Domestic Economic Objectives of Joseph Stalin on 1928-1937

Joseph Stalin’s First and Second Five Year Plans Abstract As an adolescent residing in a Post-Soviet State, where the successes and failures of Joseph Stalin’s economic policies are hotly debated to this day, it is important to hold a discerning opinion. Therefore the research for this extended essay is conducted according to the question: “To what extent were Joseph Stalin’s Five-Year Plans from 1928 to 1937 successful in achieving the domestic economic goals, which he had designated? Hence the scope of the investigation is an examination of Stalin’s first two Five-Year Plans from 1928 to 1937 as well as the evaluation of the successes and failures of these plans in relation to the economic objectives of Stalin. From the evidence, arguments and counter-arguments it may be concluded that Stalin achieved his designated economic objectives to a very large extent. Overall an increase industrial output as well as development in the infrastructural sector was evident. Nevertheless in the course of such a steep development curve, Stalin overlooked human development and living standards.

Lastly it is important to mention that the research question: “To what extent were Joseph Stalin’s Five-Year Plans from 1928 to 1937 successful in achieving the domestic economic goals which he had designated? ” was chosen solely out of personal interest for Joseph Stalin Five-Year Plans. Thus the essay will also argue the personal perspective that although heavily criticized for overlooking humanitarian issues in regards to the economy Joseph Stalin managed to achieve almost all of his economic goals through his uncompromising economic policies. Word count: 245 Acknowledgements

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Alex Rakochy (IB Diploma History and MYP Humanities Instructor) – for support and instruction throughout the extended essay project Alish Kerimov (Hero of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Astarkhanbazar Kolkhoz) – for participating in an interview Aydin Kerimov (Russian Historian, Senior Fellow to the Azerbaijani State University) – for participating in an interview for research purposes Dominic Larkin (Secondary School Librarian) – for help in finding printed and web resources Jamil Hasanli (Member of the Azerbaijani Parliament and a Cold War historian) – for participating in an nterview for research purposes Mehman Abbas (Senior Strategic Planning Expert, Group Strategic Planning Department at Islamic Development Bank) – for participating in multiple interviews for research purposes Contents Introduction5 Background to Stalin’s Five Year Plans5-6 The First Five Year Plan 1928 – 19327-8 The Second Five Year Plan 1933 – 19378-10 Conclusion10-11 Appendices12 Works Cited13-14 To what extent were Joseph Stalin’s Five-Year Plans from 1928 to 1937 successful in achieving the domestic economic objectives he had designated?

Joseph Stalin firmly believed in the fact that a communist state cannot prosper without a centralized economy or economic autarky (Stalin on Autonomy 1). Upon ascending to power after Lenin’s death in 1924 he pursued this overarching economic goal by designing certain economic plans (Laver 2-3). In theory these relatively minor economic plans would in aggregate develop the USSR into a global economic superpower.

Stalin’s economic plans came in the form of Five-Year Plans, of which two are discussed to analyze the successes and failures in achieving domestic economic objectives designated. The objective of the First Five-Year plan was the improvement of infrastructure, collectivization of land as well as industrial expansion and development (Edgar 269). The Second Five-Year plan by Stalin gave heavy industry top priority (Encyclopedia Britannica Second Five-Year Plan) while also aiming to improve communications and the completion of collectivization (Harry The Goals of Stalin’s Five Year Plans).

In order to fully tackle the question it is necessary to understand the general economic aura in the USSR as well as the reasons for Five Year Plans before developing a discussion as to how successful Stalin’s policies were in achieving his economic objectives and ultimately his overarching objectives of economic autarky and a centralized economy. Posterior to his questionable appointment as part of the Troika in 1922 by Vladimir Lenin, Stalin revealed his economic plans during the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Party Congresses in 1925 and 1927 respectively (Todd 71).

After the 1928 introduction of the First Five Year Plan, Joseph Stalin declared, “We are 50 to 100 years behind all advanced countries. We must cover this distance in 10 years. ” (Oracle “Russia under Stalin”). The initial policy, which Joseph Stalin undertook to accomplish the improvement of infrastructure, collectivization of land as well as industrial expansion and development, was the decree of the First Five Year Plan (FYP1) in October of 1928 (Kennedy 363). Stalin expressed in 1928 that the objective of FYP1 was collectivization of land as well as industrial expansion and development (Edgar 269).

In order to achieve the desired results from the Five-Year Plans Stalin created the Central Planning Committee more commonly known as Gosplan (Fiehn & Corin 177). Gosplan was responsible for imposing the orders of the Five Year Plans, in order to ensure Stalin’s hardline economic policies were fulfilled (Fiehn & Corin 177). This policy would, as Stalin officially declared, help monitor economic activity taking place on the vast territory of the USSR (Fiehn & Corin 176).

Furthermore, it would help Stalin to directly intervene in the agricultural and industrial sectors in order to achieve the economic objectives which he had designated. To achieve industrial development and expansion as well as land collectivization during a short period of time, several actions were undertaken. Primarily Stalin sped up the collectivization and imposed the prohibition of small private industry Lenin had permitted as a part of his New Economic Policy (Staniforth 27).

The relatively wealthy peasants or kulaks were eliminated as a social class during the creation of collectivized farms and state owned farms in 1928, known in the USSR as kolkhoz and sovkhoz respectively (Kerimov). Secondly, the economy was completely centralized and the law punished those who did not share all resources and work towards communed effort. Following the December 1st Law of 1934 violators of the principle of communed effort and sharing were also unable to appeal under the Soviet Constitution (Sebag 151).

The uncompromising nature of Stalin’s economic policies coupled with the harsh changes in the constitution meant that the average worker would face longer working hours, and receive less in return due to rationing. The negative side effects caused by the FYP1 and the Second Five Year Plan were detrimental to Soviet society because it reduced living standards. Five Year Plans ultimately would lead to a 250% increase in the USSR’s overall output by 1937; the end of the Second Five-Year Plan therefore they can be considered a success (Jamil Hasanli).

On the other hand, the argument lies that Stalin degraded the well being of the general population due to the fact that he was achieving his uncompromising economic goals, which overlooked human development and living standards. Nevertheless, economists such as Mehman Abbas consider it extremely important to take into account that the USSR at the time was under-industrialized and under-developed compared to Western Europe and the USA, therefore it could not be expected to yield the same social welfare level.

Such reasoning is questionably however as the Soviet Union was based on the ideals of a welfare state. Prior to 1926 Lenin’s NEP failed to produce enough grain to pacify domestic demand (Traynor 226). In response to the grain shortage, Nikolai Bulganin stated in 1925 that the policy towards the countryside should be relaxed and allow kulak farms, to stoke production (Beers Russian Collectivization). Stalin was in complete opposition to the allowance of kulak farms and relaxed policies. He believed the allowance of kulak farms could lead to chaos in the countryside (Beers Russian Collectivization).

Stalin’s opposition to kulak farmers stemmed from the fact that during grain shortages kulak farmers refused to sell grain in expectations of larger profits in the future (Jamil Hasanli). Under Lenin’s NEP the agricultural production of the USSR had been estimated to expand over 50% in 1926 in comparison to 1918 (Hosking 151). Nevertheless, Stalin considered such economic growth sluggish (Lewis & Whitehead 61), and the shortages of grain in 1927 presumably reinforced his support base within the party. Therefore, by collectivizing land with the assistance of the Gosplan and other state entities, Stalin initiated the FYP1.

In 1928 the Gosplan, and Stalin’s advisors had informed Stalin that the USSR’s agricultural sector was in shortage of 250,000 tractors (Simkin Five Year Plan). Presumably Stalin accredited the lack in agricultural industry to Lenin’s NEP to provide lip service to the proletariat or simply to find a scapegoat. Additionally, Stalin was informed that the oil fields of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan needed to be developed to an extent in which they possessed the sufficient output capacity to supply the Soviet agricultural and industrial sector with fuel (Jamil Hasanli).

Furthermore, the Soviet Union faced massive electrical power outages (Jamil Hasanli), which were in most cases essential for the industries and increasing output. Therefore, the FYP1 was issued in October 1928 in order to tackle lags in communications, collectivization, and output. In order to achieve his objective of industrial development and expansion, Stalin expressed that the USSR would be focusing on the development of iron and steel, machine tools, electric power and transport (Fiehn & Corin, 181).

Such rigid focus on Stalin’s objectives was allowed due to complete state planning. In relation to development of communications, the construction of modern towns such as Stalinsk, Magnitogorsk, and Karaganda as well as the renovation of the Trans-Siberian railway showed that infrastructure in the USSR was developing (Alish Kerimov). On the other hand, Alish Kerimov, a man titled the Hero of the Soviet Union stated that in his village, located in Celilabad, Azerbaijan, infrastructural development was not evident.

New combine harvesters and tractors were provided however the infrastructure remained poor and during cold seasons private transportation of goods became extremely difficult. However, Alish Kerimov also stated the fact that their goods were collected and crops were not left to rot even in extreme situations such as blizzards. Taking this into consideration it is possible to confidently state that Stalin did not achieve his economic objective of improving connections to the fullest extent possible.

Nevertheless, it is also important to consider the counter-argument that due to domestic difficulties and the rush to industrialization the absolute necessities, such as fuel from Azerbaijan, was a higher priority than the infrastructure of a Celilabad. Additionally a reliable conclusion cannot be drawn from a rural sample in the USSR. The FYP1 can be considered as a success when considering certain aspects of industry, however the general economic situation in the USSR was not black and white. Primarily, Stalin succeeded in increasing the supply of the two main strategic goods of the USSR – oil nd coal (Fiehn & Corin 180). During the FYP1 output of oil increased from 11. 7 to 21. 4 million tons, and coal production increased from 35. 4 to 64. 3 million tons (Staniforth 32). This indicated that the USSR managed to increase its oil and coal production almost 100% in less than five years. New tractor factories were built in Stalingrad in order to supply the deficit of tractors. In 1932 tractor production, measured in thousand 15 horsepower units, rose to 50. 8 in comparison to a mere 1. 8 in 1928 (Fiehn & Corin 180).

Despite the access to the tractors granted by Machine Tractor Stations (MTS), grain shortages still prevailed in the USSR, as production was 32% below average (Conquest). On top of that Stalin also had set an objective to develop communications, thus cities such as Stalinsk, Magnitogorsk, and Karaganda were constructed (Alish Kerimov). However, as abovementioned, Alish Kerimov’s statements during his interview could be considered in two ways. Either the Celilabad region of Azerbaijan was completely overlooked during economic planning, or rural regions were not the main focus of the Soviet Government.

Both cases express negative sides of the FYP1 because the prior shows the inefficiency of central planning while the latter shows that the importance of rural regions were simply disregarded. In addition to this marginal failure it is important to consider that the economy of the USSR failed to achieve the plan in some areas because the FYP1 had set goals to increase for example coal production to 75 million tons (Staniforth 32), while electricity increased 215% in comparison to the 335% as planned (Mehman Abbas).

Additionally, due to Stalin’s heavy concentration on the energetics sectors, the general population experienced a shortage of woolen cloth meaning that there was a shortage of clothes (Mehman Abbas). Stalin also made great emphasis on quantity of goods produced within the economy therefore factories and farmers would sometimes produce substandard goods in order to meet the economic demands. As such, it can be presumed that individuals or government organizations either undertaking or monitoring economic activity were determined to achieve the designated objectives.

Therefore, they pursued the quantity over quality, which creates an issue when the achievement of goals is measured. For example, in FYP1 most production goals were achieved but if the goods were of a substandard nature this would strongly detract from Stalin’s success. However, there is no solid evidence regarding the issue, except for the fact that cotton produced within the USSR was of poor quality (Mehman Abbas). Furthermore, it is essential to understand the fact that all the Five Year Plans achievements could be a matter of producing enough substandard goods to satisfy Stalin with statistics.

Unfortunately in retrospect it is merely possible as a historiographer to draw conclusions from statistics and reconnaissance, which are at times extremely misleading. The USSR is infamous for its use of public economic documents as propaganda tools rather than accurate representations of the economy and as it allowed limited foreign analysis of its economy one cannot be reassured that the statistics used are accurate. Finally, in relation to FYP1 it can be stated that Stalin succeeded in accomplishing his economic objectives to a large extent despite certain difficulties.

Industry experienced a colossal expansion of 93. 7% in a mere 4 years and 3 months (Riasanovsky & Steinberg 487) and new towns were constructed and railways were renovated. Stalin followed up his economic stratagem by introducing the Second Five Year Plan (FYP2) in 1933. Stalin again set the expectations extremely high, which had to be scaled back in order to provide more focus on economic consolidation than simply production (Fiehn & Corin 183). He aimed to increase coal output to 150 million tons and double the production of steel and machine tools (Staniforth 32).

Stalin gave top priority to heavy industry during the FYP2 due to its potential to increase the capacity of capital good production (Encyclopedia Britannica Second Five-Year Plan). This would allow the USSR to produce its own consumer or finished goods in the future, as, in 1932, most consumer goods were imported. As such the USSR faced a trade deficit, which Joseph Stalin was determined to remedy and ultimately establish the USSR as an economically autarkic state. Furthermore, collectivization was not completed and FYP2 would continue the process of collectivization in the USSR (Riasanovsky & Steinberg 490).

In 1937 the Gosplan calculated the achievements of the FYP2 and it became explicit that the Soviet Union had made significant progress. Oil production increased from 21. 4 million tons to 28. 5 million tons and the coal production increased almost 100% now standing firmly at 128 million tons (Staniforth 32). In a period of four years such increases in sources of energy in the USSR showed that the industrial sector was well supported energetics-wise. Stalin had expanded industry of the USSR to the extent that its share in world production amounted to 13. % in 1937 (Riasanovsky & Steinberg 492). The production goals for steel and machinery tools significantly rose, and in these areas Stalin over fulfilled his objective of 100% increase and the USSR was now one of the largest steel and iron-ore producers in the world (Riasanovsky & Steinberg 492). Furthermore, projects labeled as “prestige projects” by Stalin as a part of the development of communications lead to the construction of the Moscow underground as well as the modernization of the central regions of Celilabad, Azerbaijan (Kerimov).

Thus it can be suggested that the Gosplan had actually gained experience from FYP1, which had allowed them an increased level of efficiency in central planning. On the other hand, as the previous economic policy introduced by Stalin, the FYP2 also had negative effects on the economy. By 1937 all individual tendency to excel in different areas had significantly decreased mainly due to the repetitive tasks issued by the Gosplan, which were to be carried out (Laver & Waller, 30). This can be accredited to the intolerance of diversity, which Stalin introduced after coming to power (Laver & Waller, 30).

In addition, although coal production did boom it did not reach Stalin’s goal of 150 million tons (Staniforth 32). Moreover, former Soviet citizens claim that in 1935 there were no razorblades or frying pans in Leningrad (Jamil Hasanli). Presumably Stalin was less concentrated upon the development of social standards because his priority as stated in his 1928 speech was to make up an economic lag of 50-100 years in only 10 years. Considered a success by Stalin but a failure in the practical sense was the White Sea – Baltic Canal or the Belomor Canal (see appendix 1).

The USSR had poured investment into creating a canal from the White Sea to the Baltic Sea, which would aid USSR trade and navy wise. In reality this project was a failure. The death rate was estimated to be 60,000 mainly due to freezing and working to unbearable exhaustion as most of the workers were prisoners in Gulags (Staniforth 32). Ultimately the canal was useless because Soviet ships could not pass through it: it was too narrow and too shallow (Gorky, Averbakh, Firin, Williams-Ellis 356).

Despite such failures, Stalin’s FYP2 can be considered a success when considering his objectives which were the expansion of industry, improvement of communications as well as the completion of collectivization. When addressing collectivization it can be said that 25,000,000 individual farms had been transformed into 250,000 kolkhozes (Riasanovsky & Steinberg 492). This transformation as Stalin had predicted in 1928 would allow more efficiency when farming land. When coupled with the growth in tractor numbers, in thousand 15 hp units, from 50. 8 in 1932 to 173. 2 in 1936 economic growth was to look sterling (Corin & Fiehn 180).

However the situation was not quite so, as grain production had increased a mere 1. 7 million tons in comparison to the 1928 figure of 73. 3 (Corin & Fiehn, 171). This showed that the kolkhoz and sovkhoz farms were slightly more efficient than private farming, which shows that Stalin’s collectivization policy was marginally successful. Nevertheless, it can equally validly be claimed that Stalin had succeeded. 24,000,000 individuals had left the countryside to uptake a job in the bigger cities’ industrial sectors during FYP2 (Riasanovsky & Steinberg 492), which meant that the workforce producing grain had significantly decreased.

Thus merely maintaining the 1928 levels of grain production can be considered a success rather than the failure of collectivization. Furthermore, in regards to Stalin’s policies concerning communication it is important to address the most important project of the FYP2, the White Sea – Baltic Canal. This canal had the great potential to bring a trade and military advantage to the USSR. However its depth was 3. 5m in the shallowest regions (Gorky, Averbakh, Firin, Williams-Ellis 356). This meant that major navy vessels as well as cargo ships carrying goods could not pass through it.

Such action was an absolute wastage by Stalin’s Gosplan, and expresses the failure of Stalin concerning the communications objective of the FYP2. On the other hand prestige projects and development of infrastructure in regions such as Celilabad express a success in terms of developing communications, nevertheless the failure to successfully construct the Belomor Canal outweighs such successes. Lastly, and probably what Stalin overachieved, was giving heavy industry top priority to boost output in the USSR. For example since the plan began in 1933 electric output had been increased to 36. billion kWh and power shortages had become extremely rare in urban cities. Iron, copper and steel had doubled in production since the end of FYP1 in 1932, and although Stalin had failed to achieve his coal output goal, other production levels outweighed this failure. Therefore when considering the successes and failures of development in industry, communications, and collectivization it is important to state that Stalin was to a certain extent successful in achieving his designated economic objectives. Judgment of the first two FYPs is complicated as it is a controversial issue.

There are two sides to the argument, firstly it is possible to consider Stalin’s economic plans a success to a large extent, and secondly the contrary. According to my argument Stalin succeeded in achieving his designated economic objectives. Such a conclusion is reached because Stalin in FYP1 developed industry, commenced collectivization and improved communications in the USSR. He managed to tackle problems such as the tractor shortage, and the lack of industry in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan’s energetics industry. He did not completely eradicate these problems however it is important to consider that such progress was made in over 4 years.

Equally importantly FYP2 was to a certain extent a success in achieving Stalin’s designated objectives despite certain difficulties. Stalin had managed to increase output by improving heavy industry, communications as well as completing the collectivization process. In aggregate, it can be said that the abovementioned facts and opinions support the argument asserted however there is another side to the argument. Stalin could be considered a failure in reference to him trying to achieve his designated economic objectives.

In support of the counterargument one can state that during FYP2 hardly any of his objectives such as coal production reached their designated production levels. Furthermore it can be stated that the horrific failure in the construction of the Belomor Canal during FYP2 made it clear that Stalin did not achieve his goal of improving communications. Nevertheless, when holding the two extremes of success and failure side by side is possible to come to the conclusion that Stalin was to a certain extent successful in achieving his designated economic objectives during the First and Second Five Year Plans from 1928 to 1937.

Finally as mentioned in the introduction Stalin also had certain overarching objectives, more specifically – economic centralization, and economic autarky. During FYP1 and 2 Stalin succeeded in centralizing the USSR’s economy to the largest extent in Russian or Soviet history. He had established a firm grip over the economy by using state entities, particularly the Gosplan. Furthermore, Stalin resorted to aggressive methods such as pogroms, purges or exile when encountering domestic dissent for his economic policies, which was another factor reinforcing economic centralization in the USSR.

Secondly, concerning economic autarky, it can be stated quite confidently that Stalin achieved this economic goal to a limited extent when considering FYP1 and 2. The USSR still experienced grain shortages as well as a shortage in consumer goods in 1937, in other words the end of FYP2. Thus the USSR depended upon imports of certain goods in order to pacify domestic demand. During FYP1 and 2 Stalin failed in achieving his overarching economic goals.

Nevertheless, it is important to consider that Stalin’s dominance over the higher echelons of government in the USSR continued until 1953 and his overarching economic goals were intended to be achieved in the long term rather than in a short period of 9 years. Appendices 1. Einstein, Norman. “White Sea – Baltic Canal. ” Wikipedia. 6 Nov. 2005. Web. 10 Jan. 2012. <http://en. wikipedia. org/wiki/File:White_Sea_Canal_map. png>. Works Cited Abbas, Mehman. “Economic and Political Analysis of the USSR. ” Personal interview. 8 Sept. 2011. Beers, George. “Russian Collectivization. Master & Margarita. Web. 4 Dec. 2012. <http://www. masterandmargarita. eu/archieven/collectivization. pdf>. Conquest, Robert. The Great Terror: Stalin’s Purge of the Thirties. New York: Macmillan, 1968. Print. Deardorff, Alan V. “International Economics Glossary: C. ” U-M Personal World Wide Web Server. World Scientific Publishers, 2006. Web. 10 Feb. 2012. <http://www-personal. umich. edu/~alandear/glossary/c. html>. Edgar, Adrienne Lynn. Tribal Nation: The Making of Soviet Turkmenistan. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2006. 269. Print. Einstein, Norman. “White Sea – Baltic Canal. Wikipedia. 6 Nov. 2005. Web. 10 Jan. 2012. <http://en. wikipedia. org/wiki/File:White_Sea_Canal_map. png>. Fiehn, Terry, and Chris Corin. “How Did Stalin Transform the Economy of the USSR in the 1930s? ” Communist Russia under Lenin and Stalin. London: John Murray, 2002. 150-99. Print. Gorky, Maksim, L. Averbakh, Semen Georgievich Firin, and Amabel Williams-Ellis. The White Sea Canal: Being an Account of the Construction of the New Canal between the White Sea and the Baltic Sea,. London: John Lane, 1935. Print. Harry, Tim. “The Goals of Stalins Five Year Plans – by Tim Harry – Helium. Helium – Where Knowledge Rules. Helium, 01 May 2010. Web. 1 Sept. 2011. <http://www. helium. com/items/1160457-the-goals-of-stalins-five-year-plans>. Hosking, Geoffrey A. “Revolution from Above. ” The First Socialist Society: a History of the Soviet Union from within. 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1992. 149-83. Print. Jonathan Lewis and Phillip Whitehead. “Stalin: A Time for Judgment”. Random House. New York, 1990. 61. Print Kennedy, Paul Michael. “The Coming of a Bipolar World 1919-42. ” The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000.

London: Fontana, 1989. 250+. Print. Kerimov, Aydin. “Stalin’s Economic Plans. ” Personal interview. 10 Sept. 2011. Laver, John, and Sally Waller. “High-Stalinism. ” Triumph and Collapse: Russia and the USSR, 1941-1991. Cheltenham: Nelson Thornes, 2009. 36-47. Print. Malcher, George C. Blank Pages: Soviet Genocide against the Polish People. Woking: Pyrford, 1993. Print. Riasanovsky, Nicholas V. , and Mark D. Steinberg. “Industry and Agriculture – 1939. ” A History of Russia. New York: Oxford UP, 2005. 468-91. Print. Sebag, Montefiore Simon. Stalin: the Court of the Red Tsar.

London: Orion, 2003. Print. “Second Five-Year Plan. ” Encyclopedia Britannica. Encyclopedia Britannica Online. Encyclopedia Britannica Inc. , 2012. Web. 10 Feb. 2012. Simkin, John. “Five Year Plan. ” Spartacus Educational. Spartacus Educational. Web. 10 Feb. 2012. <http://www. spartacus. schoolnet. co. uk/RUSfive. htm>. Staniforth, James. “Section 1 USSR and Marxism. ” Aqa As History Totalitarian Ideology in Theory and Practice, C. 1848-1941. Gardners, 2008. 10-44. Print. Time Magazine US. “Stalin on Autonomy. ” Rev. of Stalin on Autonomy TIME. Time 14 Feb. 1944: 1. Print. Traynor, John. 9 The growth in popularity of the Bolshevik Party: February-October 1917. ” Challenging History Europe 1890-1990. NelsonThornesLtd, 2002. 226-239. Print. Todd, Allan. “The USSR, 1924-53. ” Democracies and Dictatorships: Europe and the World, 1919-1989. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2001. ——————————————– [ 1 ]. Autarky is the political and economic quality of being self-sufficient (Deardorff “International Economics Glossary”). [ 2 ]. Troika in the political sense means a committee of three. In this case specifically Troika was the collective government consisting of Stalin, Trotsky and Zinoviev [ 3 ].

The relatively wealthy peasant category varied around the USSR. For example in Latvia peasants were considered kulaks if they had owned more than 30 hectares of land or employed manual labor while in mainland Russia kulaks were characterized by hoarding grain. [ 4 ]. Rationing refers to a system, which allows a limited amount of a commodity, usually designated by the government in periods of shortage. [ 5 ]. Human development is development measured though the HDI index, which accounts life expectancy, education and GDP per capita (Deardorff “International Economics Glossary”). 6 ]. Demand in this case refers to the willingness and ability to purchase a specific good at a given price and time (Deardorff “International Economics Glossary”). [ 7 ]. The Gosplan had accumulated economic information since the Bolshevik revolution and possessed a massive pool of data utilized by Stalin and his advisors (Fiehn & Corin 177). [ 8 ]. Capital goods are goods used to create other goods for example crude oil (capital good) is refined to create petrol (finished good) (Deardorff

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