Free Speech, Pornography and the RelationshipBetween Law and MoralitySuppose one accepts MacKinnon and Dworkin s suggestedstatutory definition of erotica. How does one whogenerally accepts MacKinnon and Dworkin s positions on thepervasively harmful consequence of erotica, and who accepts a needfor legal damages of the injuries perpetrated by erotica, dealwith adult stuff? The regulation proposed by MacKinnon and Dworkin would dealwith such stuff by ordaining statute law which gives peopleadversely affected by the plants, which clearly fit theirdefinition of erotica, a cause of action against theproducers, sellers, exhibitioners or distributers fortrafficking, or for an assault straight caused by thespecific work. I do non believe progressives, or others for that affair, shouldhave much job with the clause covering with assault, since acausal connexion to specific plants is demanded by it.
However, s. 3.2 ( three ) which deals with trafficking would be veryproblematic for progressives and legal conservativists because itcreates a cause of action for a individual contrary to thetraditional construct of a rights holder s cause of action.This subdivision reads: Any adult female has a claim hereunder as a adult female moving against the subordination of adult females. Any adult male, kid or transsexual who alleges hurt by erotica in the manner adult females are injured by it besides has a claim. [ accent added ] My end in this paper is to propose that a slightmodification to this subdivision of the regulation would do itvery hard for progressives and legal conservativists to object toit. This alteration would curtail the cause of action to thesame individuals as the other subdivisions of the regulation, viz. , theparticular victim of the specified hurt. I shall reason thatsuch a alteration would mostly cling with the construct ofharm already at work in Ontario jurisprudence, would afford merely a minorreduction in the possible efficaciousness of such statute law incurbing the injury of erotica, and would offer to authorise thefeminist cantonment which is behind such an regulation with a mechanismfor societal and political alteration if a sufficiently organizedfeminist vanguardtook clasp of the chance to empowerwomen.
Adrian Howe argues that the construct of societal hurt whichmay be suggested by the regulation recognizes the differentialharm felt by adult females from erotica. Howe suggests this socialnotion of injury may be a necessary characteristic of any successful lawreform which is to turn to the immense societal job of maledomination and female subjugation. The broad impression of anindividuated human right fails to capture, for MacKinnon andHowe, the specificity of the injury to women.Thus, anordinance which did non make a cause of action for adult females aswomenwould neglect to turn to the root of the societal job ofwhich erotica is a manifestation. This construct of societal injury, and therefore subsection ( three ) , may pique progressives or legal conservativists in two ways.First, the impression of non-individuated injury is antithetical to theliberal construct of a rights holder claiming a cause of action.Fundamental to a broad construct of injury is the impression of theindividual who is independent, separate and basically worthyof regard. Rawls and Kant represent this position in their analyseswhen they posit the uniform ego, free of any particularqualities save that of being an agent worthy of a cardinal, inviolable regard. This impression of the single worthy ofequal concern and regard in the eyes of the province permeatesliberal constructs of rights. It is besides a cardinal, if notexclusive, dogma of the common jurisprudence of civil wrongs: In civil wrong judicial proceeding, the tribunals must make up one’s mind whether to switch the loss suffered by one individual, the complainant, to the shoulders of another individual [ accent added ] . Clearly, on its face this construct of injury precludes thenotion of a injury suffered jointly which can non be delineatedindividually. While category actions are possible, and claims possibly made on behalf of groups such as company stockholders, this isonly by virtuousness of the fact that a lawfully recognized individualhas suffered an identifiable peculiar injury. Therefore, the conventional broad impression of injury is radicallydistinct from that outlined by Howe and MacKinnon.
Since on theliberal construct rights holders are independent, individualselves who are basically distinguishable, injury to one is distinguishable fromharm to another. It may be that a broad construct of a rightsholder merely renders the construct of a societal injury, and therefore acause of action for adult females as adult femalesincoherent. I do non wishto discuss whether it is possible to develop a complete liberalnotion of societal injury. It is sufficient to observe that the notionof injury to rights holders inherent in the dominant broad legaldiscourse appears to prevent a cause of action by any individualsimply by virtuousness of their rank in an laden socialclass. The job for feminism is that the offense of traffickingin erotica, if the cause of action were limited toindividuals who allege a direct injury stemming from thistrafficking, may seldom if of all time present a redress. See theimmense load for a successful action: She must foremost turn out that the relevant stuffs are pornography. They must be sexually expressed and they must incorporate one or more of the characteristics listed in the definition. Second, she must turn out that the stuffs sexually subordinated her. The stuffs have to be more than merely violative ; this is non a jurisprudence that worries about piquing esthesias, it is concerned with hurts to adult females. These hurts must be proven in tribunal. Merely so will the complainant be awarded amendss or an injunction against the stuffs in inquiry [ accent added ] . The injury which a peculiar adult female suffers as a consequence oftrafficking in erotica is non easy delineated. It is notthe physical assault or forced screening outlined in the othersections of the regulation. Nor is it ( for MacKinnon/Coleproponents ) a touchable physical injury in the John hits Marysense: [ P ] ornography causes attitudes and behavior of force and favoritism that define the intervention and position of half the population. [ P ] ornography institutionalizes the gender of male domination Since the injury caused by erotica is a societal, collectiveharm to adult females, conventional broad impressions of tortious injury areseemingly unable to capture its earnestness ( no individual womanappears to hold been grievously harmed ) .
Therefore, to restrict thecause of action in the regulation s trafficking proviso toparticular, single adult females might look futile for women’s rightists inthat a traditional broad tribunal would be unable to do sense ofthe claims of injury involved. The state of affairs may non be rather so black. It will be usefulto analyze the impression of a societal injury, a injury which can non betied straight to one victim, in the countries of condemnable and tortlaw. I suggest that Ontario tribunals already have the footing for aframework of societal injury in the federal statutory commissariats onhate literature, and in the rules which can be adopted fromthe Bhadauria instance. The Criminal Code in subdivisions 318 and 319 prohibits theadvocating or advancing of race murder and the incitation of hatredof identifiable groups severally. It is notable thatidentifiable groupis defined as any subdivision of the publicdistinguished by coloring material, race, faith or cultural beginning, butdoes non include gender designation. These subdivisions allowgroups, instead than persons, to seek damages for thedissemination of hateful or pro-genocidal stuff. Section 319has been found to go against s.2 ( B ) of the Charter of Rights andFreedoms, but to be justified under s.1 of the Charter.
Thus, it is considered to be consistent in Canadian felon lawfor a slightly intangible societal injury to hold been suffered by agroup through the publication of literature, and for a redress tobe appropriate. There are jobs with this sort of legal protection fromsocial injury if MacKinnon and Cole s premises about the legalsystem are accepted. The subdivisions may take consequence merely on theinitiative of the Attorney General ; it is this characteristic which ledto charges against Ernst Zundel [ for the publication ofliterature denying the holocaust and claiming the being of aZionist confederacy ] being laid by Judaic militant groups unders.181 of the Code. Thus, Cole s claim that legal damages forthe injury of erotica will non be efficaciously obtained throughreliance on intercession by a male-dominated executive subdivision ofgovernment is supported by the failure of anotheridentifiable victim group to hold charges laid by the AttorneyGeneral in what appeared to many to be a clear instance. In isolatedcases like Keegstra, where kids were the group to whomhateful information was being disseminated, the jurisprudence recognizessocial injuries as actionable. It is clear though that thepragmatic barriers to condemnable prosecutions for the harmpornography causes to adult females, as opposed to society s moralintolerance of the violative content, are huge in a maledominated broad society. What should non be lost in this matter-of-fact pessimism is theadequacy of the conceptual foundation of a societal injury whicharose in Keegstra.
In this instance, the societal injury was seennot merely to impact the marksof the information, in this caseJews, but to adversely impact society at big. Furthermore, the type of injury caused to the mark group is similar to thatseen by women’s rightists as suffered by adult females due to pornography: Disquiet caused by the being of such stuff is non merely the merchandise of its odiousness, nevertheless, but stems from the really existent injury which it causes. [ E ] motional harm caused by words may be of sedate psychological and societal effect. [ They ] can represent a serious onslaught on individuals belonging to a racial or spiritual group, and in this respect the Cohen Committee noted that these individuals are humiliated and degraded ( p. 214 ) . Mentioning so to a outstanding broad theoretician, Dickson C.J.said: In my sentiment, a response of humiliation and debasement from an person targeted by hate propaganda is to be expected. A individual s sense of human self-respect and belonging to the community at big is closely linked to the concern and regard accorded the groups to which he or she belongs ( see Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in Four Essays on Liberty ( 1969 ) , p. 118, at p. 155 ) .
Let us name the injury to a peculiar adult female which is sufferedas a consequence of trafficking in erotica a quasi-social harm.It is distinguished from a societal injury in that the victimconceived as a member of a exploited category, but any action toredress this injury is brought entirely on her ain behalf for theharm personally suffered. Unlike the actions in the criminalcases antecedently cited, claims here are non on behalf of a groupor on behalf of society as a whole, but are on behalf of anindividual who has suffered as a member of a category. The modifiedordinance I propose seeks to right quasi-social injuries. One mayquestion whether this ( as distinct from turn toing societal injury ) is a well-founded legal proposition or non. I suggest that it is, atleast in Ontario, given our constituted legal classs andmeans of damages. The Ontario Human Rights Code provides an illustration of anattempt to right quasi-social injuries. It may be true that tortlaw is unable to turn to the societal hurt that occurs at apersonal degree, but this is precisely the sort of hurt thehuman rights codifications of the state have been enacted to redress.While couched in the nomenclature of single human rights, theOHRC s classs of protection indicate a necessary connectionto the impression of a societal injury. The OHRC does non assure equality, equal intervention, equalrespect etc. of every individual, its grandiose preamblenotwithstanding.
What it promises is that injuriousdiscrimination to persons due to rank in certain socialcategories will be redressed by amendss or injunction. Thesesocial classs are those which are traditionally associatedwith societal hurt race, lineage, topographic point of beginning, coloring material, cultural beginning, citizenship, credo, sex, sexual orientation, age, matrimonial or household position, or disability. Notice that manycategories are absent recklessness, poorness, linguistic communication group, instruction, etc. What this indicates is that the OHRC does notaddress an equality right per Se, but addresses societal injury as aresult of being eg. black, female, Croatian, homosexual, blind, 25 yr. old, single, etc. The redresss under s.40 of the OHRC arenearly indistinguishable to those in the modified regulation amendss, including those for personal torment, costs of the action, andinjunction. The modified regulation would therefore be rather similar to theexisting human rights statute law in Ontario in its recognitionof societal injury and its suggestion of redresss. Where it woulddiffer is in its refusal to replace the power of the victim topursue their ain action in tribunal, instead than cover with acommission ( and its discretional powers ) or board of enquiry toinvestigate affairs. Thus the modified regulation wouldremain women-initiated and women-driven.It would alsodiffer from the OHRC in that it would clearly stipulate an as yetunrecognized peculiar method of bring downing injury: traffickingin erotica. One well-known effort to prosecute a redress for a quasi-socialharm outside the administrative kingdom of the OHRC succeeded inthe Ontario Court of Appeal, but failed at the Supreme Court ofCanada. In Bhadauria, the complainant alleged that she had beendiscriminated against because of her race in using for ateaching place, and brought an action on a common jurisprudence tortbasis of favoritism, and besides cited a misdemeanor of the OHRCas giving a cause of action.
Wilson J. in the Court of Appeal held that it was unfastened tothe tribunal to let the enlargement of the common jurisprudence to include thetort of favoritism, and would hold allowed the action toproceed. The inquiry of whether the OHRC gave rise to anindependent civil action was non entertained given thisfinding. Laskin CJ. in the Supreme Court of Canada said that the OHRCwas meant to replace the effort to seek a redress at common jurisprudence, non to supplement it, and therefore barred the action from proceedingeither at common jurisprudence or straight from an alleged breach of theOHRC since Bhadauria had non attempted to raise the proceduresof the OHRC for damages. What is notable from this caseis that the inquiry of whether this sort of injury was capable ofjudicial consideration was ne’er at issue. For the Court ofAppeal, the common jurisprudence was to the full capable of entertaining such aharm as a civil wrong. For the Supreme Court, the OHRC was seen as theappropriate agencies of righting such injury. What the illustrations from condemnable and tort jurisprudence demonstrate isthat the impression of a quasi-social injury is well-founded in our legalsystem, peculiarly if persons are given a statutory rightto pursue redresss for it. Therefore, the modified regulation wouldsimply indicate to the tribunal a class of societal injury which has non antecedently been specifically addressed, the injury to womenfrom the extension of erotica. The comparative success atachieving redresss from OHRC commissariats, as compared to thereluctance of the authorities to allow the exercising of theCriminal Code commissariats, indicates that retaining a civil rightof action for persons will be the strategically better movefor women’s rightists insofar as they are seeking damages. I shall leavediscussion of whether this is a well-founded women’s rightist politicalstrategy for covering with erotica for a ulterior portion of thepaper.
It may be objected that the fact that our legal tradition iscapable of doing sense of the impression of a quasi-social injury, andthus could supply the bench with the conceptual tools toadjudica Te on a modified version of the regulation, does non implythat the modified regulation and its construct of injury isacceptable in a broad model. A broad model maydemand individuated injuries, and the fact that our bing legalframework can work outside that restriction merely demonstratesthat liberalism is non at the root of our legal framework’sevolving impression of injury. Therefore, the regulation may still be seenby progressives as incoherent, or worse, to raise an illegitimateconception of non-individuated rights and afford province enforcedremedies for bastard intents. This broad statement may be theoretically well-founded, and thusthe “bleak” image I painted may still use in so far as wefavour a broad legal model. Furthermore, the powerfulliberal statements refering freedom of address may overrule theconcern for the sort of injury contained in the regulation. Perhapsbecause the alleged injury has non been provably linked to thepropagation of erotica, or is non a injury in the liberalsense, but an look of a penchant, a broad frameworkcould non allow the regulation since it is an undue restrictionon free look. My response to this is double. First, given thatprotection from injury is by and large an acceptable justification fora limitation on autonomy in a broad model, it is up toliberals to present a coherent rebuttal to MacKinnon et al.’scontention that erotica causes echt physical andpsychological injury to adult females, instead than merely repugnance.
To dateI hold non seen a broad rebuttal which did non do theassumption that the root of the job of erotica is simplymoral offense, i.e. strongly held penchants against thepropagation of erotica. I find the women’s rightist claims aboutharm to be really persuasive, and until they are addressed byliberals in footings of a rebuttal of the injury, instead than byreference to the moral disvalue of erotica, the burden shouldrest on them. Second, the regulation is non an effort to get at acoherent theoretical place on erotica, but is an attemptto solve a societal job through the mechanism of jurisprudence. If theattempt of the bing legal system to right such jobs isillegitimate merely on abstract broad evidences, it need non be afundamental practical concern of women’s rightists to convert liberalsthat the regulation is acceptable. From the women’s rightist strategicperspective, it is adequate to demo, as I am trying, that someform of the regulation coheres good with the bing legaltradition whether that tradition is basically broad orotherwise. The job of theoretical legitimacy of the legalsystem as a whole demand non be of peculiar concern forproponents of the regulation ; what is of import is righting theharms done to adult females by the political and legal agencies at hand.Moreover, I am non positive, given the remarks of Dickson J. above, that broad theories are committed to abandoning thenotion of injury and the agencies of damages which we see in theexisting legal model. Possibly so merely certain categoriesof liberalism would take expostulation with the impression of harmaddressed in Keegstra or the OHRC. The 2nd major job with the regulation for ourtraditional broad legal model is the designation of thesource of the injury. The broad construct of autonomousindividuals requires a peculiar victim and a particularperpetrator.
MacKinnon and Cole extensively consider the notionof adult females as victims of a societal injury, but give littleconsideration to the impression of the culprits of this harmbeyond the simple definition of erotica. For them, itwould seem that if we can place erotica, we can identifythe beginning of the injury. Clearly, designation of theperpetrators is required before an action for damages can belaunched under the regulation. Even though this is non atheoretical demand of every system of damages for injury, it is both a theoretical and matter-of-fact demand for launchinga civil action. The models of condemnable jurisprudence, civil wrong jurisprudence and theOHRC all presume an identifiable culprit of a injury can beidentified. Even if it were non a legal demand for adetermination of entitlement to a redress that one be capable ofidentifying the culprit, it would be instead unpointed tolaunch an action for amendss or injunction if there were noidentifiable legal individual from whom to roll up or upon whom theinjunction would move. The injury from erotica is non easy traced to a singlesource. MacKinnon et Al. travel to great lengths to indicate out thecomplexity of the job of erotica, that injury ensues notjust because of what the content of erotica is, but becauseof how the messages of erotica contribute to the socialfabric of male hegemony. “Pornography institutionalizes thesexuality of male supremacy.” If, as has been argued, pornography’s injury is closely connected to societal patterns, so possibly fault for this injury can non be pinpointed topornography entirely, or any peculiar beginning of erotica. Itis beyond the range of this paper to try an analysis ofsociety which could offer insight into the distribution ofresponsibility for reparation of the injury of erotica acrossall members and establishments in society.
Alternatively I shallattempt to offer penetration into the smaller job of distributionof duty among porn merchants. Given the immense volume ofpornography, in many instances it may be impossible to nail theparticular publishing houses, stuffs etc. which led to the quasi-social injury against a complainant. I suggest that a solution tothe job of culprit individuality may be suggested by analysisof the California Supreme Court’s intervention of the job in aproduct liability instance. The extract from Linden above indicates thattraditionally the culprit of a civil wrong must be clearly, separately identified as the cause of the injury suffered by theplaintiff. This traditional construct of causing in civil wrong jurisprudence isnot inviolable. In Sindell, an action launched by a victim of aharmful drug succeeded against a battalion of pharmaceuticalcompanies even though no 1 company could be causally linked tothe injury suffered by the peculiar victim. The plaintiff’s female parent had consumed the drug DES during herpregnancy, and the complainant suffered birth defects as a result.Evidence of the peculiar provider of this drug to her motherhad long since vanished, but it was certain that somemanufacturer out of a figure bring forthing it at the clip of thepregnancy had promoted the drug without warning of the potentialside effects. The California Supreme Court held that, in theabsence of direct causal links to any peculiar provider of thedrug DES, the complainant could retrieve amendss in proportion tothe likeliness that any maker was the one which providedthe drug to her female parent during gestation. This instance has many obvious differences from a purportedaction for injury from trafficking in erotica. It was certainthat the complainant had suffered a touchable physical injury from theproduct ; the lone inquiry was whether maker A, B, C etc. had been the culprit.
What is interesting about the instance forproponents of a modified regulation is that if a adult female coulddemonstrate to the tribunal a injury from the extension ofpornography in general, this instance would bespeak that allpornographers or sellers might be held apt in proportionto some step of their market portion. Of note is the fact thatonly “the manufacturers of a significant portion of the market, thatis, over 50 per cent” needed to be sued to raise this”market share” liability impression. Therefore, if a adult female coulddemonstrate the relevant quasi-social injury from erotica, andname manufacturers of at least 50 % of the market portion of therelevant stuff, she would run into the threshold for conveying anaction. Of class, if a peculiar seller could demo thattheirs was non a harmful trade name of erotica ( or moreaccurately, was non harmful, and therefore was non erotica ) , theywould be immune from the action. One job with this strategy is restricting the nameddefendants to those who produce an identifiable sort ofpornography. I am non confident that in all or even most instances awoman would be able to place any peculiar sort ofpornography as that which caused the injury she experienced. Thisis once more due to the complex societal nature of the injury, itsdifficulty to pinpoint. There is a danger that an implausible oruntenable figure of publishing houses or sellers of other sortswould be named in any given case. Furthermore, publishersmight get down a “third party” craze in an effort to pull inothers to administer the costs of the suit. However, it seemsplausible in at least some instances that a peculiar category ofmaterial could be identified as the cause of the injury, andsince ( as I shall shortly reason ) the importance to women’s rightists of theordinance is non merely its success at counterbalancing particularwomen, but its political and societal effects, if some casessucceed it will be a great triumph.
Therefore, the job of designation of a culprit is notinsurmountable. There is at least some law which wouldgive Judgess the tools to offer damages where individualperpetrators can non be identified. In peculiar instances there maysimply be individual or multiple suspects, or there may be anidentifiable category of suspect where the peculiar perpetratorsare unknowable. In either instance, the Ontario tribunals haveavailable to them the conceptual tools to cover with the affair. The add-on of the indeterminate culprits doctrine fromthe DES instance would be a welcome add-on to the judicialtreatment of a modified regulation, but successful actions wouldnot depend on it. It is non impossible to conceive of the sort ofmaterial that would be claimed to be harmful – it wouldcontain images or words where adult females in a sexual context aredehumanized, objectified, shown as basking hurting, colza orhumiliation, bruised, shed blooding or hurt, etc. Once theidentification of harmful stuff is accomplished, thepublishers, distributers, etc. necessitate to be identified and named.Then the major job for a adult female to get the better of as complainant unders.3.2 ( three ) is to show that some echt quasi-social harmto her came about from the extension of erotica, althoughshe was non assaulted or forced to see or take part in it. Asthe Ruth M. testimony indicates, this is non wholly implausible. To sum therefore far, a modified version of the regulation wouldgive single adult females a cause of action for quasi-social harmsthey have suffered as a consequence of trafficking in pornography.
While the hatred literature commissariats of the condemnable codification suggestthat our legal model can cover with the impression of societal injury, greater success can be expected if the alteration is adopted.This alteration would convey the feminist impression of harmsuggested by MacKinnon and her advocates within a legalframework non unlike some of the bing legal scheme in Ontariowhich give civil redresss for quasi-social injuries. The job ofspecifying a culprit, while great, is non insurmountablegiven the philosophy in Sindell and the recognized impression of multipledefendants in civil suits. Finally, though the regulation may atfirst look impracticable ( as any new legal philosophy does until ithas had judicial intervention ) , there are echt fact state of affairss inwhich damages seems merely and plausible. I have mentioned feminist scheme in assorted contexts inthis paper. Of class there is argument within feminist circlesover the appropriate schemes for covering with the job ofpornography. The regulation, modified or non, will notsatisfy every women’s rightist. I think it would be a tenableproposition for MacKinnon and her advocates non merely in itsprovision of a redress for peculiar societal injuries suffered byindividual adult females, but because it will function to expose the injury ofpornography to great public examination, provided women’s rightists devotesubstantial political attempt to peculiar instances. MacKinnon et Al. are concerned that the regulation should bea mechanism for altering the power dealingss sustained bypornography.
Since the injury of erotica is in a sense heldcollectively, is societal, and since the modified ordinancerestricts the cause of action to a individual complainant on her ownbehalf as a adult female, the modified regulation has arguably created alaw which is improbable to be pursued. This is because the womenmost likely to win are the least likely to continue – theyeither will non possess sufficient power in their state of affairs ofsubjugation, or they will non acknowledge the injury since for themit is normalized, adopted, accepted. It is likely true that the regulation will non turn inverted the subjection of adult females merely by offering redresss toindividual adult females. The injury of erotica to adult females is societal ; single redresss will non alter that. However, the existenceof the regulation, and the being of adult females like Ruth M. andLinda Marchiano who somehow interrupt out from the bonds of apornographic being mean that some instances will come to light.If advocates of MacKinnon’s regulation adopt a suited strategicposture, the regulation will be effectual in run intoing their purpose oflimiting the harmful consequence of erotica on adult females. The undertaking for women’s rightists, I would propose, is double. First, organisation of support mechanisms is needed to give adult females theresources to come frontward and challenge those who harm themthrough trafficking in erotica is needed. The function ofsupport groups, groups to supply legal resources, groups toprovide personal support in a state of affairs where one’s establishedvalues, relationships etc. are jolted apart, is important to thesuccess of actions brought under the regulation. Individual womenwould be genuinely exceeding to successfully convey forth an actionon their ain. Second, feminists must seek to incorporate and face politicalopposition to the modified regulation which can be expected.There is small uncertainty in my head that instances brought under thisordinance would convey approximately much promotion, merely as Keegstra andZundel did.
Oppositions will be speedy to indicate out the”censorship” involved, the limitation on freedom of look, and call for the supplication of the Charter of Rights to thwartefforts at righting the injury to adult females. Feminists must striveto conveying the injury to the attending of the populace, show the publicwhat it is that erotica does, every bit good as show the communitywhat it contains. The runs, the promotion in both lobbyingfor passage of the regulation, and prosecuting actions under itwill no uncertainty rally a important section of the community tosupport adult females in their pursuit for freedom from injury. While itwill no uncertainty besides create contentions, polarisations, resistance, etc. ( much as the Thomas hearings late did on theissue of torment ) , the exposure of the issue will, I suggest, be strategically good. To reason, a version of the regulation which is modified torestrict the cause of action for trafficking in erotica toindividuals would be a well-founded proposition.
It would non be anextreme going from our broad legal tradition, but wouldafford damages for persons who suffer quasi-social injuries in amanner consistent with bing statute law on favoritism andhate literature. The job of placing culprits isdifficult, but bing philosophy in the domain of carelessness lawprovides some penetration into covering with it. Furthermore, thefeminist end of a big graduated table alteration in the power imbalanceperpetuated by erotica will at least be advanced, though notfully attained, by the regulation. I suggest that such a modifiedordinance should be given serious consideration by women’s rightists andour legislators. “Remedies for Pornography in the Ontario Legal Context” Term Paper for “Free Speech, Pornography and the RelationshipBetween Law and Morality”
