From the end of the Persian Wars to the start of the First Peloponnesian War, Sparta’s dominance waned and Athens grew in influence in Greece. Thucydides (460-400 BC), a renowned historian during this time, offered the most reliable accounts of this era. While he did not possess enough evidence for certain events, his Histories served as the main source of information for that period. It is worth mentioning that as an Athenian and a member of the Athenian army, his writings may have been partially biased.
During the years 480-479 BC, there was significant concern regarding the strength and size of the Persian danger. Despite successfully driving the Persians away from the Greek mainland, the risk of reconquest lingered. However, in the battle of Plataea (479 BC), led by Spartan regent and general Pausanians, the Greeks completely destroyed the Persian army. Additionally, they achieved a naval triumph at Mycale. Although the war persisted for several years, these two victories signified the conclusion of the Persian threat to Europe and the commencement of the era of Greek prominence.
The concept of panhellenism, which represents the recognition of Greek unity, emerged in response to the fear of the Persian invasion. It was during this time that Persia played a role in helping Greece acknowledge its identity, leading to the importance of marking the year 479 BC as the start of the Classical Greek period. However, from a political standpoint, the year 479 BC does not signify a significant turning point.
Sparta’s control over her allies remained intact even after the Greeks achieved victory in Plataea, causing the fear of the Persian invasion to dwindle. The concept of a unified Greek alliance began to decline, giving way to a sense of Phthonos (envy) that characterized the relationship between Sparta and Athens, as well as between numerous other city-states in the aftermath of the Persian Wars. This rivalry persisted incessantly.
The wars resulted in Athens becoming the dominant naval force in Greece, enabling them to greatly expand their empire over the newly acquired territories like never before. This power shift between Athens and Sparta established a new political system that would have a significant impact on Greek history.
Following the Persian Wars, Athens commenced reconstruction of their city walls that were demolished during the conflict. Thucydides reported that upon learning about this restoration project, Sparta immediately dispatched a delegation to Athens in order to confirm the situation. Sparta opposed any city-state having fortifications, as they could pose a danger in case of another invasion. The presence of fortified cities would potentially enable invaders to utilize them as military bases, similar to how the Persians did during the recently ended war (I, 90-92).
Thucydides expressed suspicion towards Sparta’s reasons for disputing the fortification of Athens. Athenian general Themistocles traveled to Sparta to address these doubts. His intention was to conceal the truth about the construction of Athenian walls until they were completed (I, 90). Themistocles even instructed the Athenians to prevent Sparta’s representatives from returning until the walls had been finished. Once the walls were completed, Themistocles revealed the truth to the Spartans. He asserted that Athens now had the ability to make decisions regarding its own interests and those of the rest of Hellas (I, 91).
Thucydides states that the Spartans showed friendliness towards Athens because of their courage in the Persian wars, yet they refrained from openly displaying their anger. Thucydides also posited that Sparta began to feel apprehensive about Athens’ growing power and size.
The strengthening of Athens was also influenced by the Spartan commander, Pausanias, who led the Hellenic forces in battles against Cyprus and Byzantium. Pausanias faced unpopularity among his own people, particularly in recently liberated states that yearned for Athens to assume leadership and protect them from Pausanias. Suspicions arose that Pausanias may have collaborated with the Persian king, leaving Sparta no choice but to remove him from the war and bring him to court. Ultimately, Pausanias was sentenced to death by starvation (I, 94-95).
The Greek allies quickly became dissatisfied with Spartan leadership due to their arrogant and violent behavior. As a result, no ally was willing to accept Sparta’s leadership anymore, prompting Sparta to relinquish its leading position. According to Thucydides, Sparta feared that their officers would become corrupted when going overseas, as seen in the case of Pausanias. Additionally, Sparta no longer wanted the burden of the war against Persia. They believed that the Athenians were fully capable of taking command and also had a friendly relationship with them at the time (I, 95).
The ongoing need for Sparta to keep their army at home most of the time in order to guard against a helot revolt made it difficult to maintain prolonged overseas operations. The Athenians successfully took over leadership and assumed control over all important decisions regarding the war, including the amount of money or number of ships every country had. Understanding the events that followed begins with questioning the true nature of the relationship between Sparta and Athens after the Persian war.
According to Thucydides, Sparta peacefully accepted Athens’ seizure of political power, as evidenced by the defensive speeches given by Athens’ orators. However, there is evidence suggesting that Sparta was actually coerced into accepting the change. Herodotus mentioned that Pausanias’s behavior served as a mere pretext for Athens to establish hegemony. The Athenians then removed the Lacedaemonians from their position of supremacy, although this was officially attributed to Pausanias’s arrogance (Herodotus 8.3-4). There is no indication that Sparta readily accepted this.
In addition, Thucydides’ writings reveal contradictions regarding Sparta willingly relinquishing their authority. Thucydides mentions that in 477/476 BC, Sparta sent its army, led by Pausanians, to Cyprus and Byzantium (I, 96). This indicates their desire to expand their influence and compete with Athens.
Diodorus recounts a dispute within Sparta concerning hegemony. The younger Spartans desired to maintain their military leadership and engage in naval expeditions, whereas the older Spartans opposed this idea. Certain Spartans were even prepared to wage war against Athens rather than relinquish leadership to them. However, Hetoimaridas, an elder Spartan, successfully convinced his fellow Spartans to refrain from going to war with Athens.
In Tagea, there was a proposal to form an Arcadian alliance and separate from the Peloponnesian League under Sparta’s leadership. The people of Arcadia and Tagea sought independence but were defeated by Sparta in two occasions (in 471 BC and 469 BC) and forced back into the Peloponnesian League.
The increased discontent among the serfs in Messenia and Laconia posed a major danger to Sparta. Pausanians, having failed outside of Laconia and feeling betrayed by Sparta, tried to overthrow the current constitution of Sparta. He sought help from helots and also formed an alliance with the Persians. However, Pausanians’ own messenger exposed his intentions to the ephors, who managed to trap him and quell the uprising.
In 464 BC, a devastating earthquake struck Laconia and caused significant damage to Sparta, resulting in the deaths of over 20,000 people. The Helots capitalized on the chaos and tried to gain control, but King Archidamus of Sparta managed to regain control in Laconia. However, problems with Messenia continued as Sparta, despite receiving military aid from allies in the Peloponnese and Athens, failed to capture Mount Ithome. Meanwhile, Athens saw an opening and used the situation to establish its own dominance.
The formation of the Delian League in 477 BC was driven by the ongoing concern about another Persian invasion. Led by the Athenians, this league brought together different city-states, including smaller ones with naval power like various Aegean islands and certain Ionian city-states in Asia Minor. Consequently, Sparta’s dominance and influence rapidly declined.
Thucydides’ explanation of the transition of power in Greece following the Persian wars is deemed incorrect based on all available evidence. It can be concluded that Sparta did not voluntarily relinquish its authority. Rather, Sparta was forced to do so due to Athens’ ascendancy and several other factors that impeded Sparta’s further expansion temporarily.
Reference
- Fornara, C.W. From Plataea to Potidaea (1979), Oxford, London
- Herodotus, The History (1987), The University of Chicago Press, Chicago
- Hornblower, S. The Greek World 479-323 BC (1983), Methuen, London
- Meiggs, R. The Athenian Empire (1972), At The Clarendon Press, Thucydides, The History – Book
