The erosion of Neville Chamberlain’s# reputation was brought about quickly as his policy of appeasement failed to prevent WW2. The Cato# collective branded him as a criminal in the ‘Guilty men’#. Churchill# further reinforced this view telling the commons “England has been offered a choice between war and shame. She has chosen shame, and will get war. ”#. These more orthodox views starkly contrast the reactions of the public and media pre-war. Hailed as a hero “Most newspapers supported Chamberlain uncritically, and he received thousands of gifts, from a silver dinner service to many of his trademark umbrellas. #, with newspapers such as the Stockholm Tidningen# suggesting he receive the Nobel peace prize, Strasbourg renaming her streets overnight and the Telegram# concluding “Your name will go down in history as a statesman who saved civilisation from destruction”#. Ultimately appeasement, “the reduction of tensions between two states by the methodical removal of the principal causes of conflict and disagreement between them, which might otherwise lead to war. ”# may not have been the only realistic option, but it was certainly an option and it was taken forward.
Used as a synonym for weakness and ‘giving in’ in today’s world, there are Historians who argue that Chamberlain and his policy of appeasement was weak and lead to WW2 such as L. B. Namier, while there are also historians, such as A. J. P Taylor, who argue it was the only realistic option for him, during the years 1936-38. An assumption can be made that to go to war, or engage in conflict, a government must have a certain level of public backing and a stable economy.
The Oxford union debate in 1933 caused shock waves in Britain as they voted “257 votes to 153 that ‘This house will in no circumstances fight for king and country’”#, suggesting the ruling class had become open to appeasement. However what it doesn’t show is the opinion of the majority, just the few upper class. Also if the debater for appeasement was substantially stronger, this could also explain the outcome. The acceptance of appeasement was also seemingly replicated in the lower classes.
Validating the view that the public wanted a more passive foreign policy was the Fulham East by-election in 1933 when the Tory in favour of rearming, lost his seat to the pacifist Labour MP. The dramatic swing seems to show the sentiment that the public did not want to rearm. However this may not be the sole reason for the swing. The economy had only just posted positive GDP movements out of the recession and still had around 3 million unemployed. Therefore they could’ve voted labour simply for his policy’s.
Supporting this alternative interpretation Ted Hanson suggests “”For most Fulham voters it was almost certainly housing, food prices and employment, that influenced their vote. ”#. Hanson’s argument devalues the idea that voters were purely voting on the rearmament ideologies of the candidates and is complimented by the state of the economy in 1933. Therefore is relatively more reliable than the idea of it being won due to views on appeasement alone, implying that the public in Fulham east may not have been strongly against appeasement.
Contrasting this, however, is the peace ballot of 1934/5. The results would resonate with Baldwin as around 10 million, approximately 35% of the entire population and 93% of those who were asked, were in favour of stopping aggressive nations by ‘economic and non-military measures’. This makes the case for appeasement more realistic as it is such a large quantity of data, it could be said to be fairly representative. However the last question on the ballot ‘If necessary, by military measures? ’ had a ? majority in favour. Winston Churchill in 1948 said it meant Britons were “willing, and indeed resolved, to go to war in a righteous cause”#. So if there was a possibility that the public would be willing to wage war, then surely there was alternatives to appeasement, maybe not to the extent of a war, but some sort of military intervention. The peace ballot is the most valuable source as it is simply so extensive and balances any anomalous results, compared to say, 400 Oxford students. Their representation is also useful as it the public’s opinion just before the Rhineland re-occupation.
So in this case shows that there was already a majority in favour for using force, if necessary, even though nothing like the Rhine had happened yet. Between 1936 and 1938 the public’s sentiment seemed to change. While 5,000 supporters gathered outside 10 Downing street for Chamberlain, 16,000 were demonstrating at Trafalgar Square, after Munich. The mass media reported the supporters but not the protesters. This bias which is also shown to journalists such as Norman Ebbut could be the reason why public opinion started to sway on such a scale, so late.
If Chamberlain did have public support, other options to appeasement would have been more realistic. The censorship of Ebbut’s writings and his withdrawl from Berlin, which is reciprocated through the majority of mass media, is an important source as it would mean that Baldwin and Chamberlain would not have the public support to rearm in the early to mid part of the 30’s. Disproving this, though, Sir Walter Citrine# in 1935 :“There is no alternative left to us now but the applying of sanctions, including the possibility of War”. As he is head of the TUC# it could be argued that he speaks for the working man. This source is valuable as it is an unlikely view of a labour trade-unionist who represents the working class who would essentially be fighting the war. Although he isn’t implicitly stating he is anti-appeasement, it does show that Britain should of been preparing for War sooner. The 1936 remilitarization of the Rhineland was a ‘flagrant violation’ of the Treaty of Versailles# and Locarno treaties#.
Arguably this is when Britain could of taken action as an alternative to appeasement. For Churchill, and other similar minded historians, the Second World War could have been prevented by a policy of timely resistance to German aggression:“there never was a war so easy to stop. ”# Churchill identified the remilitarization of the Rhineland, in March 1936, as the last opportunity to prevent world war, had Britain and France responded to Hitler’s treaty violations using their still overwhelming military superiority. Ludwig Beck# also supports this as he “warned Hitler that the German Army would be unable to successfully defend Germany against a possible retaliatory French attack. ”#. Although this source could be weakened as Ludwig was increasingly against the Nazi regime at this point, therefore may have ulterior motives. Affirming the argument that Germany would back down to military aggression even further is Hitler himself who “reassured Fritsch that he would ensure that the German forces would leave at once if the French intervened militarily to halt their advance. #.
These both prove that there was an alternative to appeasement. But the realism isn’t all there. Chamberlain didn’t have this knowledge and as Eden writes, “They might succeed in crushing Germany with the aid of Russia, but it would probably only result in Germany going Bolshevik”# which would have been a great concern for Chamberlain making appeasement more realistic. Further to this as Blake states “‘Appeasement’. It was supported by the treasury, by the chiefs of staff and by the dominions. ”#. Therefore considering verything, with imperfect knowledge and full backing from the majority that are closest to him, it seems that Churchill’s views are much weaker, and the policy of appeasement is more logical as the threat of another great European war and fear of communism was too great. Contrary to this, though, there was an alternative which wouldn’t likely end in war. Germany, at that stage, had weak western fortifications, while France had a strong military force on the ready and Britain enjoyed clear naval supremacy.
There was also the possibility of an alliance with the Soviet Union, which, Churchill argued, Chamberlain should have pursued assiduously well before 1939#. Had Britain advanced such a deterrent force posture, it would have served as a signal that the Versailles-Locarno treaty was to be taken seriously, and Hitler might have been discouraged from developing Germany into a central European hegemonic power#. This view is implicitly endorsed by Kenneth Walz: “One must lament Churchill’s failure to gain control of the British government in the 1930s, for he knew what actions were required to maintain a balance of power. #. Even though Britain had naval superiority, she didn’t have military superiority and was only spending just above ?100 million, between 1933-37. She would have to count on an ally to help if she was to take action against the Rhine remilitarisation or to help Czechoslovakia.
Kennedy argues that rearmament within the limits which the Treasury quite rightly considered necessary for Britain’s peacetime stability and which were observed up to 1938 “was manifestly inadequate to meet the military threats, but that the massive increase in armaments on which Britain embarked in 1939 could not be sustained by the economy”. . It could therefore be said that the demands of military security and economic security were not merely in competition with one another, but were mutually incompatible. With this conclusion Churchill’s views and the views of anti-appeasement, seem to be proved implausible as they are not really possible. Although they could be the right thing to do and may well have stopped a war or at least postponed it, Kennedy’s argument would make appeasement the only realistic option.
Even though public and cabinet opinion changed, Britain would have had to have been for rearming and potentially plummeting themselves back into a recession, at the start of the 30’s. Munich could be said to have been the last chance for Chamberlain to ‘put his foot down’. The “Great Betrayal” interpretation is the linking of appeasement to the failure of deterrence in 1939. This view argues that the Munich conference, by casting doubts upon the subsequent British security commitment to Poland, encouraged Germany’s invasion of that country.
This then undermined Britain’s later deterrent posture by creating a “psychological effect” ,a reputation for irresolution, which convinced Hitler that the British guarantee was likely to be a “bluff”. # This argument gains much of its support from a comment Hitler is alleged to have made to his aides, that the response from Britain to any German invasion of Poland would be a “mere recalling of Ambassadors, or perhaps a blockade. “#Hitler then followed: “The men I got to know in Munich are not the kind that start a new World War”#.
This suggests that appeasement, although it was meant to delay the German military, actually encouraged it and Hitler to be more aggressive. On a whole, however, Munich becomes meaningless under the grand scheme. As Hitler was already preparing for War. Munich, hailed as a success by the world was essentially a facade. Therefore these sources and arguments become relatively less important than all others at it hems on the edge of the period, pre war. Everything was already in motion and there was little that Chamberlain or the cabinet could do to prevent it, if anything.
This agrees with the argument that Britain was not ready for war, as they were too busy trying to delay it so they were ready. However as a result, it could be implied that Hitler may not have thought this way if Britain had taken action in the Rhineland in 1936. But as the sources before this suggest, Britain simply couldn’t help in the Rhine and it was near impossible to help Czechoslovakia. In recent years Historians have started to Reject the orthodox characterization of Chamberlain as a naive, wishful-thinking optimist.
The new consensus among historians emphasizes the military, economic, bureaucratic and political constraints that limited Chamberlain’s diplomatic alternatives during the 1930s. Chamberlain, an experienced diplomat, “simply lacked the cards to play a very difficult game. “#. According to Sir Horace Wilson, “Chamberlain would have been as glad as anyone to have ‘stood up to Hitler,’ but he realized that in 1938 he was not in a position, politically or militarily, to do so; nor were the people of this country or the Commonwealth, still peace-minded, ready to proceed with war. #Essentially appeasement became the only realistic option in the period 1936 to 1938. The unprepared state of public opinion, the isolationism of the Dominions and the United States, lack of confidence in France, lack of interest in Central Europe, fear and distrust of the Soviet Union and Communism. It was massively overdetermined: any other policy in 1936-38 would have been astonishing.
Bibliography
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