History and Background
The Muslim Brotherhood is a Sunni Islamist movement which spans many nations, and is the largest and most powerful political Islamist group in the world. In many Arab nations, particularly in Egypt, it is the largest political opposition force. Founded by Hassan al-Banna in March 1928 in a city called Ismailia, its basic ideology is that, “Allah is our objective; the Quran is our constitution, the Prophet is our leader; Jihad is our way; and death for the sake of Allah is the highest of our aspirations” (“Muslim Brotherhood”). Basically, Al-Banna intended to follow the methods and ideologies of previous Islamic reformers such as Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida. His reason for founding this movement was because he felt that in the modern world, Islam no longer enjoyed social dominance, as Western influences had diluted the very essence of Islam and corrupted Muslims. In Islam, law is known as Shariah and is based on the Holy Quran and Sunnah, which are perceived as law given to Muslims by Allah, and are deemed fit to be applied to all areas of life, such as the administration of the government and even the management of everyday issues (Munson, 2001).
Al-Banna aimed to be a populist and gave the Brotherhood an outlook similar to a political and social revolutionary movement. It created a dichotomy between the people and the ‘elite’ as it claimed that it wanted to protect labor classes from exploitation by foreign and monopolist enterprises. Hospitals, pharmacies and schools flourished but the Brotherhood was extremely conservative regarding matters of women’s rights and liberation. Additionally, from its inception it adopted a very hostile stance towards trade unions and other independent working-class and popular organizations (“Muslim Brotherhood”).
A mere six years after its founding, the Muslim Brotherhood had 800 members and just two years later, this number became 200,000. Till 1948, the number of members had become half a million an according to Robin Hallett (1974, 138), ” By the late 1940s the Brotherhood was reckoned to have as many as 2 million members, while it strong Pan-Islamic ideas had gained it supporters in other Arab lands.” Headquartered in Cairo, Egypt became its center and convention place where representatives from the global Muslim community gathered. However, by the end of 1948, the then Prime Minister of Egypt, Mahmud Fahmi Nokrashi, ordered the dissolution of the Brotherhood as it was assumed to be involved in bombings and assassination attempts. In 1954, the Group was accused of the assassination attempt of Gamal Abdel Nasser, the head of the Egyptian Government. It denied having anything to do with it, and accused the government of using this as a ploy to punish the organization and its members. However, it was convicted of this attempt and since then, the Brotherhood has had the status of an illegal organization (“Muslim Brotherhood”).
Till this date, there are events of mass arrests in the Brotherhood. However, its popularity as an opposition group has not suffered and in Egypt, remains the principal advocate of Islamic reform, a democratic set-up and has an extensive network of support because of its various Islamic charities which are working for the welfare of poor Egyptians. Lately, its political stance has become more anti-Western as compared to Turkey’s administrative power, the Justice and Development Part, and one tilting towards moderate Islam and Islamic democracy. In the 2005 parliamentary elections, the debate in Egypt about the removal of the ban on the Brotherhood gained new momentum when compared to the approved opposition parties who won only 14 seats, the Brotherhood’s candidates (who participated as independents) won 88 seats (“Muslim Brotherhood”).
Goals and Strategies:
Munson (2001) writes that the fundamental concerns behind the goals of the Muslim Brotherhood were the domination of Egypt by foreigners, the poverty and inequalities the Egyptian people faced, and the corruption they saw in the administration of Egyptian state as well as in the lives of people there. Hence, they felt the solution to all these vices was an “embrace of Islamic teachings and an understanding that all Muslims comprise a single cohesive community and must work together to resist the encroachment of corrupt Western influences.”
Abed-Kotob (1995) says that because the Islamist movement is gaining renewed vigor in the Middle East and North Africa, it is important that scholars and practitioners try to understand the motivations, goals and strategies of the groups within this movement. Additionally, this resurgence is not a uniform phenomenon, rather there are different parts and voices that comprise it which have differing views on “the nature of society, the preferred relationship between Islamist activists and the political system, methodology for alleviating socioeconomic frustrations and spiritual laxity, and the temporal framework within which Islamist goals are to be achieved.”
The Muslim Brotherhood is very different in its approach and beliefs as compared to the various Islamic militant groups that propose violence as the only means to rid Egypt of all ‘moral, social and economic decay’. Compared to these elements, the goals of the Brethren represent mainstream Islam and the entire ideology behind their goals and strategies is a politically centrist and moderate one, which is what differentiates them from the militancy (Abed-Kotob, 1995).
Abed-Kotob (1995) quotes Umar al-Tilmisan, who was the General Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood until he dies in 1987 as having characterized Islam as “creed, worship, homeland, citizenship, creation, the physical, culture, law, forgiveness, and power.” Hence, following this, Islam is not simply a religion, but a way of life, the teachings of which can be applied to all aspects of life. The Brotherhood therefore considers themselves more than simply a political party and has goals which have remained unchanged since its inception in 1928. Today, the Brotherhood strongly support al-Banna’s initial objective of educating a new generation of Muslims who will follow the Islamic call or da’awa and become examples for others, in a way so that Islamic nation will be freed from Western reign and a free Islamic state will be formed (Abed-Kotob, 1995).
This goal leading to the eventuality of an Islamic nation would be achieved by the reform of ‘individual hearts and souls.’ After this, the framework for society would be laid such that it would be fit to be lived in by the ‘virtuous community which commands the good and forbids evildoing’ and this community would lead to the establishment of the ‘good state’. This was the goal upon which the foundation of the Brotherhood was laid. The Shariah would govern the Islamic state, and not any man-made laws and would be in alignment with the Muslim belief that God or Allah is the only Supreme Power and Sovereign. In an attempt to explain the Brotherhood’s views on political governance, Abed-Kotob (1995) quotes Sheikh Muhammad ‘Abdallah al-Khatib as saying, “The Muslim Brothers use neither legal nor illegal methods to gain power, because their foremost concern is the system of rule and not the ruler.” They do not wish to rule the Islamic state themselves necessarily; they simply want a ruler who will govern the state in alignment with Islamic precepts.
There is a common charge against the Brethren that their goals do not include democracy, however, time and again, their members have said this to be a lie, and reiterated that a democratic system is in fact very much possible within Islamic legislation and Shariah. Muhammad Ma’mun al-Hudaybi, son of the former General Guide Hasan al-Hudaybi and himself head of the Brotherhood delegation in the People’s Assembly has said that several aspects of democracy such as “respect for the constitution, an independent judiciary, press freedom, party independence, and man’s protection from torture” are particularly important for an Islamic state (Abed-Kotob, 1995).
The goals of the Brotherhood also include socioeconomic justice and they emphasize that an Islamic system would automatically lead to a socioeconomic uplift as it would assure social security to all citizens, reduce social and income inequalities between classes, provide welfare aid to the underprivileged, encourage economic harmony among citizens and enforce the rule that each able-bodied person must be able to provide for himself and contribute to the economic system (Abed-Kotob, 1995).
Till today, the most noticeable strategy that the Brethren have always followed is that they have been willing and ready to further their goals by operating within the existing political framework. This is actually the attribute which distinguishes their activities from the strategies usually pursued by Egypt’s militant Islamist groups. As Abed-Kotob (1995) notes, “Political accommodation is not a new strategy in terms of Brotherhood ambitions, although it is a new phenomenon in terms of actual practice”.
From 1984 and until there was a general opposition boycott in Egypt in 1990, the Brotherhood has had active participation in election campaigns and because of this, has acquired for itself a role in the People’s Assembly. Even though the state does not recognize it as a legitimate political party, it has strategically aligned itself with other legally recognized political parties so that through them, it can also have access to the political scenario. When they participate in the elections, this works to their benefit because they can further promulgate their da’awa, free from the many legal constraints which otherwise prevent them from spreading their message (Abed-Kotob, 1995).
They have been demanding full party status as well as an alternative to participating in national politics, and at the same time, have strengthened their presence in politics at the professional association and syndicate tiers. This strategy of playing a prominent role in nongovernmental associations has reaped profits for them as it has given them a chance to gain exposure among the educated of Egypt. They speak at professional conferences and conventions organized by association and universities. Today, the Brotherhood has assumed a ‘conciliatory’ approach, in part due to the government’s agreement to revise article 2 of the Constitution, which enshrines Shariah as the main source of legislation. According to them, this is one minor victory in the long journey to implement Islamic law. Hence, they do not consider the government as an enemy they have to overcome, rather this stance of theirs shows that they are willing and committed to working within the present dynamics, even though change occurs at a very slow pace and there is definite reluctance in implementing the legislation that the Islamists are striving for (Abed-Kotob, 1995).
Another strategy which led to the popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood concerned the flexibility of its membership structure. It dealt with the problem of people with varying levels of belief in its ideology by incorporating a three-tiered membership structure, which allowed it to initiate new members with a diversity of beliefs and commitment: potential recruits were not required to immediately dedicate their entire future to the organization and its activities. Rather, initially when they were first-tier members, they had to do nothing more than commit their name and a small amount of funding. Higher up the membership levels, material and ideological responsibilities increased. Hence, this way these tiers acted as a ‘screening device’ and at the same time allowed the Brotherhood to gain from the support of members with a range of commitment in its ideology and activities (Munson, 2001).
Lastly, the most obvious element of the current strategies pursued by the Brotherhood has been its powerful rejection of employing violent tactics as a way of achieving the Islamic society it desires. The contemporary Muslim Brotherhood is offended by accusations blaming it for violence and terrorism against the state and people. However, this does not mean that they are against jihad. Abed-Kotob (1995) quotes al-Tilmisani who wrote in his expose of the thought of Hasan al-Banna that “jihad prescribes justice toward enemies and the guidance of Muslims to show mercy in this respect” and that the Brotherhood follow this method of jihad not through weapons, but through words: “We state the word of truth. . . .We summon with every available means, distant from evil, distant from offensive actions. Wisdom and good advice are our religion.” They do not shy away from admitting that previously, violence against the state was a tactic followed by former members, today, it is no longer used and they support constitutional avenues for change along with a complete repudiation of violence (Abed-Kotob, 1995).
Conclusion:
The Muslim Brotherhood is not one monolithic organization, and if generalized, it is primarily striving towards an Islamic state which is governed by Shariah. There exist many misunderstandings and extremist views regarding the Brethren in the west and owing to the recent resurgence of the Islamist movement, it is imperative that people understand the motivations, goals and strategies of this group because this movement will not disappear because of a reluctance to understand or accept its rise.
Bibliography
Abed-Kotob, Sana. “Accommodationists Speak: Goals and Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 27.3 (1995): 321-339.
Hallett, Robin. Africa Since 1875. Ann Arbor, Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 1974.
Munson, Ziad. “Islamic Mobilization: Social Movement Theory and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.” Sociological Quarterly 42.4 (2001): 487-510
“Muslim Brotherhood.” Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. 11 Nov. 2007. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muslim_Brotherhood (retrieved 16 Nov. 2007).
