The quest to find the best leaders has been a hotly-debated topic in the United States. From the Founding Fathers’ generation to current-day America, each historical period has reacted differently to the question; even in a short spanning of time, different people could have different opinions about this subject. James Madison, a contributor to the Federalist Papers and Alexis de Tocqueville—arguably two well-established voices—both tried to reason their answers in America’s context. In this writing, by laying out Tocqueville’s critiques and Madison’s presumptuous response, I will demonstrate that in a democratic government, institutional arrangements, although effective, cannot be a full substitution for virtuous statemen.
The authors of the Federalist Paper envisioned a government that would likely be governed by virtuous statesmen; therefore, they advocated for a system that would encourage the participation of righteous citizens. As Madison noted, since the representatives are entrusted by the people, it is possible to assume that they would be dignified in their manners. Also, members of Congress could sense the honor that the people have bestowed them; therefore, if they were moral, they would feel obliged to be loyal to their constituents (Madison, Federalist 57, 349). Indeed, it was the job of the representative to “refine and enlarge” the opinion of the people they represent (Madison, Federalist 10, 76). On the other hand, if representatives saw what the mass desires would not be beneficial, they could decide to vote by their conscience without being voted out: they could then explain to the people and retain a certain amount of voters, hoping that the people would to listen to them and understand the situation (this, however, requires citizens to be virtuous to a certain extent). Therefore, people holding office are likely to study laws or economy, which allows them to develop long-term thinking and become more enlightened—an inevitable aspect of virtuousness. In addition, note that House members are drawn from large districts: this allows for talented candidates to be easily spotted; also, the long-term vision from their education would help them in noticing the issue from not only their constituents but also others’, thereby help them in shaping better decisions (Madison, Federalist 56, 344).
As much as the founders wanted the country to be ruled by virtuous people, they knew that “[e]nlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm” (Madison, Federalist 10, 75). They imagined a possibility where egotism rears its ugly head: since there is no boundary on the characteristics of elected officials, there is no guarantee that virtuous people would be chosen—what, then, could hamper those “unwanted outliers” blinded by self-interest? This is why the founders implemented institutional arrangements that could function in extreme cases. As it turns out, the genius of the system lies in the fact that it could be run solely by self-interest. We learn that “pride and vanity” would compel the representatives to act in accordance with their constituencies even if they do not want to, hoping for “honors and distinctions” in exchange (Madison, Federalist 57, 349).
Ambitions force members of Congress to follow the voters’ will, assuming that they are wise. Also, the Constitution mandates that the term for House members is two years—short enough to require representatives to care about the people if they want to stay in power. Finally, since all laws passed in Congress will affect members of the House the same it will a normal citizen, it would be in their self-interest to create laws as fair as possible (Madison, Federalist 57, 350). Indeed, they could use their power to immune themselves, but they must bear in mind that the executive branch could veto the law, and the judicial branch has the right to declare the law unconstitutional—this is the spirit of checks and balances (Madison, Federalist 51, 318). This is how Madison thought would be the solution for the absence of virtuous leaders—giving the (presumably virtuous) citizens the right to decide who should be in their government.
This form of representative government could potentially give its citizens a great deal of authority. Therefore, it is possible for one to think that citizens are empowered in this society, since no one stands between them and the power. Hence, a majority of the citizens could become the dominant force in America—their voice is “omnipotent,” as Tocqueville assessed tyranny of the majority in the United States (Tocqueville 1835 [2002], 235). The reason for them to claim such power is, first, “ten million people cannot be wrong:” the minority must “accept [the majority’s verdict] only with difficulty” (Tocqueville 1835 [2002], 236).
Confidence in each individual is lost; at the same time, there is no special education for people to stand up against the majority, rendering the minority powerless. Gradually, “[the majority] makes itself obeyed by constraint” (Tocqueville 1835 [2002], 236), because “fitting in and being a part of this group” is the easier option for many people. The majority could exercise their power in yet another aspect: moral authority. In American societies, contradicting the majority’s viewpoint would be considered as a shame. Those with viewpoints conflicting the norm would not be touched physically, but would be left “worse than death:” they would live an isolated life. Everyone would need to question their own beliefs before speaking up, and so there would no “freedom of mind” (Tocqueville 1835 [2002], 245). It is natural, therefore, for Tocqueville to conclude that because the majority exercises great influence over the country, it is possible that liberty is de-emphasized, and minorities are brought to despair (Tocqueville 1835 [2002], 249).
Foreseeing a society that could be tyrannized by the majority in those aspects, the authors of the Federalist Papers introduced another institutional arrangement that could halt this seemingly forceful power: the dimension of the republic. America would be a large, diverse, commercial republic, and that significantly contributes to weakening the power of the majority faction (Madison, Federalist 10, 77-78). A large republic would make it harder for an unjust majority to arise in various ways: cross-cutting cleavages, based on “the various and unequal distribution of property” for example, would ensure that there is no permanent “us versus them” (Madison, Federalist 10, 74). Another advantage of a large republic is that dividing the country into small interests would be much easier, and the chance of forming a majority is diminished. There would be various interests, due to “different sentiments and views,” would regularly “check” each other to make sure no interest would be the most powerful (Madison, Federalist 10, 74).
In addition, the idea of “everyone loves justice in abstract” makes each citizen think carefully unless they want the law they used to support to come after themselves; this ensures fairness in the process (Madison, Federalist 10, 74). Even if an ideological unjust majority could be formed, the size of the republic would make it difficult for them to actually find each other—they would have to overcome the challenge of communication: in general, people do not feel comfortable stating their biased opinion to the public—’communication is always checked by distrust in proportion to the number whose concurrence is necessary” (Madison, Federalist 10, 78). If the majority persists, they would need at least 4 years to elect their people—that period is long enough for the minority to counter-campaign and emerge victoriously. This is how the authors of the Federalist Papers reasoned that the system is able to temper a national majority in its authority.
Tocqueville, on the other hand, realized that tyranny of the majority does not stop at social and moral issues—its effects linger on to the government[footnoteRef:1]. The fact is that the system does allow the American people to elect various officials. However, with frequent elections comes newly-elected members, making the legislative branch inherently unstable (Tocqueville 1835 [2002], 238). This instability brings forth two grave political consequences: first, there would be no great leaders in the United States. No one is willing to claim the right to guide the people, since potential leaders are too afraid of standing up to the capricious opinion of the majority and facing re-election at the same time—they’d rather submitted to the people, which reduces them to merely a tool of the people (Tocqueville 1835 [2002], 246). In addition, since the majority decides the winner of an election, it would be great if all citizens are well-informed and capable of making good judgments. That is never the case, unfortunately: people cannot always be trusted to make good decisions, since they often submit themselves “out of weakness, out of habit, or out of ignorance” (Tocqueville 1835 [2002], 246).
A second, more dangerous consequence of “majority rules” in this case is that, as Tocqueville shows us, the majority is connected to virtually anything: from public opinion and public forces to all three branches of government. Therefore, if the majority has some lasting, unwise passion that affects everyone, the system could only slow them down—they will eventually get their way (Tocqueville 1835 [2002], 237). Tocqueville believes that the weakness of this system is that it is not a fool-proof plan—there is still a way for the unenlightened majority to bypass the system and hamper the country. [1: Note that Tocqueville is mainly discussing state governments: he stated that state governments “direct American society” (Tocqueville 1835 [2002], 235). However, it is possible to generalize parts of his arguments to the federal government, since it also deals with the American society on many issues (albeit on a more sophisticated basis)—not just foreign affairs as Tocqueville claimed.]
Madison and Tocqueville agree on the disadvantages that instability brings forth to the government. Madison even claimed that although active participation of citizens and frequent changing of hands in the government are necessary for a healthy democracy, “a continual change even of good measures is inconsistent with every rule of prudence and every prospect of success” (Madison, Federalist 62, 378). However, Madison noted that the system could also supply stability in the government. The creation of the Senate provides the needed stability: with smaller size, longer term (6 years), Senators could have a “greater extent of information and stability of character” (Madison, Federalist 62, 374). Its concurrence being required for the law to be approved, the Senate will be more deliberate in the process of passing laws, thereby slowing down the pace of law-passing in the legislative branch (Madison, Federalist 62, 376). The fact that Senators are not directly subjected to the will of the people gives them more freedom to act in accordance with their conscience; thus, laws being passed are more likely to be “wise and honorable” (Madison, Federalist 63, 380).
In fact, modes of elections is another arrangement that can prevent tyranny of the majority: other than members of the House, the remaining portions of the government are not directly elected by the people. Senators were originally elected by the state legislatures, as mentioned above. The President is chosen by the Electoral College—the leader of the executive must get the wide support of the nation, and a mere majority could not decide the election. The judges in the Supreme Court are chosen by the executive, with “advice and consent” of the Senate—the majority, per Madison, is not virtuous enough (and therefore not fit) to define justice. We also learn that frequent participation of citizens in changing the Constitution is risky: first, it demonstrates that the government is flawed in its governance; second, “passion, not reason” would control the will of the people were they given the right to change the Constitution (Madison, Federalist 50, 316). Having the government reasonably distance from the people and limiting the frequent participation of the people in the government seem to be Madison’s solution to instability.
Still bothered by all the flaws of the system, Tocqueville asserts that lawyers would be the most suitable to govern, as they retain several characteristics that make them quite immune to the defects of democracy. First, as lawyers’ interests are attached to those of the people, the people need not envy them, unlike “the rich man, the noble, and the prince”; there would be no reason, also, for the people not to listen to lawyers, as they believe lawyers have no “ulterior motives” (Tocqueville 1835 [2002], 254). The “great leader” conundrum is resolved, since lawyers could bring the enlightenment they got from their education to serve the public without worrying about revenge. On the other hand, because lawyers still keep their “habits of aristocracy”—the desire for law and order, they would resist any modification as much as they could, adding to the stability of the government (Tocqueville 1835 [2002], 252). It is common, therefore, for lawyers to “fill the legislatures and are at the head of administration”—the interdependence between lawyers and citizens makes lawyers the most compatible with the system, per Tocqueville.
By comparing the arguments of Madison and Tocqueville, it is possible for us to see that democracy depends much on civic virtue to flourish. Further, virtue must come from both sides: the government must act in good faith, and citizens ought to be conscious to make the right choice. One could argue that “checks and balances” is enough to weaken a tyrannical government, or “divide and conquer” could easily subdue the majority. This argument would be accurate if success is defined as merely able to sustain. As mentioned above, however, institutional arrangements could only function well if at least either the government or the people can make good calls—more than often, they require both. Granted, Tocqueville admitted about the “inherent defects of the spirit of the lawyers”—this is why we need the arrangements (Tocqueville 1835 [2002], 254). Yet, although their existence is inevitable, institutions should only be exploited in the most extreme case. As Madison puts it, since this is a government of men ruling over men, it should be “control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself” (Madison, Federalist 51, 319).
The American government has existed for more than two centuries—its longevity and (arguably) success could be explained by the fact that a great number of lawyers have taken part in the government throughout its history, and statesmen have made good use of institutional arrangements in most cases. However, with many unexpected changes in American politics, as well as the brutal exploitation of institutional arrangements recently, the system begins to show its weaknesses. Whether the United States would continue to be thriving is indeed a mystery—only its people, who are increasingly unpredictable, could indicate the answer.
