologies as the Continental Army did, it may lack the necessary operationalization force[26][27]. Notably, though continental army and indeed all the states were highly positive in their mission, liberating themselves, both nature and human capacity appeared to work against them. By understanding these difficulties, the Quartermaster (a department to coordinate supplies and transport) was established. The quarter master therefore asked respective states to provide the necessary food, blankets, clothing and other essential items that were required by the military. Notably the quartermaster took very long before it was fully organized and therefore made more men to suffer greatly in the battle field. In addition, many people in different states were not cooperative and therefore made the Quartermaster to fail collecting enough supplies for the soldiers[28]. At this point men in the army were forced to seek alternative means of getting food and clothing by direct borrowing them from immediate households, using ineffective and old attire that reduced their efficiencies greatly[29].
Transport system for different supplies to men in the field was very poor. The supplies collected by the quartermaster often failed to get to the men in the battle field due to transport problems[30]. Even when they got to them, it was late and perishables were already spoilt and could not be useful to them. Indeed, even people involved in transporting the same supplies were never completely honest and major supplies were diverted for personal gains as the army was patriotically fighting for the nation.
(b) Monetary issues
A fact that scholars often cite to have worked against Washington’s supply consideration was lack of enough funds. During this session the Congress lacked enough Gold and Silver, as paper money was by then more worthless, to buy military requirements from Europe or even food from farmers. This created a dilemma for Washington in maintaining both recruitments and army operations as the battle ground became almost a trial and error undertaking[31]. As indicated earlier, part of the motivation to men in the army was the expected pay by the congress. However, the supply which came in form of paper currency was equally limited as congress remained undecided on models to maintain their motivation high. This put a great disadvantage to the Continental Army against the well motivated British soldiers.
(c) Lack of enough skills training services to the soldiers
One key undoing for the Continental Army was poor skills development which resulted largely due to short enlistment sessions, poor cohesion and interstates enmity that made war to initially be fought separately[32]. As a result, the uptake of militia skills was a major retrogressive aspect in that it created a reduced force in search for more effective intelligence and counterattacks mechanisms. To emphasize on this fact, a major difference was evident after the arrival of Baron von Steuben from Prussia who facilitated strong development of counter skills and survival strategies[33]. Indeed, it was after inculcation of new skills from Baron and latter arrival and support by General Rochambeau that siege of New York in the Battle of Chesapeake was successful and Britain had to surrender[34].
How did Washington’s inexperience contribute to the lack of men and equipment?
(a) Emphasis on Civilian control of the military
While reference to Washington has always been heroic, few writers have tried to focus on how he greatly contributed to key inefficiencies and particularly on lack of enough men and equipment to the Continental Army. To begin with Washington emphasized on application of civilian control in the military. Civilian control of the military withdraws the direct command of the military and entrusts it on political leadership. As a result, the experienced professionals become directly sidelined as dynamics of the political process especially in a poorly defined democracy (such as United States during the American Revolution era) are highly egocentric. At this point, Washington can only be considered to be selfish because he understood Congress supported him irrespective of his inexperience but he never cited the need for a more qualified commander-in-chief[35].
By supporting the civilian control model, Washington, unknowingly rendered him powerless in that both equipments and men for the army had to be approved and manned by the Congress. As a result, reverse trend took control of all supplies where Washington had to report to the congress for supplies[36]. This model limited the overall time for facilitating supplies that greatly impaired the respective efficiencies in the field. A good example is the 1776 Washington’s recommendations to broaden recruitment base which was not directly accepted. It was indeed hard for the political elites in the congress to figure out the real situation in the field and therefore major delays that could have led to great defeat in the field.
(b) Poor planning and lack of long term focus
Army planning and management calls for strong vision that goes well beyond the men operating in the field. Continental Army planning however assumed a highly fragmented operation that saw respective men easily loose faith in their immediate leaders and the whole congress. Washington’s proposal and emphasis to maintain short time enlistment had the following negating effects on availability of supplies and more soldiers. First, most men from the military created a negative perception of the military and discouraged others from joining it to fight the patriotic war. This negative implication could have been avoided if Washington had long-term plans and extended enlistment periods effectively[37]. As indicated earlier, both payments, diseases, war equipments and even lack of enough food were enough considerations to make a man change his mind and indeed perception of the revolution.
With communities understanding how their sons were suffering, their refusal to give supplies can be understood. Though they understood the negative implications that British rule had to them, it was hard to compare it with the seemingly worse conditions marred by torture in the hands of British troops, suffering from harsh weather conditions and unpredicted deaths, with unclear visionary revolution[38][39]. Washington’s plan failed to factor these shocking effects by the community and therefore made his plan susceptible to public emotions. The public could not easily release their sons to go and suffer in their military.
(d) Intensive use of local militia groups
Throughout the war, Washington appeared to lack an effective model that could empower the Continental Army. In particular the constant reference to militia groups created a consideration that there was enough backup against the British forces. Key Militias were called in battles such as the Cowpeas and the siege of New York. In the former Battle of Cowpeas, militias such as Virginia Battalion led by Triplett Frank, Georgia militia under Cunningham and North Carolina Militia led by McDowell made Washington to have a great win over the British troops[40]. Owing to their long time experience, Washington should have considered assimilating these militias into the army, however, lack of this consideration maintained a clear deficit of men to the Continental Army.
How did Congress help or hinder the war effort. Was new technology available that could have helped the young American Army?
(a) Congress’s help on the war effort
Congress was perhaps the most instrumental factor in determining the orientation of the Continental Army. Its input was however both supportive and at times a major obstacle that largely limited and disappointed the Army’s operations. First, the congress was made up of a congregation of strong republicans such as Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson and John Adams among others (generally referred to as the founding fathers) who coined the need for a revolution. Indeed, most historians have differed on the notion that Congress was at any time an obstacle against the Continental Army by pointing that it could never negate its very own initiated ideology[41]. Congress formed the final reference in decision making towards raising and gathering supplies for the army. The congress raised money, procured food and even military equipments for the army in the field. Immediately after Washington’s assumption of the role as the Commander-in-Chief of the Continental Army, he pointed at the critical shortage of gunpowder and small arms. About 90% of the supplies had been imported from France by the end of year 1776[42][43].
As revolution intensified, Congress assumed a more central role in the propagation of the war especially in creating the new vision. Though it was not easy for the new ‘brooding’ administration to anchor the revolution process due to non-existence of relevant infrastructure; it managed to hold high the portrait of new America to the nation and the army. The drawing of declaration of independence created a new force in Washington’s men who were appearing exhausted towards the end of war. Indeed, Washington held the declaration in his hands as he led over 20,000 men in the siege of New York[44].
(b) Congress as an obstacle to the war
However, it is important to indicate that Congress equally remained a major obstacle towards the war effort. As indicated earlier, the congress failed to emphasize on high professionalism from the beginning, a factor that almost saw the army being defeated during its war in New York. Washington was indeed poorly qualified to take the role of the Commander-in-Chief, however, congress made no efforts in seeking a more qualified person as the war progressed. In addition, Congress’s emphasis on remaining the ultimate decision maker on core issues of the Army caused major delays especially in supplies for war[45][46]. This made it hard to strengthen the Army against the highly experienced British soldiers.
Though some analysts argue that it is essential to look at Congress in the context of time and the immediate difficulties they faced by then, a factor which is indeed correct, it is essential at times to compare it with present military operations. The congress failed to establish a strong incentive that would bind the army to the long-term vision of liberating America. The congress failed to honor payments to the men who were leaving the army after their enlistment was over. This created a very negative image that even saw some residents resist cooperating with the Continental Army especially in supplying them with relevant supplies. Another major failure that Congress made was withdrawing its support to the Continental Army as it appeared that British was winning in the New York war even after the Declaration of Independence[47]. However, Washington retreated before he was supported by more militias and French soldiers to ultimately defeat the British Army which appeared to be gathering momentum.
Though technology was still less developed compared to present times, it is important to note that the existing one could still have greatly helped the Continental Army in defeating the British. Globally, this technology was available especially from Europe where mass production to support large conflicts was done[48]. For instance, Prussia, France and Germany had well established production systems for war equipments. However, this technology was only partially available to the continental army as New England lacked production units for the new communication and war equipments. As a result, they had to be imported from Europe while others were impounded from the British forces.
How could this poorly equipped army beat the most experienced standing army of the time?
Continental Army’s ability to win the war against the highly experienced British Army was a culmination of a number of factors. First, the underlying spirit for revolution against the British government undercut the whole Continental Army’s driving force as outlined by the Congress. The drive which Washington greatly utilized created a sense of liberty, freedom and therefore the ultimate break from the bondage of the British[49]. Notably, this ideology assumed an ascending tempo which climaxed in The Declaration of Independence and surrender of the British forces. The war was therefore an ideological one, a war necessitated by the time for change having reached, it could not be lost.
Compared to the British Army, Continental Army under Washington was greatly inexperienced. As a result, Congress sought assistance from more experienced personnel to train the men in the battle ground. For instance, Baron von Steuben from Prussia greatly helped in acquisition of new skills which improved tactical approaches in attacks and counterattacks on British Army. Other supportive efforts included French army and Spanish men who were equally displeased by the British both in New England and in Europe.
Finally, the input of the local militias provided an invaluable force against the British forces whish Washington relied on to win major battles during the revolution[50]. Though the militias operated largely from a localized perspective, they created the required large numbers of men required to defeat the British Army. By using the militias, Washington was able to avoid having an extremely large army factoring the notion that even the regular men he held were already hard to maintain and support with required supplies.
Conclusion
From the above discussion, this paper concludes by supporting the thesis statement, “though Continental Army suffered great shortage of qualified men and supplies, new recruitments, use of militia groups and states commitments provided the needed supply of men and food while equipments were developed in the few local industries, stolen from the British military and others bought from Europe.” Supplies to the Continental Army wit men and military requirements turned out to be one of the major setbacks for its effective operation against the highly qualified British Army. From the establishment of the Army, it came out clearly that neither the Congress nor the Commander-In-Chief, Washington, had the correct experience to navigate key operations for the vision of revolution to be realized. It further came out in the discussion that both Washington and Congress assumed key crucial responsibilities that defined the operations of the Army; however, they equally wielded major limiting considerations for faster progress. If planning was executed in a more strategic model that factored long-term orientation, it is no doubt that this war could have been won faster that it took. However, external forces were very crucial as they came to reinforce the fast dwindling Continental Force and leveraged the ultimate defeat and surrender by the British.
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