The principal role of the fusion center is to analyze terrorist information to support efforts identify and prevent terrorist activity. Our work aims to research background and aftermath of the Beirut bombing of Marines Barracks that occurred on October 23, 1983. We are going to answer whom this bombing was organised by and give fusion center a piece of useful information how to protect against similar acts of terror. Our marines were in Beirut as part of the U.S. government’s foreign policy of trying to maintain peace in Lebanon between the various warring factions of the natives plus the Syrian and Israeli armies.
While our marines were in Beirut, we sacrificed some 264 American lives for our current foreign policy. Also we are going to study impact of the bombing on foreign policy of the United States in the Middle East and give recommendations for unit commanders to prevent such events in future. Since the advent of the Iranian revolution, there has been an extraordinary new challenge to U.
S. foreign policy: terrorist attacks against military installations and even attempts to blow up Congress and the Washington Monument.
Attacks against U.S. embassies in Pakistan, Libya, Kuwait, and Lebanon have also occurred. We must keep in mind that terrorist aggressors, whether totalitarian or democratic groups, leftist militants, or just a group unhappy economically, will select their victims as a symbol of the nation or type of government that they hope to overthrow or embarrass. The topic of Beirut bombing of Marines barracks is of significant importance today because after the 11th of September USA are at war with international terrorism and we should know about terrorist’ methods and how hit them back. Besides this in the paper will be researched particular qualities of intervention during low-intensity conflict. The information given in our work is going to be both strategic and tactical. It has tactical importance for a fusion center as it’s focused on a terrorist event – bombing of marine barracks in Beirut. Also it has strategic meaning as it provides general guidance of patterns and trends of Middle East terrorist organisations. The purpose of this report is to describe the recommendation how to protect military facilities in hostile environment using case study of Beirut bombing.
At first the historical background of the event and definitions of terms will be given. Our working definition is that low-intensity conflict is almost any military action that is just short of war. It should not surprise us that American armed forces sometimes intervene in the internal affairs of foreign countries. For example, we have often sent troops to rescue Americans held as hostages. Another type of military intervention is harder for us to understand. This occurs when our government sends troops into a hostile national environment as part of a peacekeeping operation sponsored by the United Nations. This type of operation places them in harm’s way, and these troops suffer many casualties as the result of brutal acts of terrorism. Often, we do not notice that a large percentage of the population in that foreign country does not welcome U.S. troops. Hostility is difficult to understand when someone directs it toward us. We must try to explain the killing of all those U.S. Marines in Beirut in 1983. We must understand that the United States did, without an invitation, intervene with military forces in the internal affairs of another country. That government represented a majority of that country’s population. At least all the various factions fighting in the Lebanese civil war did not welcome us with open arms. Because the United States views it far differently than does the foreign country in which we are intervening. Do not doubt that a military intervention is a military invasion. It may include only a few bomb runs by the United States Air Force, or it may be a joint arms operation consisting of thousands of men. Also note that all these military interventions have taken place in parts of the Third World. They occur in the least industrialized, most economically backward, and least stabilized parts of the earth as it was in Lebanon. The most obvious incarnation of the U.S. presence in Lebanon from September 1982 was the Marine-led Multi-National Force-2 (MNF-2). Unlike the first multilateral force, this force never had a clearly defined mission in Lebanon. It had been deployed in September 1982 as an immediate political response to the horrors of the Sabra and Shatila killings and stayed on with an ill-defined and ever-shifting mission of “presence” rather than combat (DOD report, 1983, p.134). In June 1982 as part of the Palestinian Israeli agreement, a new multinational peacekeeping force was to be sent to Beirut to monitor the evacuation of Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) and protect Palestinian civilians who remained behind. The new NATO-based Multi-National Force (MNF), consisting of 800 U.S. Marines and contingents of French and Italian troops, was positioned in Beirut to carry out the first part of the mandate. In September 1982, two weeks ahead of schedule, 800 U.S. marines departed Beirut, their mission accomplished. The marines had been part of a multinational force of U.S., French, and Italian forces invited to Lebanon to facilitate the withdrawal of Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) forces from Beirut. The withdrawal was triggered by the PLO’s inability to repel Israel’s invasion. The United States was willing to participate in the withdrawal, less as a favor to the PLO than as a means of eliminating the PLO’s military presence in Beirut. U.S. participation was also seen as a step that could help end the fighting in Lebanon, which would contribute to that country’s future and to peace in the region. A month later, 1,200 marines–soon to grow to 1,800–were back. Once again, they were joined by European counterparts, in this case some 4,000 French, Italian, and British troops. It lasted some 18 months, until February 1984. The second MNF was sent in the wake of the assassination of Lebanon’s President-elect and the massacres of Palestinian civilians in refugee camps by Lebanese Phalangists. The commitment was for a long term and explicitly supported by the U.S. Congress. Although the intervention was provided a set of rationales–to bolster Lebanon’s struggling government, to restore Lebanon’s armed forces so that they could disarm the various militia threatening public order, to bring about an environment that would lead to the withdrawal from Lebanon of all foreign forces, including those of Israel and Syria–the U.S. decision to re-enter Lebanon was less a considered policy decision than an impulse to “do something” to demonstrate U.S. concern (and to assuage American guilt) over what had taken place in the refugee camps despite U.S. promises that Palestinians would be safe after the PLO’s departure. Once there, U.S. forces did little more than hunker down in fixed, vulnerable positions near Beirut airport. By August 1983, less than a year after their arrival, they were exchanging fire with various factions in Lebanon’s civil war; by September, U.S. warships and carrier-based fighter aircraft were bombing these same factions and Syrian air defense units so the Lebanese Armed Forces could maintain control of the heights overlooking the airport. The marines and the MNF as a whole had come to be perceived as a hand-maiden of Lebanon’s Christian-dominated government, which had signed a controversial peace agreement with Israel the previous May. As a result, the MNF became a de facto participant in Lebanon’s internecine struggles. Four months later, in early 1984, amidst increasing domestic opposition to their continued presence, the marines were “re-deployed,” little more than a euphemism for being withdrawn. In late September 1983 in addition to the French and Italian soldiers and an increased contingent of U.S. Marines, British soldiers joined the force, many on reassignment from United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). In support of the troops was a multinational naval force that, by the end of the year, included 15,000 U.S. military personnel, two aircraft carriers, and the battleship New Jersey. The U.S. Marines remained in heavily fortified but insecure positions at the Beirut International Airport until their withdrawal in February 1984. Between November 1982 and August 1983 the marines mounted patrols in Christian East Beirut, and they set up some outposts to control the territory. However, after 11 months of relative noninvolvement, the marines’ outposts began to exchange fire, in self-defense, with the warring factions. Our marines had many responsibilities, including Beirut International Airport. Of course, their orders would not permit them to pursue any hostile who opened fire on the airport or their barracks. They could shoot back when fired upon, but they were not allowed to pursue and destroy all hostiles who shot at them. Thus, from the very beginning, the United States placed our marines in jeopardy. So they cut back patrols, and sniping at their positions increased. It is not surprising that the longer our marines stayed in Beirut, the more suspicious their presence appeared to the local warring factions. Casualties started appearing on September 29, 1982, and continued until February 9, 1984, or just before the complete withdrawal of all American forces in Lebanon (Hammel, 1985). In September 1983, U.S. President Ronald Reagan ordered a naval bombardment in support of the Lebanese Army, clearly defining the American diplomatic and military posture as aligned rather than neutral. France also used warplanes against insurgent groups. In fact, U.S. marines who were members of the multinational peacekeeping force were involved in the fighting as early as August 28, when they fought a battle with unidentified militiamen that lasted ninety minutes. There were no marine casualties. The following day two marines were killed and fourteen wounded. The White House blamed Syria. On August 30 four French members of the multinational force were killed, and on September 1 it was announced that Reagan had ordered another 2,000 marines to the eastern Mediterranean in support of those already in Lebanon. Things got worse quickly after September 4. On September 6 two marines were killed and three wounded during heavy shelling of the Beirut airport where they were stationed, and two French soldiers were killed by artillery the following day. The U.S. Navy responded by shelling a Druze artillery position on September 8, and on September 12 Reagan authorized the use of “aggressive self-defense” by the marines. The following day he authorized them to call on naval and air support in self-defense. There were more incidents in the last two weeks of September and early October, but both houses of Congress authorized the marines to remain in Lebanon for another eighteen months. Reagan on October 19 said the marines would stay and accused the Syrians of blocking efforts at a settlement.
But then on October 23, 1983 a suicide bomber drove a yellow Mercedes truck filled with TNT into a housing complex for U.S. Marines stationed at Beirut International Airport. The explosion killed 241 people of U.S. military personnel and injured 80 others. Nearly at the same time another terrorist drove a car loaded with explosives into an apartment in which 110 French paratroopers were housed. The explosion destroyed the building, killing 58 of the military personnel and injuring at least 15 more. A few days later, yet another attack caused much loss of life at the Israeli military headquarters in the south Lebanon city of Tyre (Bolger, 1988:191-260). The truck driven by a fanatic Muslim barreled past the marine sentries and, after traversing the outer courtyard, hurled itself through the front door of the marine barracks. The detonation of its load of explosives destroyed the marine barracks and killed nearly all the American military personnel resident there. The force of the explosion lifted a four-story reinforced concrete building off its foundation. Gravity then dropped the entire mess of concrete, steel, plumbing, and people back to the ground. Technically, the building leapt into the air, the roof came off, and the walls fell inward. It is unlikely that an ordinary (e.g., nonstate-supported terrorist group) could have mounted the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks at Beirut International Airport. In addition to the complex logistical and intelligence support that was provided to the terrorists, the weapon they used was not of the sort found in the typical terrorist group’s arsenal. The truck bomb that destroyed the barracks and killed 241 Marines consisted of some 12,000 pounds of high explosives, whose destructive power was strengthened by canisters of flammable gases attached to the explosive device by its designers. The explosion was described at by FBI investigators as the “largest non-nuclear blast ever detonated on the face of the earth” (Hummel, 1985, p.303).
There is no agreement of opinion who did those bombings. Responsibility for these attacks has never been established publicly, but the Syrians and their radical Shia allies are the most likely suspects (as they are for the blowing up of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut on April 18, when forty-six people were killed and some 100 injured). Fundamentalist clerics who consolidated power in Iran during the early 1980s not only imposed a form of religious fascism at home but turned their country into a center for the propagation of terror abroad. Soon afterward, they began financing and arming Hamas, Hezbollah, and other Middle Eastern factions known for their involvement in political kidnapping and assassination. American investigators implicated them in both the 1983 suicide bombing in Beirut and the 1996 attack that killed another 19 marines in Saudi Arabia. Hezbollah (the Party of God) is Lebanese Shi’a terrorist group. Its spiritual leader Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah (1986) pointed out that Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982 was the embodiment of the West’s hostility to revolutionary Islam:
This invasion was confronted by the Islamic factor, which had its roots in the Islamic Revolution in Iran. And throughout these affairs, America was the common denominator. America was generally perceived as the great nemesis behind the problems of the region, due to its support for Israel and many local reactionary regimes, and because it distanced itself from all causes of liberty and freedom in the area (pp. 4-13).
For example, immediately after the 1983 suicide attacks on the US Marines and French parachute headquarters, Hussein Mussawi said:
I proclaim loud and clear that the double attack of Sunday is a valid act. And I salute, at Death’s door, the heroism of the kamikazes, which they are; they are now under the protection of the All Powerful one and of the angels (1983, p.38).
So Muslim clerics have lent their support and given their blessing even to self-martyrdom — though suicide is forbidden by Islamic law. The role of clerical authority in sanctioning terrorist operations has always been critical to the Shi’a organizations. Khomeini backed forces have made no secret of their goal: total U.S. withdrawal from the Middle East and the defeat of the “Great Satan” (Ricks, 1979). The Muslim terrorists who planned and conducted the October 1983 truck bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks at the Beirut International Airport sought to use U.S. casualties to turn U.S. public opinion against U.S. intervention, and their action that forced the eventual withdrawal of U.S. troops from Lebanon. As Geoffrey Kemp, who served on the National Security Council staff at the time of the bombing, points out:
From the U.S. perspective, the bombing of the Marines meant that it was not a question of whether we would leave but when. The domestic pressure in the U.S. to pull the Marines out coincided with the Defense Department’s long-standing wish to redeploy the troops back to ships. It was clear to the President’s domestic advisers that when Congress returned in January from the long Christmas recess (which begins in early November), grass roots support for keeping the Marines in Lebanon would be zero (Kemp, 1991, pp. 139-140).
The incident did as much as anything else to affect the ignominious withdrawal of the U.S. peacekeeping forces from Lebanon. According to Robinson, “In the face of stalemate among Lebanese factions, the risk of greater conflict with Syria, and confused public opinion at home, President Reagan, on February 7, 1984, announced the forthcoming withdrawal of the American forces” (1997, p.252). Reagan responded the next day by saying the presence of the marines in Lebanon was “central to [U.S.] credibility on a global scale” and prevented the Soviet Union or its “surrogates” (meaning Syria) from dominating the country. With the cost of war brought home so suddenly and viciously, the American congress and press began urgently questioning Washington’s Lebanon policy. Any effective response on the part of the Reagan administration to this challenge was constrained militarily by the reluctance of the Department of Defense (DOD) to commit any more forces to a mission in Lebanon that they already considered dangerously ill-defined. Politically, the U.S. reaction was more clear-cut. Merely six days after the explosion, President Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive 111 (NSDD-111), which reinstated the concept of strategic collaboration with Israel. Arguing that Lebanon remained vital to U.S. interests, the Reagan administration maintained that the United States could not capitulate to terrorism and that a precipitous withdrawal from Lebanon would only enhance the positions of Syria, the radicals, and, through them, the Soviet Union, in the Middle East. Still, Reagan seemed to be delicately trying to establish an exit for the marines when he commented that should there be a “collapse” in Lebanon, U.S. forces would have no mission (“Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters, December 14, 1983″,” 1983, pp. 1688-89). What was quickly collapsing was the administration’s early hope of using Lebanon as the foundation of an overall political rearrangement in the Middle East. In Washington, Pentagon planners had always worried about the fuzzy nature of the MNF-2 mission, and by October the president was starting to prepare for the upcoming reelection campaign. After the October attack, the administration started serious internal discussions about how to remove the Marines from Beirut. At the beginning of 1984, there was no denying Washington’s own dilemma. The choice was between committing more men and firepower to try to impose the Gemayel regime’s supremacy or extricating the troops from Lebanon with as much grace as possible. The choice was between committing more men and firepower to try to impose the Gemayel regime’s supremacy or extricating the troops from Lebanon with as much grace as possible. On the other hand, 1984 was an election year in the United States, and a major new military venture in Lebanon promised to become a focal point of criticism against the administration’s handling of foreign affairs. In early February 1984, as though venting Washington’s frustration in a last roar of cannon fire, the battleship New Jersey used its well advertised sixteen-inch guns to devastate a thirty-square mile area near Beirut. A week later, Gemayel agreed to a Saudi peace proposal calling for the abrogation of the May 17 pact with Israel. Twenty-four hours later, the already pending evacuation (officially termed “redeployment”) of U.S. marines began. The marine’s evacuation ended Lebanon’s growing role in U.S. domestic politics, but not that of the Middle East. The suicide bombing dominated evening newscasts for two nights, before it was overshadowed by the U.S. invasion of Grenada on October 25. According to some accounts, this event increased the president’s determination to move against Grenada. But the early decisions to act had already been made. No one won any victories. In the end, television showed the mightiest warships in the U.S. navy firing artillery rounds at the mountainous Lebanese coast as President Reagan called his forces home in February 1984. Coverage of the Beirut bombing was extensive, though, and the bombing and the invasion were linked both in television news accounts and official public statements. News of the destruction of the Beirut marine barracks reached Washington on Sunday morning, October 23, 1983. About 7:00 P.M. on that same day, President Reagan ordered already-designated fleet, air, and army units to invade the island republic of Grenada. An invitation from these other island nations was an opportunity for the Reagan administration to rescue some of its public image on the very day of the bomb explosion in Beirut. In all the ruckus around Grenada, did we forget the tragedy of the U.S. Marines in Beirut? The bombing of the Marine barracks on October 23, 1983, horrified us only because of the actual events and the number of marines and navy personnel killed (Hammel, 1985).
Another new term to military operations and especially so in the sphere of low-intensity conflict is what we should call defense paranoia. “A little paranoia never hurt any soldier,” as Colonel Charles M. Simpson III, a retired army officer, said in his article “Paranoia as a Weapon in Unconventional Warfare” (1984, pp. 30-33). In fact, a lot of paranoia can be a ready asset to any commander. By paranoia we mean fear of the surprise attack. To guarantee insofar as possible that a sudden guerrilla-style attack does not overtake a unit or an individual soldier involves real work. During combat, soldiers lead miserable lives of hard discipline and perpetually varying routines, and they are nearly always cut off from the civilian population that usually surrounds the encampment. So safety is constantly an issue of paramount importance. Colonel Simpson contends that the bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks near Beirut International Airport was an example of where the local commander had a clear lack of paranoia that he might be the object of an attack. The marine barracks near the Beirut International Airport was an obvious military installation. Certainly, the barracks was in hostile territory. Then why were the precautions against just such an attack as did occur so incomplete (Perhaps sloppy is the better military lingo term)? Undoubtedly, the attacker was a member of a terrorist group bent on placing political and psychological pressure on the Reagan administration to pull the American forces attached to the UN peacekeeping mission out of Lebanon. It worked: Some 241 dead affect marines in one big bang was more than enough for the American people. The remainder of the marines soon came home. The United States suffered an enormous loss of world prestige only partially recovered by URGENT FURY (the invasion of Grenada).
First we need to remember that the marine officers who commanded at the Beirut barracks probably had little or no training in guerrilla warfare or any other form of low-intensity conflict. These marines had learned to go grab a piece of real estate and to sit on it until properly relieved. At first glance, most of us would think this unusual. Throughout our Vietnam defeat, rocket attacks on airfields to warn our serving officers that staying prepared for a sneak attack is vital.
Yet training for low-intensity conflict was still, except in special units, in its infancy at the time of the Beirut bombing. The type of paranoia needed around the marine barracks in Beirut in the midst of this many-sided civil war was complete mistrust of everyone not in one’s own marine unit. They were on a major highway leading to an international airport. They should have closed the road around the marine barracks and mined it. Those marines should have been patrolling with fully loaded weapons, and the safety switches should have been in the “on” position; instead, the reverse was true. The appearance of the local defense at the marine barracks in Beirut must have been almost, but not quite, like that around most bases in the United States–a wire fence, a few guards with weapons on safe, and the guard reserve inside the main target building. The marines in Beirut did not avoid consistently following routine. The enemy observed that lack. They furnished an open program of their movements for the future. In short, the local marine commander did not protect his leathernecks as though they were facing a conventional enemy in a regular war. They acted as if they “owned the place” and as if the “locals” were “friendlies,” all on their side.
We are looking at possible counterterrorism actions here. We cannot place all the blame on the local marine commander. Supposedly he arranged his security according to his training and in accordance with his standing orders. And President Reagan, along with most of us, including myself, felt that the marines could shoot their way out of anything. We were all wrong. Paranoia does have a place in low-intensity conflict. One of the slogans for our military units that we will place in future operations is “Fortify your position!” As American individualists, we might also learn to “look over our shoulder” to check what that smiling person does just after we pass. Many of us might be in for some unpleasant surprises. Watch that television and read that newspaper. Be aware of the next time that we “set up” our own U.S. troops in another such situation. Perhaps, when you notice this sort of situation developing, you will use your telephone to call your congressman. Possibly you will send that telegram if you think that our president is risking some of us needlessly.
So let’s consider the result of Lebanese intervention went. According to Robertson:
In late October 1983, President Reagan had declared the issue of a sovereign independent Lebanon a “vital interest” of the United States. Now (after the bombing) he had abandoned it. The incident displayed how much harder it was for the United States to decisively use force to affect events in far reaches of the globe than it had been in Eisenhower’s time — and the extent to which Reagan and his advisers appreciated this, despite their rhetoric (1997, p.253).
Also give at least a passing thought to whether or not you want American troops sent to foreign countries to support peacekeeping efforts, American citizens, or American economic efforts. All three are normally involved and cannot be separated, one from the others. Remember that here was an official U.S. government policy to keep the peace in a foreign country as a part of a UN multinational peacekeeping force. Yet it also involved American civilian lives and American economic interests. Military intervention by U.S. armed forces into the territory of other sovereign nations without being asked by the established legitimate government is not to happen, but it does. The Marines lost 241 dead, and the French lost 57. Whom do we blame? Whose fault was it? We will always debate this question. Your television and your newspaper will feature it. In this case, does the responsibility for these two hundred sixty-four dead marines belong to (1) our U.S. national administration for placing the marines in harm’s way; (2) one or more of the local participants in the Lebanese civil war, to include the Syrians and the Israelis; (3) the United States for not letting the warring factions in Lebanon simply destroy each other so someone could pick up the pieces and start over; or (4) a tactical error by the local Marine Corps commander? You well know who shouldered all the blame. Duryea Smith in her book showed:
One political lesson of the Beirut tragedy is that the superior firepower of a NATO peacekeeping force, in contrast to the more pedestrian equipment of Third World contingents, cannot offset the danger in peacekeeping of deviating from a position of neutrality (Smith, 1985, p.64).
The U.S. forces sent to Beirut by President Reagan in 1983 for a “presence” mission were attacked by a suicidal terrorist driving a truck loaded with explosives and suffered over 200 casualties. In the United States, the House Armed Services Investigations Subcommittee faulted the military chain of command for lax security at the headquarters building and criticized the Reagan administration for policies that put the marines in a vulnerable position. The Long Commission, which was appointed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to investigate the bombing, also faulted the chain of command for lax security. No reports argued that there could be perfect military safeguards against terrorist attacks aimed at peacekeeping units. The Long Commission concluded: that the “presence” mission was not interpreted the same by all levels of the chain of command and that perceptual differences regarding that mission, including the responsibility of the USMNF [United States Multinational Forces] for the security of Beirut International Airport, should have been recognized and corrected by the chain of command (DOD report, 1983, p.122). The Long Commission found that security at the U.S. base was lax because the forces in the field were not alerted to intelligence reports circulating in Washington that an attack might occur. Washington was aware of these reports, as was the U.S. Commander in Chief, Europe (USCINCEUR), under whose responsibility the Beirut operation ultimately fell. The Long Commission found that there was “a lack of effective command supervision of the United States Multinational Force security posture.” Because of the great distance of CINCEUR from Beirut and because of the undue length in the chain of command, this information from Washington never got to the field commander of the forces in Beirut. Washington had been alerted to a possible terrorist attack, but the forces at the airport were not. As a consequence, they had not taken simple precautions that could have foiled it. The subsequent withdrawal of U.S. forces from Lebanon heavily damaged U.S. credibility among its Middle Eastern Allies. So we must pay proper attention and provide security of U.S. military facilities in hostile environment. This research paper gives recommendations to a fusion center how to organise this security using case study of Beirut bombing.
Ayatollah Muhammed Hussein Fadl Allah (sic). (1986). Islam and Violence in Political Reality. Middle East Insight, vol. 4, nos. 4-5, 4-13.
Bolger, D. P. (1988). Americans at War, 1975-86: An Era of Violent Peace. Novato, CA: Presidio Press.
Hammel, E. (1985). The Root: The Marines in Beirut, August 1982-February 1984. San Diego, CA: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
Kemp, G., “The American Peacekeeping Role in Lebanon,” in McDermott, A. and Skjelsbaek, K. eds., (1991). The Multinational Force in Beirut 1982-1984, Miami, Fla.: Florida International University Press.
Report of the DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Attack, October 23, (1983).Washington, D.C.: GPO, December 20.
Ricks, T. M. (1979). The Iranian People’s Revolution: Its Nature and Implications for the Gulf States. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Center for Contemporary Arab Studies.
“Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters, December 14, 1983″,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents: Administration of Ronald Reagan. Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, December 19, 1983.
Robertson, C, L. (1997). International Politics since World War II: A Short History. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
Simpson, C. M. III, (1984). Paranoia as a Weapon in Unconventional Warfare. Army, April 1984, 30-33.
Smith, C. D. (1985). The Hundred Percent Challenge: Building a National Institute of Peace a Platform for Planning and Programs. Cabin John, MD: Seven Locks Press.
Cite this Marine Barracks Suicide Bombing
Marine Barracks Suicide Bombing. (2017, Mar 30). Retrieved from https://graduateway.com/marine-barracks-suicide-bombing/