Herbert Feis, a Special Consultant to three Secretaries of War, has written this book as the final installment in his series on the history of World War II from a government perspective. One of his previous books in the series even received the prestigious Pulitzer Prize. In this particular book, Mr. Feis offers strictly factual descriptions based on personal accounts and discussions that occurred within the White House. He extensively cites references throughout the text to support the information presented. Due to his governmental position, Mr. Feis possesses first-hand knowledge obtained directly from individuals involved in evaluating actions during that period; thus, he does not rely on second-hand testimonies for his content.
In early August 1945, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, two Japanese cities, were targeted with atomic bombs. The aftermath of these bombings led to Japan’s surrender and marked America’s withdrawal from World War II. By 1946, it was estimated that around 240,000 Japanese citizens had lost their lives as a result. President Truman and Secretary of War Henry Stimson justified the use of atomic bombs in the 1950s and 60s by arguing that it was necessary to prevent a potential loss of one million lives during an American invasion of Kyushu. However, historians in the 1960s proposed a different theory suggesting that the bombings were aimed at gaining diplomatic advantage over Russia. Two decades later, Feis presented another perspective based on new evidence and historical hindsight. He stated that various military, domestic, and diplomatic pressures influenced the decision to drop the bombs while also criticizing Truman and other influential figures for not exploring alternative options. As a result, it remains uncertain whether Truman’s choice ultimately saved lives or if his monumental decision can be morally justified.
Japan’s expansionist goals in Eastern Asia and the Western Pacific led to their aggressive actions. In 1940, the United States imposed an embargo on Japan, restricting the import of oil and other resources. Due to its primary focus on war efforts in Europe, the United States was not fully prepared to retaliate, allowing Japan to swiftly conquer a significant portion of South-East Asia, including the Philippines. During this conquest, Japanese forces engaged in intense battles and frequently utilized suicide tactics.
Truman was informed about the project, originally named S-1 but later known as the Manhattan Project, by Secretary of War Stimson on 25 April 1945, only after becoming President. Simultaneously with the Manhattan project, both Japan and America were preparing for a final comprehensive conflict, which both sides anticipated as involving an American invasion of mainland Japan. To this end, the Americans intensified conventional bombing and strengthened their increasingly effective naval blockade. The Japanese began stockpiling aircraft and formed a massive conscripted military force, as well as establishing a civilian army where all members pledged their unwavering loyalty to the emperor. This awe-inspiring army even consisted of “Sherman Carpets,” young individuals equipped with dynamite who were trained to hurl themselves under American tanks.
Despite final preparations, they were ultimately ineffective. On August 6, 1945, the American B-29 bomber Enola Gay, commanded by pilot Paul W. Tibbets, targeted and dropped an uranium-based bomb called “little boy” on the city of Hiroshima.
Three days later, Nagasaki was hit by a plutonium bomb known as “fat boy.” Finally, on August 14, 1945, Japan surrendered unconditionally, effectively ending the war in Asia.
Truman’s significant choice to employ these bombs stemmed from a complex array of decisions. Dropping the bomb was impacted by three primary factors: military, domestic, and diplomatic pressure.
Truman held meetings and discussions with Secretary of War Stimson, Army Chief of Staff General Marshall, Chief of Staff Admiral Leahy, Secretary of the Navy Forrestal, and others. These interactions resulted in pressure from the military. On June 18, 1945, General Marshall and Secretary of War Stimson convinced Truman to make plans for an invasion of Kyushu Island in November 1945. Truman was aware of the intense fighting occurring in the Pacific and desired to minimize the expected long and brutal struggle. The bomb emerged as a solution. Even until the end, Truman suggested that the American people should take pride in the bomb because it ultimately saved more American lives.
Truman and his advisors were under pressure to cease using atomic bombs for several reasons. Both domestic concerns and the desire for reelection played a role, as did the prevalent American animosity towards the Japanese. Similar to previous military conflicts, there was a push to depict Americans as morally superior to the Japanese. Truman himself shared this sentiment, referring to the Japanese people as “savages, ruthless, merciless, and fanatic” on July 25, 1945. Furthermore, Truman’s advisors feared that any leniency shown towards Japan’s ultimate war goal would be seen as appeasement both at home and abroad. Truman recognized that giving in or not dropping the bomb could incite public outrage. Additionally, if the bomb was not utilized, Truman worried about justifying the two billion dollars spent on the Manhattan Project in post-war America.
Truman faced various pressures to drop the bomb, including diplomatic tensions with Russia. The influence of these tensions on Truman’s decision is still debated by historians. Unlike Roosevelt, who emphasized cooperation with Russia through programs like Lend-Lease and friendly gestures at the Yalta conference, Truman took a more confrontational approach. During his preparations for a meeting with a Russian official, he expressed his frustration by saying “they could go to hell.” In his meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov, Truman asserted that only the American interpretation of the conflict over Poland was valid. This direct approach shocked Molotov, who exclaimed “I have never been talked to like that in my life.” Overall, these statements demonstrate Truman’s shift towards a stricter and more aggressive policy towards Russia.
Truman’s embrace of a new hard-line policy is widely accepted, but there is controversy surrounding whether he took it a step further. According to historian Alperovitz, Truman intentionally postponed the Potsdam meeting until the atomic bomb could be tested, which he refers to as the “strategy of a delayed showdown.” The goal was to intimidate the Russians and gain a political advantage. Secretary of State Byrnes suggested that the bomb could enable dictating terms at the end of the war. Stimson informed Truman on May 16, 1945, that they would have even stronger cards in their hands later on and supposedly advised him to adopt a policy of delay. Even though many details are missing from Truman’s discussions with his advisors, it becomes difficult to believe Truman and Stimson’s assertion that the bomb was solely dropped for military purposes, as Alperovitz admits.
The evidence found in Truman’s diaries and letters to his wife contradicts Alperovitz’s theory about American diplomacy using the bomb to intimidate the Russians. In a diary entry on 7 June 1945, just over a month before the Potsdam Conference, Truman wrote that he was not afraid of Russia and believed they had always been and would continue to be friends. This sentiment is strengthened by Truman’s appreciation for Harry Hopkins, whom he sent to meet with Joseph Stalin and prepare for the upcoming conference. Truman was delighted with the progress Hopkins had made. On 12 May 1945, Winston Churchill expressed his concerns in a telegram to Truman, questioning what would happen with Russia while the Allies, including his own country, were withdrawing troops from Europe. Feis argues that if Truman had indeed been seeking a confrontation with Russia as Alperovitz suggests, he would have responded to Churchill’s concerns and ordered American troops to remain in Eastern Europe. This way, when the anticipated conflict did occur, Truman would still have military influence in Europe.
Truman continued withdrawing American troops from Eastern Europe, stating that he wanted to uphold the agreements made during the war to keep Russia fighting. He did not seek confrontation or intimidation but rather cooperation with Russia. Truman expressed his satisfaction in a letter to his wife, stating that he achieved what he came for and that Stalin would enter the war without any conditions on August 15. However, one diary entry from the Potsdam Conference supports the theory proposed by Alperovitz. Truman mentioned that most important matters were settled and that they would finish off the Japanese when Russian aid came into play. These six words suggest Truman’s possible desire to gain an advantage over Russia by dropping the bomb, as argued by Alperovitz.
Looking back, there were five major options for the atomic bomb: a non-combat demonstration, modifying the demand for unconditional surrender, pursuing “Japanese peace feelers,” waiting for Soviet entry into the war, and continuing conventional warfare through aerial bombings and naval blockade. However, the first two options are arguably the most realistic, so I will only discuss those.
A non-combat demonstration was considered during discussions on the use of the bomb. This would have involved either dropping the bomb in a desolate area with international observers present or dropping it on an unpopulated area of Japan. The idea was raised twice, first on May 31, 1945 at the Interim Committee Lunch and again in the Frank Committee report on June 11, 1945. The Scientific Panel, consisting of four principal physicists involved in the Manhattan Project (Fermi, Lawrence, Compton and Oppenheimer), recommended that the bomb be used solely for “direct military use.” Stimson, Truman, Byrnes and others agreed with this recommendation because they were concerned that the bomb might not be effective in intimidating the Japanese and also due to limited available materials. Stimson later explained that they did not have extra bombs to spare. Therefore, this alternative was not pursued due to logistical challenges and doubts about whether the observers would be allowed to accurately report the demonstration to the Japanese Emperor.
The second option to avoid using the atomic bomb was to modify the American demand for Japan’s unconditional surrender so that the Japanese emperor could remain in power. Many American officials believed that this was the main obstacle preventing peace factions in Japan from surrendering. On 18 June 1945, Admiral Leahy recommended to Truman, after consulting with Joseph Grew and Harry Hopkins who believed Japan was close to defeat, that the demand for unconditional surrender be changed. Truman said he would consider it but expressed concern about “public opinion on this matter.” Secretary of Stimson agreed and suggested in his memorandum on 2 July 1945 that the United States should demand a “peacefully inclined government” without excluding a constitutional monarchy under Japan’s current dynasty. However, Truman ultimately rejected this recommendation and released the Potsdam Declaration without any mention of the emperor. Truman made this decision because he feared that changing the demand might encourage the Japanese to keep fighting for better terms. Ironically, when Japan surrendered on 14 August, they allowed the emperor to remain in power. Therefore, this alternative was eventually adopted but only after dropping the bombs when it became no longer an option.
Feis argued that considering alternative options could have provided insight into the true impact of the atomic bombs on saving lives, while acknowledging the need to consider hypothetical scenarios. Feis suggested envisioning Truman’s exploration of not only the mentioned main alternatives but also three additional ones. The first possibility is that these alternatives could have succeeded before November 1, 1945. If this were the case, it would mean that instead of saving lives, around 240,000 innocent Japanese citizens would have lost their lives due to the bombs. The second possibility is that the alternatives would have failed and resulted in a planned invasion in November. To ascertain whether lives would have been saved in this scenario, Feis could only speculate on casualty numbers among both Americans and Japanese during this invasion in November. Despite Truman and Stimson’s assertion about one million American casualties from an invasion, there was no evidence supporting this claim. During a meeting on June 18th, the Joint War Plans Committee presented Truman with projected death rates ranging from 31,000 to 50,000 and a projected casualty rate (including deaths, injuries, and missing) of 132,500. From March 1st ,1944 to May 1st ,1945 during Pacific fighting instances, Japanese casualties were significantly higher than American casualties at a ratio of 22 to 1According to Feis, the projected death toll for Americans was around 40,000, with calculations indicating approximately 880,000 Japanese casualties. These forecasts would have resulted in a total of 920,000 deaths. However, the actual death rates in Hiroshima and Nagasaki were significantly lower than these estimates, not even reaching half of those figures. This suggests that if an invasion of Kyushu had been necessary and the Japanese had been killed at a similar rate as in previous conflicts, the atomic bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki actually prevented loss of lives.
The use of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki is a subject that has been extensively debated in history, with numerous books and journals dedicated to it. There are varying views on this issue, ranging from considering it an immoral diplomatic maneuver to perceiving it as a glorious military action. However, the most reasonable perspective takes into account the military, diplomatic, and domestic factors that influenced Truman’s decision. Instead of unequivocally stating that the bomb either caused innocent lives to be lost or saved lives, it is more rational to conclude that determining the outcome definitively is impossible. Furthermore, Truman made this significant decision shortly after assuming the presidency without apparent consideration of alternative options. Teaming up with his advisors, Truman never questioned the fundamental principles established during the Manhattan Project under Roosevelt and firmly believed that dropping the bomb was the correct course of action.
