1. Abstract: The collapse of Barings Bank was one of the biggest financial failures in modern history. The events that transpired changed the way risk management and proper corporate structure would be viewed by the world. This case study will chronicle the events that took place, identify the failures, and recommend how these events could have been avoided. To chronicle the events, books and articles of the event were read to understand how Nick Leeson’s activities caused the fall of Barings Bank.
Failures such as risk management were identified throughout the events so that final recommendations like regular monitoring could be made to prevent these disasters from happening again. With this methodical retracing of events our considerations can make a vulnerable company identify the risks and help to plug the holes before a catastrophic outlying event exposes them. 2. About the Bank Barings Bank had a humble origin compared to the prestige and honor it carried throughout most of its life. The Barings’ family originated from Holland then moved to Bremen in northern Germany and finally migrated to England in 1711.
The patriarch of the family, Johann Baring, settled in Exeter where he married a local girl and established a modest business as a wool broker. He raised his family in the quiet countryside but his sons were dissatisfied with this life and wanted to move into the big city. When they were old enough they moved to London where, “Francis Baring expanded the family’s merchant businesses and opened the independent and privately controlled bank with his brother John and son-in-law Charles Wall” (Hunt and Heinrich 1996, pg 7).
Barings Bank was initially used to finance the family’s wool trading business, but then expanded to include shipping and all aspects of international trade. As Britain prospered, so did the bank and Sir Francis Baring. “Sir Francis eventually became a director and chairman of the East India Company, was elected to Parliament, and was ultimately created a Baronet under William Pitt in 1793” (Hunt and Heinrich 1996, pg 7). The Barings began as a family of wool merchants and began to entrench themselves in the higher echelon of Britain’s society. Barings rise coincided with the rise of Britain in the world’s ranks.
The bank profited from the ascension of the British expansionism and colonialism. Barings Bank filled Britain’s war chest to fight the French emperor Napoleon Bonaparte, and then continued to profit by arranging loans for reparations for the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy after Napoleon was defeated at Waterloo (Hunt and Heinrich 1996, pg 7). The bank continued to extend help and became agents and advisers to the young United States, Russia, China, and Japan. These turned out to be extremely profitable ventures for Barings and gave them high returns for taking on the risk of dealing with these developing countries.
The Baring family was even involved in negotiating the Louisiana Purchase. With all those profitable deals under their belt the Baring family and their bank had entrenched and rose in both wealth and social status. With their growing wealth and status Barings Bank had become one of the most trusted and powerful banks in the world. Although the Baring family eventually lost outright ownership of the bank in 1890, they stayed involved with the bank and continue to empower themselves and the bank all the way through until its fall in 1995.
This power was aided by the Bank of England (BoE), which had essentially become the British government agency influencing interest and exchange rates and regulating the country’s banks. A very trusting and friendly relationship developed between the two banks that inevitably caused the oversight of many of the rules and regulations that Barings Bank was breaking. The trust of the Bank of England towards Barings and the directors’ inability to understand the complex events happening in a satellite office in Singapore caused the ultimate demise of one of the most powerful banks in the world. . Events that led to the Barings’ Collapse a. Leeson’s Trading Strategy: As the chief trader, Leeson’s official trading strategy mainly was to buy and sell future contracts on the Nikkei-225 Index and Japanese Government Bonds (JGB) over the Osaka Securities Exchanges (OSE), Tokyo Stock Exchanges (TSE), and Singapore International Monetary Exchange (SIMEX), in an arbitrage strategy designed to take advantage of price differentials between equivalent contracts listed on those exchanges.
This arbitrage, which Barings called ‘switching’, required Leeson to buy the cheaper contract and to sell simultaneously the more expensive one, reversing the trade when the price difference had narrowed or disappeared. This kind of arbitrage activity has little market risk because positions are always matched. Instead of hedging his positions, he gambled on the future direction of the Japanese markets. He decided simultaneously to buy and sell stock index futures on the Nikkei 225. It was reported that Barings has originally built a position of short straddles, a combination of short puts and short calls with the same strike price.
A short straddle is generally characterized by limited returns represented by the total premiums of the put and call involved, but it also imply unlimited liability if the underlying asset price moves unlimitedly high (Zhang 1995, pg 114). Leeson earned premium income from selling well over 37,000 of these straddles over a fourteen month period. For these to be profitable, Lesson’s strategy required that the Nikkei had to stay in the 18,500 – 19,500 range. The figure below is a graphical presentation of the profit and loss profile of a straddle.
At the time this seemed reasonable as the Japanese economy was rebounding after a 30 month recession. It appears however that Leeson made no attempt to hedge his position and to protect Barings’ exposure to market volatility. (Sell Straddle pay-off) b. Leeson’s doubling trading strategy: To summarize, Leeson expanded his positions when the losses were mounting, which is classically called as doubling strategy. Leeson stated that: “I felt no elation at this success. I was determined to win back the losses. And as the spring wore on, I traded harder and harder, risking more and more.
I was well down, but increasingly sure that my doubling up and doubling up would pay off . . . I redoubled my exposure. The risk was that the market could crumble down, but on this occasion it carried on upwards . . . As the market soared in Julyw1993xmy position translated from a ? 6 million loss back into glorious profit. I was so happy that night I didn’t think I’d ever go through that kind of tension again. I’d pulled back a large position simply by holding my nerve . . . but first thing on Monday morning I found that I had to use the 88888-account again . . . t became an addiction. ” -Fay 1997. (SIMEX Nikkei Futures and Leeson’s Position) The above figure shows that Leeson’s trading activity of Nikkei futures on SIMEX. It can be seen Leeson doubled his positions significantly during last months of 1994 and beginning of 1995 to come out of losses. The striking attribute of the doubling strategy is an inevitable loss preceded by high returns with low volatility which can also observed from the above graph. Had the management noticed this strategy by the end of January 1995 then the losses would have been significantly less. . The Turbulence: Barings has estimated a 15-20% rise in the Japanese equity in 1995. In the first two weeks of January, Leeson began small-scale futures purchases betting that the Nikkei will not drop below 19,000 by March 10. On the day of the Kobe earthquake, January 17, 1995, the Tokyo stock market plunged to 19,350 points and the annualized volatility of the futures price increased from 16% to 30%. It ended that week slightly lower at 18,950 or by approximately 7%. Leeson’s straddle positions were at risk.
The call options Leeson had sold were beginning to look worthless but the put options became very valuable to their buyer and other traders choose to take advantage of the big position that Barings had to bet against the firm. If the Nikkei continued to decline below 18,500, Leeson’s losses on these puts would be unlimited. With increasing volatility, Leeson’s short options would have shown losses even if the Tokyo stock market had not plunged. . As the loss grew, Leeson requested extra funds to continue trading, trying to rescue his short straddles and other open positions.
He rapidly built up a long futures position betting that there would be a post quake rebound and the Nikkei would stabilize at 19,000. His only hedge was in partially holding a short position on JGB’s betting that interest rates would rise. This is reflected the chart below which shows that Lesson’s positions went in the opposite direction to the Nikkei. As the Japanese stock market fell, Leeson’s position increased. Before the Kobe earthquake, with the Nikkei trading in a range of 19,000 to 19,500, Leeson had long futures positions of approximately 3,000 contracts on the Osaka Stock Exchange.
A few days after the earthquake his position reached 19,094, about a month later on February 17 (Chew Lillian). Source: Datastream and Osaka Securities Exchanges However, the market did not rebound. Over three months Leeson bought more than 20,000 futures contracts worth about $180,000 each in an unsuccessful attempt to move the market. Total loss to the 233-year-old Barings Bank was well over $1 billion and led to its eventual bankruptcy. 4. The Japanese Economic Recovery and Financial Markets
Despite conflicting signs of recovery in the middle of 1994, the Japanese economy was expected to recover from its recession since the breaking of the economic bubble in the 1990s. By the end of 1994 and early 1995, economic releases showed signs of full and immediate economic recovery. For instance, domestic auto sales in January 1995 rose 5. 1% for the eight consecutive monthly increases. Machinery orders from the auto industry in the fourth quarter of 2004 rose over 30% for the third consecutive quarterly increase, which suggested further recovery in private capital spending.
Exports figures also improved suggesting further increase in production along the industrial sector. However other economic indicators showed negative signs of recovery or at least signs of a weak recovery. For instance, industrial production in December of 1994 posted a slight decline. Private investments were also likely to decline In addition to the Kobe earthquake which postponed the Japanese economic recovery to a large degree and pushed the Japanese stock market to slide further to lows not seen since early 1994, other factors also inflicted such fall.
Those factors are critical in forecasting the speed of the Japanese economic recovery and in understanding and evaluating Nick Leeson’s extreme positions. First, property prices had been declining for few years because of the economic recession. The decline in property called attention to the bad loans problem which upset the banking industry for few years, for significant amount of bad loans were secured by land. The total amount of bad loans, which were written-off by the Japanese banks in early 1995, range between US $100-200 billion.
The bad loans problem had a significant negative impact on the economic recovery (Zhang 1995, pg 125-126). Another factor that negatively impacted the Japanese economy in late 1994 was the bail-out of the two credit associations, Tokyo Kyowa and Anzen, by the Central Bank of Japan after the discovery of more than ? 100 billion (about US$1 billion) in bad loans. The rescuing plans are believed to have had some negative impact on the financial market. Mentioned should be made that these associations were deemed to be involved in illegal transactions after issuing loans for more than 20% of their capital to one borrower.
Next, the Japanese government was so divided and weak that it was very unlikely it would deliver a huge rise in public spending to stimulate the economy or push the stock market back up. This can be seen in the slow response of the government to the Kobe earthquake. In addition the bail out of the two big credit associations referenced above have caused a lot of public opposition to the use of public money for such purpose (Zhang 1995, pg 126-127). Last but not least, the Dollar-Yen exchange rates fell by the end of 1994. Such decline has negatively impacted the Japanese economic recovery and stock markets.
Source: http://www. discount-currency-exchange. com Although there was signs in late 1994 that recovery of the Japanese economy was underway, the recovery was slow. The Kobe earthquake along with the above-reference factors was perceived to be having a significant negative effect on the Japanese economy, yet Leeson unreasonably became extremely bullish. 5. Causes of The Failure a. Leeson’s Behavior Initially, Leeson had been buying options contracts on the SIMEX and selling on Osaka in a strategy designed to take advantage of price differentials between equivalent contracts listed on the two exchanges.
This strategy has little market risk because positions are always matched. However he chose to ignore the strategy which he was supposed to employ. Moreover he did not hedge his positions. As noted in the ‘Report of the Inspectors of Baring Futures (Singapore) PTE LTD’, the transactions were not hedged by matching positions (Lim 1995). As a result, the Baring Group was exposed to enormous potential losses from even small market movements. Given the scale of the Barings’ Nikkei position, every 1% drop in the Index would expose the firm to US $938 million of losses.
If Leeson was long on the OSE, he had to be short twice the number of contracts on SIMEX. But Leeson was not short on SIMEX; in fact he was long approximately the number of contracts he was supposed to be short. In addition, as noted by the ‘Report of the Board of Banking Supervision Inquiry into the Circumstances of the Collapse of Barings 18 July 1995’, Nick Leeson acted beyond his authority in all aspects (Lim 1995). He had no authority to maintain open positions overnight. He also had no authority to trade in options.
Moreover, he concealed his unauthorized activities and related losses by a number of ways including the suppression of account ‘88888’ from Barings in London, the submission of falsified reports to London, the misrepresentation of the profitability of his trading, and a number of false trading transactions and accounting entries. Most shockingly, Leeson managed to mislead his management into funding his unauthorized activity. b. Barings’ Management Issues: The fall of Barings can be considered as a model of bad organizational structure and poor risk management practices.
Right after the collapse, preliminary investigation pointed the Barings collapse cause to the Nick Leeson’s risky behavior and trading strategy. Leeson is still accused of fabricating documents relating to his trading activities, lying to auditors and management, and falsifying trading reports. However, the final analysis revealed that Barings cultural traits and management practices have contributed to the downfall. Barings had completely failed to establish a proper managerial, financial and operational control system.
Due to the ineffective control, Nick Leeson was able to carry out his unauthorized trading tricks without been detected. The failings of Baring Bank that led to its collapse can be divided into the following key points: i)Lack of Segregation of Duties: Barings’ organization structure failed to separate trading from settlement. The management of Barings did not relieved Leeson from his functions as head of settlements after he became head of trading. He became in charge of both the dealing desk and the back office. As a general rule, the two functions must be kept apart.
Barings Bank let Leeson to settle his own trade deals despite warnings of the danger inherent in this position in an internal audit, which allowed him to conceal the high risks he took and the amount of funds he lost as a result of his gambling strategy (Rawnsley 1995, pg 182). In short, the back office provides the necessary checks to prevent unauthorized trading and reduce the potential for misappropriation. The back office records, confirms and settles trades transacted by the front office, reconciles them with details sent by the bank’s counterparties and assesses the accuracy of prices used for its internal valuations.
It also accepts/releases securities and payments for trades. Since Leeson was in charge of the back office, he had the final say on payments, ingoing and outgoing confirmations and contracts, reconciliation statements, accounting entries and position reports. He was perfectly placed to relay false information back to London. Beside his trading activities, as a general manager, he had an excessive concentration of power. Allowing Leeson to remain Chief Trader, while being responsible for settling his trades, was a considerable mistake.
As a result, Leeson was able to hide information on the 88888 account that was set up in July 1992 as an error account in Barings Futures Singapore system by removing this account from the daily reports which Barings Futures Singapore sent Barings Bank. ii)Ignoring Warning Signs: The management of Barings had never responded to the recommendations of the internal audit team’s report in August 1994. The internal audit team warned that there was a significant general risk by allowing Leeson be responsible for both the front and back offices as this will allow him to override the controls.
In its report, internal audit requested that Leeson be relieved of some of his responsibilities including supervision of the back office, signing checks, and signing off bank reconciliations. However, No one in London checked on whether key internal audit recommendations on the Singapore back office had been followed up. On January, 11, 1995, Yu Chuan Soo, the VP for Singapore International Monetary Exchange (SIMEX) audit and compliance, complained about a deficit of $116 million in account “88888” that was caused by financing the margin requirements of this account.
Yu Chuan Soo also noticed that the initial margin requirement of this account was in excess of $342 million. Barings Futures Singapore was asked to provide a written explanation of the margin difference on account ‘88888’. BSF did not send any warnings to the headquarters in London. No one investigated or asked Leeson for an explanation. Instead, It allowed Leeson to respond himself to SIMEX concerns. In addition, there was inadequate investigation of an unusual request for a large cash payment from one of the
Asian exchanges that would have likely revealed Leeson’s activities. Apparently, Barings’ management missed all warning signs. iii)Lack of Supervision and clear reporting line: Leeson was not closely supervised, and it appears that none of his direct managers reviewed his trading activities, or tried to understand the origin of his success. In addition, nowhere within Barings, or with its external auditor, did Leeson’s uncommon success set off any warnings. In theory, Leeson had more than one supervisor and more than one reporting line which caused confusion.
There was little oversight of his activities and no individual was directly responsible for monitoring his trading strategies. Leeson’s supervisors have disputed who was directly responsible for him and no one knew exactly whether he should be reporting to his managers in London or overseas. No one exercised any real control over him. Two former directors of Barings Futures Singapore have repeated their denials that Leeson had reported to them on trading on SIMEX. The two directors indicated that he reported to London and they did not know who should be responsible for monitoring his activities. v)Lack of Understanding of the Business (Technically Non-Competent): One of the key questions to be asked is why top Barings management did not questioned Lesson’s rogue trading behavior before it was too late? The root of the Barings’ collapse lay in top management’s lack of understanding of derivatives business and their laissez-faire position to its operations in Singapore (McNee 2004). Laissez-faire position. Barings’ top management was thrilled by the income from the firm’s operations in Singapore and did not want to investigate too deeply into an area that was bringing in the profits.
Senior managers did not even know the details of Leeson’s reported profits. Even Peter Baring, ex-chairman of Barings, told the Board of Banking Supervision (BoBS) of the Bank of England which conducted an investigation into the collapse of Barings believes that he found the earnings “pleasantly surprising” since he did not even know the breakdown. Under the structure of Barings’ operations before the collapse, it was almost impossible for the senior managers to detect what Leeson was doing. It is likely that they wanted to ensure the stream of profit from Singapore, and the boost to bonuses made them reluctant to impose tight controls.
Lack of Understanding. Barings’ top management did not have enough knowledge and experience with the trading business. If they did (1) they should have questioned where all the profit is coming from, (2) they should not have ignored concerns regarding the large positions and ignoring market risk simply because they thought those positions were hedged, (3) they would have conducted a comprehensive review of Leeson’s funding requirements, and (4) they should have known that it was not rational for Leeson to be making the profits that he was reporting without taking on unjustified risk.
Of Ron Baker (head of the Financial Products Group) and Mary Walz (Global head of Equity Financial Products), two of Barings’ most senior derivatives staff and Leeson’s bosses, the BoBS report concluded, “Neither were familiar with the operations of the SIMEX floor. Both claim that they thought that the significant and large profits were possible from a competitive advantage that BFS had arising out of its good inter-office communications and its large client order flow.
As the exchanges were open and competitive markets, this suggests a lack of understanding of the nature of the business and the risks (including compliance risks) inherent in combining agency and proprietary trading. ” -Chew Lillian v)Inadequate capital and Large Exposure Risk: All financial institutions must have enough capital to survive the effect of unfavorable market changes on its outstanding positions and sufficient cash on hand to keep these positions going. Moreover, these institutions must take a closer look to their funding needs of hedged positions.
Barings managers exposed the institution to considerable market and funding risk. They were borrowing large amount of funds based on requests from Singapore to cover their positions. They thought they were paying margins on hedged positions and that is why they continued to fund Leeson’s activities, while they were in fact losing funds on gambling on the Japanese stock market. After Leeson had an illegal Nikkei exposure of 30,000 contracts, the institution was unable to bear the loss of about $1. 4 Billion (larger than the capital base).
It might be true that Barings’ top management did not know what Leeson was doing in Singapore, but they should have known where and for what reason the large amount of money exceeding their capital based were moved. They failed to pick up on that because there was no complete reconciliation of Barings’ book. In addition, Barings settlement and treasury departments were never able to reconcile the top-up payments demanded by Leeson, and made no effective attempt to clarify exactly where the money was being directed. vi)Loose Internal Control:
The supervision of Barings’ overseas operation was extremely loose and the failure of internal controls had serious impact on Barings financial position. Barings seemed to lack an independent unit to provide an additional layer of checks and balances (Zhang 2005, pg 157). Its internal control procedures were simply inadequate and ineffective. Those weak control procedures are as follow: -Lack of training to Leeson. Leeson who hardly had any training in derivatives was making transactions on his instinct. When the market was good, he profited; when the market was low, he lost and his gambling instinct got the upper hand. Inexistence of an independent unit to check the accuracy of Leeson’s reports. Leeson’s futures positions showed no market risk because trades were supposedly offset by opposite transactions on another exchange. -Barings failed to introduce effective limits on either his trading of funding requirements because it felt that there was little market risk attached to arbitrage trades since at the close of business, the position must be flat. According to the internal audit report in August 1994, there were no gross limit set for the arbitrage positions.
The only constraint is that group treasury will eventually inform Barings Futures that they will cease funding requirements if they grow too large (Rawnsley 2005, pg 183). -Barings did not require Leeson to justify his funding requirements; neither did it have an approach to reconcile the funds he requested to his reported positions and that of its client positions. London simply, automatically, remitted to Leeson the sum of money he asked for. All the above is a clear indication that the collapse of Barings was an extreme example of operations risk. Lessons to be learnt are not only from Leeson, but also from the management.
It will be unfair to blame the downfall of Barings on Leeson alone, and it is fair to believe that the collapse could not be a result of the work of one man, but an institution that had a bad structure (Zhang 1995, pg 157). 6. Recommendations The downfall of Barings Bank in 1995 had an enormous effect on the global financial markets. Since Barings Bank collapsed, financial institutions have implemented few strategies to improve risk management and internal in order to prevent villain trading behavior. The lessons from the Barings collapse can be explained into the following: 1.
It is important that banks make certain that trading positions are regularly scrutinized and monitored by exports or auditors. Banks should implement well structured organization and employees take seriously of their responsibility and report to the senior management on regular basis and accurately. Responsibility for each business activity has to be clearly established and communicated. Furthermore, the banks should set up an independent group of auditors to check the balance sheet issued by the accounting department regularly and also, the members of that group should be substituted after a certain period. . Top management must have a great knowledge of the different business areas. Top managers have the duty to understand fully the business they manage. It is worth mentioning that financial derivatives constitute an important part of portfolio executed in banks, financial institutes and security companies, it is necessary for the management to understand the operations of various instruments. “Understanding the business that you are in is fundamental and must start at the very top of the organization and work its way throughout,” said Leeson. I can speak first-hand that at Barings, management became very distracted from what was going on at the ground floor. They had no expertise in futures and options, and no understanding of how the markets worked. ” – (McEachern 2007) 3. One of the most important lessons is that firms have to invest in risk management systems. In other words, they have to focus more on internal control. Risk control measures should be set up for all the trading activities such as the limits of the open interest, the limits for the arbitrage activities, and exposure.
Top management has to ensure that major weaknesses are detected to them by internal audit and are resolved quickly. It is clear that one of the main reasons for the Barings Collapse is the lack of control and oversight of Leeson’s behavior from the risk management perspective. “At Barings, it has been proven that the risk management systems just didn’t work,” Leeson claims. – (McEachern 2007) 4. Banks need to focus more on derivatives not only because to the power they have over the financial markets, but also derivative instruments currently represent the biggest opportunity for heavy trading.
Finally, as indicated earlier, financial institutions must have enough capital to survive the effect of unfavorable market changes on its outstanding positions and sufficient cash on hand to keep these positions going. Managers have to be more knowledgeable about hedged positions and must take a closer look to their funding needs of those positions. 7. Conclusion Based on the information presented in this case, some may argue that Nick Leeson was not a rogue trader as reported in many cases. His trading activities, as characterized by short straddles, were reasonable because the Japanese market was believed to follow a declining pattern.
It was after the Kobe quake that his short positions began to lose money significantly. In order to regain his losses, Leeson established huge long positions on March Nikkei futures. He simply tried to push the market back to its pre-quake level. He relied on Barings’ optimism of the Japanese economic recovery as well as the Japanese stock market performance which would have increased the interest rates and lowered bond prices. His mistake was that he was over confident of his power to move the market back to its pre-quake level.
Instead of taking the losses, a decision that would have broken his trading records; he put the financial position of the entire bank at risk and Barings collapsed because it could not meet the enormous trading obligations, which Leeson established in the name of the bank. Nevertheless, no one can argue that arbitrage is an inherently low risk strategy and was intended for Leeson and his team to gain a series of small profits through careful speculation, rather than spectacular gains, but if not used appropriately it can quickly bring heavy losses or even disasters resulting from the leverage effect.
Leeson was supposed to be arbitraging, seeking to profit from differences in the prices of Nikkei 225 futures contracts listed on the Osaka Securities Exchange (OSE) in Japan and the Singapore International Monetary Exchange (SIMEX). Instead of hedging his positions, Leeson gambled on the future direction of the Japanese markets and brought down the 233-year financial empire to its knees. This is not to say that Leeson alone was responsible for the collapse of the Barings bank. Official inquiries into the circumstances of the collapse conducted by the Bank of England revealed many errors and omissions across the board.
Should management have succeeded to institute a proper managerial, financial and operational control system; the firm would had caught on to Leeson unauthorized trading activities. However, the foundations for effective controls were weak that the firm’s fragile system failed at a number of operational and management levels and in more than one location. 8. References Hunt, Luke, and Karen Heinrich (1996). Barings Lost: Nick Leeson and the Collapse of Barings Plc. Asia: Reed Academic Publishing. Rawnsley, Judith H. (1995). Total Risk: Nick Leeson and the Fall of Barings Bank.
New York: Harper Business. Zhang, Peter G. (1995). Barings Bankruptcy and Financial Derivatives. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co. Fay, Stephen (1997). Gerstein, Marc S. (2008). The Collapse of Barings. New York: W. W. Norton Case Study by Lillian Chew. Not Just One Man – Barings. Website of International Financial Risk Institute (IFRI). http://riskinstitute. ch/137550. htm Report of the board of banking supervision inquiry into circumstances of the collapse of Barings 18 July 1995 – http://www. numa. com/ref/barings/bar00. htm McNee, A. 2004. Barings Case Study. eRisk. com.
February, 2004. http://www. erisk. com/Learning/CaseStudies/Barings. asp Lim, Michael Choo San Barings Futures (Singapore) Pte Ltd : investigation pursuant to section 231 of the Companies Act (Chapter 50) : the report of the Inspectors appointed by the Minister for Finance / Michael Lim Choo San, Nicky Tan Ng Kuang. Singapore: Singapore Ministry of Finance, 1995. – xi, 183p. McEachern, Cristina (2007). Exclusive Interview with Nick Leeson: An Inside Look at Rogue Trading. Advanced Trading (March 07, 2008). http://www. advancedtrading. com/printableArticle. jhtml? articleID=206902512
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