The Battle of Leuctra in 371 B.C. was a crucial moment in Greek military history, as it marked the Thebes’ triumph over the Spartan hoplite army. This victory shattered the long-standing belief in Spartan invincibility that had prevailed since the ‘Golden Age’ of the fifth century. Although previous events had reshaped the Greek balance of power, Spartan military strength had remained unchallenged until this point.
The sight and sound of Spartan soldiers advancing once struck fear into their enemies, even before the battle commenced. Adorned in scarlet capes, helmets with horsehair plumes, and close-ordered shields displaying the letter L (symbolizing ‘Lacedaemon’ or ‘Laconia,’ their homeland), the Spartans were an imposing presence. Advancing in orderly formations akin to lightning bolts, accompanied by shrill tunes played by military pipers, they possessed renowned speed in navigating challenging terrain, swiftly gathering their forces, and executing intricate tactical maneuvers. The Spartans achieved a legendary status for these abilities. Their final charge was as devastating as Zeus himself hurling thunderbolts.
The Spartans achieved victory over Athens and gained dominion over Greece just before the Battle of Leuctra in 404 B.C. Although the defeat at Leuctra may have been unexpected for some, a closer examination of Sparta’s history as a militaristic society reveals that their downfall was inevitable. Prior to their encounter with the Thebans at Leuctra, Sparta had already been grappling with significant challenges, making it only a matter of time before someone exploited their internal vulnerabilities. The demise of Sparta offers an important lesson on the interconnectedness of social organization and military might.
Sparta, situated in the center of the southern Greek peninsula known as the Peloponnesus, was a formidable city-state. This region was graced by the Eurotas River valley and overlooked by the Taegetus Range. Despite its reputation for stability and embodiment of traditional Greek values, Sparta was a complex society filled with contradictions. It possessed traits of both cunning and self-delusion, and despite achieving success, it suffered from confusion and fragility. While Sparta was recognized as a hoplite republic, it ultimately failed to muster enough hoplite-warriors to avoid military catastrophe. The root cause behind these contradictions lay in Sparta’s conservative social structure which consisted of distinct social castes that held mutual disdain for one another. Each caste aimed to be composed of identical individuals and remained segregated from others. At the pinnacle of this strict hierarchy were Spartans themselves – warriors who referred to themselves as “the Similars.”
Life in Spartan society was privileged, but not without its challenges. Upon the birth of a male Spartan child, he would be examined by elders for any physical defects. If deemed unworthy, the child would be abandoned in a nearby gorge to perish from exposure. At seven years old, surviving boys were separated from their mothers and commenced their formal education focused on discipline and obedience – an education that lasted for life. These young Spartans were organized into groups known as “herds” and subjected to an educational system resembling a rigorous Boy Scout troop. The older boys supervised these herds and had the power to physically punish the younger ones, occasionally employing whipping during endurance rituals. Essentially, Spartan kindergarten was overseen by tough adolescents who themselves were shaped into toughness by strict elders with similar upbringing.
The young men in training were separated from the rest of society. It is not surprising that homosexual relationships between boys and young men were common. In fact, it was considered shameful for a boy to not be courted by an older youth. The Spartans believed that these relationships fostered a sense of unity and bravery on the battlefield. They thought that a lover would not want to embarrass themselves in front of their beloved by backing away from the battle.
The Spartan youths were taught self-sufficiency through various training activities, such as military drills, sports competitions, and simulated battles. To develop their agility and resourcefulness, they were required to steal their food from local farmers. Those aspiring to be like them had to rely on themselves and their fellow soldiers, disregarding others. The story of the Spartan boy who stole a fox exemplifies the culture of institutionalized theft. Despite being caught, the boy boldly denied the theft and remained unfazed as the desperate fox tore into his stomach. Although likely fictional, this story represents the extreme toughness that Spartans viewed as their ideal and serves as a symbol for a society that eventually jeopardized itself with its unwavering principles.
Upon reaching the age of twenty, the young Spartan aimed to join one of the collectivized mess units that were central to the lives of the Similars. Failing to be accepted into one of these units meant that a young person could never truly be considered a Similar. Instead, they would be forced into a lower caste, effectively ruining their life before it had even begun. These mess units, consisting of approximately fifteen men each, formed the foundation of both the military and social organization of Spartan society. A Spartan would fight alongside, live with (until marriage), and share meals with his mess-mates. Absolute loyalty was expected towards one’s fellow mess members, and it was customary for each Spartan to take turns providing dinner for the group on a regular basis.
Every Spartan inherited a piece of land and a group of Helot-serfs to work on it. This land was supposed to be sufficient for their sustenance and for their regular contribution to the mess unit. If a Spartan was unable to fulfill his duty of feeding his fellow soldiers when it was his turn, due to either bad luck or mismanagement, he would be expelled from the unit and demoted from the rank of Similars.
Disobeying an order or showing any sign of fear during battle was also a reason for expulsion. There were multiple lower classes of individuals who had fallen (or whose ancestors had fallen) from the upper class Similars; each was given a derogatory label such as ‘Inferiors’ or ‘Tremblers.’ ‘Tremblers’ did fight alongside the Spartan army, but in separate (and clearly inferior) groups. In summary, there was significant social mobility in Sparta, but mostly in a downward direction. A Similar could be demoted for various failures; neither they nor their descendants could expect to regain their privileged status.
The primary privilege enjoyed by a Similar was the chance to fully engage in public affairs, such as military training, participating in battles, supervising the youth, and handling state governance. The accumulation of wealth was intended to have no significance in his life. (However, some did manage to make money, albeit discreetly.) All adult Similars were part of the Citizen Assembly of Spartans (also known as the Apella) and consequently possessed the right to voice their support or opposition concerning all matters related to state policies, especially decisions regarding going to war. Nevertheless, typically their approval was demonstrated solely through vocalizing in favor of the determinations made by a select group of Spartan magistrates.
Sparta, aside from its two hereditary kings who held religious and military roles, was governed by five state officers known as Ephors, who were elected annually by their counterparts. These Ephors were advised by a group of twenty-eight Elders, chosen from the senior Spartans. The system allowed for confusion due to unclear lines of authority between the kings and the Ephors, resulting in clashes and deadlocks in Spartan policy. Personal initiatives, both bold and foolish, were sometimes taken to break these deadlocks. One particularly ambitious king, Cleomenes the Mad, is remembered for his aggressive policy towards neighboring nations. While his behavior became violent and erratic towards the end of his life, it was his aggressive foreign policy that may have led to the accusations of madness. The rigid social structure within Sparta was strangely juxtaposed with its unpredictable foreign policy.
The Spartan Similar was not allowed to display any signs of wealth or a taste for luxury in public. They were expected to dress in rough clothes like everyone else, live in a simple house, and consume the same unpalatable black bean soup as their fellow Spartans. Their lives were constantly monitored by their peers, and they rarely had time to spend at home. Their sons were also raised in the same strict environment.
He spent minimal time with his wife, even allowing her to be borrowed by others for breeding purposes. In Spartan society, women were expected to accept this treatment without questioning and focus on teaching their children the values of obedience, courage, and duty. A legendary Spartan mother allegedly instructed her son to come back from a military mission either as a victor or as a corpse, symbolizing the expectation for success or sacrifice.
The Spartan Similar developed a strict system that produced highly skilled soldiers in the Greek world during the mid-seventh century through the early fourth. These soldiers dedicated their lives to preparing for battle and were not berserkers capable of defeating multiple opponents in single combat. In 480 B.C., Xerxes, the king of Persia, sought to understand the soldiers he might face during his invasion of Greece. Aware that Spartans were regarded as Greece’s finest warriors, Xerxes consulted Demaratus, an exiled Spartan king residing in Persia. Although Xerxes expected to confront overwhelming odds, Demaratus revealed it was not the Spartans’ individual fighting abilities that distinguished them; rather, it was their intense discipline and training enabling effective combat in the closely organized hoplite phalanx formation.
The Spartan phalanx, which consisted of 9,000 men when Demaratus spoke to Xerxes, effectively utilized the phalanx formation. They advanced steadily shoulder to shoulder with locked shields, creating an unbroken wall of shields and thrusting spears. This strategy proved highly effective against Xerxes’ Persians, as evidenced by their victories at Thermopylae and Plataea. At Thermopylae, a small group of only 300 Spartans serving as a rear guard in a narrow mountain pass inflicted significant casualties on elite Persian infantry. Additionally, at Plataea, the Spartans were able to overcome the best Persian cavalry. However, Sparta’s governmental and social structures lacked the ability to adapt quickly during the time period between the battles of Mantinea and Leuctra – a challenge faced by all Greek city-states.
During the battle of Mantinea in the middle of the Peloponnesian War (431-404 B.C.), Sparta’s once-impressive reputation among the Greeks had already suffered significant damage. The war between Athens, a bold democratic naval power, and the Peloponnesian League, dominated by Sparta, lasted longer than anticipated. Initially, the Spartans believed that Athens would surrender after a few seasons of fighting. However, Athens had a strong navy, secure supply lines abroad, and the financial resources of a maritime empire. In contrast, Sparta led a well-established coalition of Peloponnesian states with a formidable land army featuring skilled Spartan heavy infantry. From summer 431 onwards, this superior land army repeatedly devastated Attica – Athens’ home territory. Despite this devastation though, it was unable to weaken Athens’ overall strength or internal unity and failed miserably in siege warfare.
In 425 B.C., during the sixth year of the war, the Spartan army faced a significant setback when they decided to attack Pylos, a headland on the southwestern Peloponnesian coast that had been taken over and fortified by the Athenians. The Spartans attempted a marine landing as a means to bypass Pylos’ walls, but their plans were disrupted when the Athenian navy unexpectedly arrived. Consequently, a group of Spartan soldiers became stranded on Sphakteria, an offshore island. The Athenians blockaded the island and deployed lightly armed troops who continuously harassed and used projectiles against them. Eventually, this relentless pressure led to the surrender and capture of several hundred Spartan warriors.
The shocking defeat at Sphakteria proved that Spartan soldiers were not invincible, which in turn fueled the dreams of independence among the subject Helots due to the continued Athenian presence at Pylos. However, Sparta found a highly innovative military leader within their ranks, Brasidas, who with a makeshift army mainly consisting of Helot recruits, opened up a new front in northern Greece. This posed a threat to Athens’ crucial grain markets and timber resources. Thus, the balance was restored as Sparta’s fears of Helot revolts were countered by Athens’ fears of collapse in the north.
After a few years, the uneasy Peace of Nicias was negotiated, bringing relief to many Athenians and Spartans as it marked the end of the first stage of the war. However, some of Sparta’s key allies felt that the peace had been signed prematurely without proper consultation, leading them to believe that their interests were being overlooked in the peace terms. Meanwhile, cunning Athenians, including the notorious Alcibiades, engaged in diplomatic intrigue with their Spartan counterparts, resulting in a confused international situation within the once well-organized Peloponnese.
By 418, when hostilities resumed, doubts arose among many Greeks regarding Sparta’s legendary courage, resolution, and straightforwardness. It seemed that their fanatical devotion to secrecy in all matters concerning their military organization had started to appear as a cover-up.
Yet, according to Thucydides, the Athenian-general-turned-historian, all doubts were resolved during the battle of Mantinea. This engagement was crucial for the Spartans, taking place in their own Peloponnesian territory. They were confronted by a formidable alliance comprising of discontented former allies and long-standing adversaries. To face this threat, the Spartans and their faithful allies assembled a hoplite army of approximately 10,000 soldiers. This force included an estimated 4,000 elite Similars.
The Spartan side had a rough start to the battle. King Agis, the commanding general, made a last-minute tactical redeployment in an attempt to avoid being outflanked. He moved two units of sub-Similars, which were not manned by full Spartiates, from the line and placed them on the left flank. Then, he ordered two regiments of Similars on the right flank to withdraw and fill the gap. However, the regimental commanders of the Similar units chose to prioritize the safety of their own units over the overall well-being of the army and refused to obey the order. This created a dangerous gap in the Spartan left wing, through which their opponents seized the opportunity, pushed back the Spartan left, and caused numerous casualties.
Despite facing the possibility of collapse, King Agis fearlessly led the Spartan center and swiftly defeated the opposing troops according to Thucydides. Many of Agis’s adversaries were unable to withstand the initial attack and immediately retreated, with some even being trampled in their haste to escape before the Spartans reached them. Agis further directed his army to the left, causing the temporarily successful right flank of the enemy to disperse. The victorious Spartan soldiers returned home just in time for an important festival on their religious calendar. Moreover, they expelled two regimental commanders who had disobeyed orders, accusing them of cowardice.
The Spartan war machine was both a dream and a nightmare for the Greeks, encompassing their vision.
The defeat of the Athenians and their allies at Mantinea proved to be a positive omen for the rest of the war. Despite the war continuing for another fourteen years, Sparta eventually gained the upper hand, leading to Athens surrendering in 404 B.C. The spoils of war were divided between Sparta and Persia, with Persia regaining control of the culturally Greek western littoral of Anatolia. As the dominant mainland Greek state, Sparta established friendly governments and garrisons in the previously under Athenian rule island and northern Greek states. This marked the beginning of a new era of Spartan dominance.
Only thirty-four years after, at Leuctra, Sparta was permanently expelled from the group of powerful Aegean powers. Leuctra marked not just a setback but also the end of Spartan power and influence. On the other hand, Athens, Sparta’s defeated rival in the Peloponnesian War, survived the seemingly catastrophic events of the late fifth century and continued to thrive until the rise of Macedon in the later fourth century ended the era of truly independent mainland city-states. Similar to how Athenian commitment to democracy explains Athens’ remarkable post-war resilience, Sparta’s swift downfall can be understood in terms of its highly distinctive approach to government and social organization.
Sparta’s military successes, the original development of the ‘armed-camp’ structure of Spartan society, and Sparta’s eventual collapse were all attributed to the caste system. The caste system consisted of three primary castes. Below the superior Similars were the Fringe Dwellers (Perioikoi), an intermediate caste consisting of free persons engaged in trade, agriculture, and armed forces service. However, they did not have the right to vote or partake in the government. While many Fringe Dwellers were not openly hostile towards the Spartan regime, they also lacked a strong sense of loyalty towards the Similars. Below the Fringe Dwellers lay the vast serf caste known as the Helots. Unlike chattel slaves, Helots were bound to the land and could not be bought or sold. They were assigned to a specific farm and owed a significant portion of their harvest to the Spartan Similar who was appointed by the state as their master.
Initially, there were two main types of Helots: those who were natives of Laconia and the Messenians. The Messenian Helots lived in the westernmost part of the Peloponnese and had previously been free citizens of their own city-state. However, Sparta conquered them in wars during the eighth and seventh centuries B.C. These wars were also the catalyst for the formation of Sparta’s powerful military.
Despite being under Spartan rule for centuries, the Messenian Helots still held on to their memories of freedom and tales of their brave resistance against the Spartans. Whenever they had the opportunity, they would rise up against their masters and seek refuge on Mount Ithome, which overlooks the rich Messenian plain.
The most well-documented uprising of the Messenian Helots happened in 463 B.C., after an earthquake caused chaos and disruption in Spartan communications.
A generation later, during the Peloponnesian War, many Helots sought shelter in the fortified Athenian camp at Pylos. It was the fear of Athenian support for an armed Helot rebellion that compelled the Spartans to take hasty actions, leading to the disastrous Sphakteria defeat.
Spartan society relied heavily on the systematic exploitation of the Helots, who served as both agricultural laborers and porters during military campaigns. During the Persian Wars, for example, each Spartan hoplite was accompanied by seven Helots at the battle of Plataea. However, because the Helots, particularly those from Messenia, were not willing participants in their subjugation, the Spartans had to exert great effort to keep them under control. Consequently, Spartan society became inwardly focused, constantly policing the Helots for any signs of rebellion and vigilantly monitoring each other for any signs of non-conformity. This united front was crucial in preventing the much larger number of Helots from rising up.
To emphasize the reality of the situation within Spartan territory, the Spartan Assembly formally declared war on the Helot population annually. As a means of teaching young Spartans about moderation, individual Helots were humiliated through rituals, such as being compelled to consume large quantities of alcohol. However, the most serious aspect was the notorious Krypteia, also known as ‘The Secret Matter.’ Despite its secrecy and deliberate spread of misinformation, it is believed that aspiring Similars were required to first serve as part of a highly covert team of state-sponsored assassins before being admitted into a mess unit. The youthful members of the Krypteia would clandestinely traverse Spartan territory, particularly during the night, and stealthily eliminate any outstanding Helots. It was perilous for a Helot to be regarded as attractive, intelligent, or ambitious. The exact number of Helots who perished annually at the hands of the Krypteia remains unknown, yet there is little doubt that the Spartans intended to subject the Helots to a life of perpetual insecurity and sheer terror—never knowing when or why they would be struck.
On certain occasions, the Krypteia’s personalized and arbitrary violence was considered insufficient. According to Thucydides, Spartans had once grown ‘so afraid of [the Helots’] unwavering character and their numbers’ that they devised a plan: they announced that the Helots themselves should compile a roster of those Helots who had performed exceptional service for Sparta during military operations, suggesting that these men would be granted freedom as a reward. Thucydides further explains: ‘However, this was a test carried out under the belief that those who displayed the most courage and were the first to claim their freedom would be the ones most likely to rebel against Sparta.’ Around 2,000 men were chosen accordingly; they adorned themselves with celebratory wreaths and offered thanks to the gods. ‘Soon after, however, the Spartans disposed of them, and no one ever found out precisely how each one of them was killed.’
Despite initially thinking they could do without Helot soldiers, the Spartans realized they actually needed them. This became evident when the Spartan general Brasidas led an army, including 700 Helots serving as hoplites, to achieve significant victories against Athenian dependencies in northern Greece. These Helots were likely recruited with similar promises as their less fortunate compatriots in the past. However, the Spartans now recognized the value of their manpower resources and did not wantonly slaughter them. While on campaign, if the Helots died in battle, it was seen as a beneficial outcome. Nonetheless, the Spartans kept their word this time. They freed the surviving soldiers of Brasidas and settled them, along with previously liberated Helots, in the town of Lepreon located in the northwestern coastal borderlands of Sparta.
Similar to sub-Similars, the single Helot caste was beginning to divide. The change in strategy, from slaughtering ambitious Helots to hiring them as mercenaries, suggests a growing issue in the late 5th century B.C.: there were insufficient Similars remaining to complete the task independently.
The decline in the Similar population can be attributed to Battlefield casualties and the strict Spartan rules that allowed for easy downward mobility but limited upward mobility. Additionally, the Peloponnesian War disrupted Spartan society’s ability to isolate itself, exposing Spartans to outside influences and separating them from their fellow Spartans for extended periods of time. To compete with Athens, Sparta had to expand its economy and engage in wider networks of trade. This led to a concentration of wealth in a few hands as the Spartan economy became more monetarized.
Many Similar individuals were unable to keep up with their mess-unit contributions and thus became Inferiors, which was a humiliating status to endure. While Spartan exultation over their triumph in the Peloponnesian War was high in the last few years of the fifth century, it was dampened by the revelation of a bold revolutionary plot by a group of Inferiors, led by Cinadon. The animosity that Cinadon and his companions felt towards the Spartan system was encapsulated in their willingness to “devour the Similars raw.” This metaphor portrays how Spartan society was being metaphorically consumed from within, similar to the tale of the boy and the fox.
The social demotion of Cinadon and his peers was exacerbated in the years following the Peloponnesian War when Sparta emerged victorious and began assuming control over the former Athenian territories. Appointed as governors, these Spartans, who had been taught to steal and held contempt for those unlike them, exploited their power and were widely resented by the people they ruled. Over time, Sparta’s disregard for international consequences led to the formation of an anti-Spartan coalition as other Greeks grew increasingly unhappy with Spartan dominance. As their credibility in diplomacy dwindled, the Spartans relied on displays of military strength to maintain authority.Xenophon’s depiction of the bloody battle of Coronea in 394 B.C. serves as a prime example of a historical event where brutality prevailed.
[King Agesilaus] immediately led his phalanx against [the Thebans] after they had fled towards Helicon. The Thebans, upon seeing this, closed their ranks and bravely advanced in an attempt to break through to their comrades. Though this act could be seen as courageous, Agesilaus did not choose the safest option… he engaged the Thebans face to face. They clashed shields, fought fiercely, killed, and died. Eventually, some of the Thebans managed to break through to Helicon, but suffered heavy casualties in the process. Despite being wounded himself, Agesilaus emerged victorious and commanded Gylis, the war-chief, to organize the army and erect a victory trophy. He also instructed all the soldiers to adorn themselves in honor of the god and had the flute-players play.
The main point is that Spartan hop-lites were unmatched, but Agesilaus lost around 350 men, and Sparta couldn’t afford many more victories like this. Every battlefield loss meant one less Similar to defend against Sparta’s growing number of enemies. Additionally, it wasn’t clear that Sparta’s complete domination of traditional hoplite tactics would continue indefinitely. In 390, the Spartans were shocked by the defeat of a separate Spartan regiment, with a loss of around 250 men, at the hands of a combined force of Athenian hoplites and peltasts – highly skilled mercenaries who used javelins and light shields, adopting tactics and weapons from Thracian mercenaries from the Black Sea region. Meanwhile, Sparta’s adversaries were becoming more knowledgeable about their military tactics. It had long been believed that Sparta should avoid repeatedly fighting the same enemy; by 371 B.C., the Thebans had been consistently battling the Spartans for over two decades, allowing the Theban commanders to intimately understand Sparta’s strengths and weaknesses – enabling them to effectively exploit them.
The Spartans dispatched a significant portion of their standing army, consisting of 700 Similars and approximately 1,600 other Laconians, to Leuctra. However, this force proved insufficient to overpower their experienced adversaries or withstand the combined might of Theban hoplites and their well-equipped cavalry. Consequently, the Spartans were incapable of preventing the subsequent series of Theban invasions into Laconia. As a result, Spartan women, who had never encountered enemy soldiers before, were obliged to observe the pillaging and looting of the prosperous peripheral areas.
The Thebans were successful in allowing the Messenians to construct a new fortified capital city on Mount Ithome, despite the Spartans lacking the numbers to prevent it. The imposing stone walls of Messene, which still exist today as a testament to Greek military expertise, signaled the downfall of Sparta. Freed by the Thebans, Messene established itself as an independent city-state, harboring deep hostility towards its former ruler. Unable to rely on the compulsory labor of the Helots from Messenia, Sparta found it difficult to maintain its military traditions and soon became just another secondary polis. While it occasionally won minor border conflicts with neighboring cities, Sparta never regained prominence on the broader Greek stage.
During the Roman era, Sparta had become a mere tourist attraction where visitors from all over Greece came to witness Spartan boys enduring brutal whippings in traditional endurance contests. These contests were conveniently held in an outdoor theater to cater to the bloodthirsty crowds who had grown bored with such spectacles. These events sadly served as reminders of the once-proud society of disciplined warrior-Similars that had now faded away. Today, the Greek town of Sparta thrives as a bustling regional center. While the Eurotas valley remains beautiful, there are few archaeological remains that reflect its glorious and terrifying past. Ironically, the ruins of the former Helot city of Messene, which tower above the Kalamata plain, are much more significant.
