The Tet Offensive was a major assault by the North Vietnamese and Viet Congagainst South Vietnam and the U.S. forces situated there. It was not only a psychologicaladvance for the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong, but also gave the United States anotion that the war wasn’t going to be an easy win, and the chances of winning the warwere, in fact, very slim.
The war initially was an attempt to limit the spread of communism throughoutAsia. Similar to Korea, Vietnam was in a civil war divided by political ideologies. (2) TheDomino Effect is the idea that when one nation falls to communism, other nations aroundit in time will fall (2). Under the fear of this happening in Vietnam, the United Statesjoined forces with the South Vietnamese to fight the spread of communism (5). Thoughmost of South Vietnam was indeed against the spread of communism, there were somewho sympathized with the North, known as the Northern Liberation Front, or Viet Cong(VC). The VC hid amongst the other South Vietnamese civilians, and used guerilla tacticsto fight for communism. (5)The Tet Offensive was an all out attack by the North Vietnamese Army (NVA)and the VC during the Tet cease-fire (6). The cease-fire was a peaceful and hospitableagreement made between the U.S. and the NVA to stop all assaults during Tet, the annualVietnamese festival for celebrating the lunar New Year. On the first day of the festival,January 31, 1968, NVA and VC launched a series of attacks on major cities and militarybases located in South Vietnam. (6)Strategically, the assault was a failure (5). The communist attackers had failed topermanently capture any of their targets, and overall, had lost more men than thedemocratic defenders (6). However, the deviousness and planning involved in theoffensive was so great that the overall psychological effect had gained an advantage forNorth Vietnam and the VC (5).
The Vietnam War was the most reported conflict in history (3). TV cameramenfrom all over the nation flew to Vietnam to document the sights and stories, so thatviewers at home would have a feel for the war they were paying for. Sometimes themedia’s output had a negative effect on the war effort, showing graphic senseless violence.
(3) They also proved wrong the claims laid by General Westermoreland of the U.S. Armythat the war would be a swift victory for democracy (2). Coverage of the Tet Offensivewas no exception. Live coverage of the VC attack on the U.S. embassy in Saigon gave the Americanpublic a different view on the war (7). Now, not only had attacks been made on the Armyof the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and U.S. forces, but fire had also been directed atAmerican diplomatic soil. An even more negative impact came from the public executionof a VC suspect. Without trial, he was sentenced to death, and within minutes was shot inthe head by an ARVN regular from point-blank range in the streets of Saigon. (6) Therelease of this footage, as well as other footage that revealed unjust treatment ofVietnamese, gave the antiwar effort more strength (4). Eventually, the media’s coverage was a severe blow to the war effort. In a liveCBS broadcast in 1968, Walter Cronkite gave his own personal opinion of the war. “Itseems now more certain than ever that the bloody experience of Vietnam is to end in astalemate.” (3) Though he never actually said it “on the record,” the American publicviewed the statement as labeling the war un-winnable (6).
Because of the shift in public opinion, Lyndon Baines Johnson, President of theUnited States, decided not to run for Democratic Party nomination in the upcomingelection (3). He felt that he was certain to lose. After viewing Cronkite’s broadcast, heturned to his press secretary and said, “If I’ve lost Walter, I’ve lost Mr. Average Citizen.”(6)As for the U.S. forces and the ARVN, the attack had torn a psychological hole inthem. There was an incredible amount of fear and paranoia felt throughout the ranks, andthe fighting made many soldiers realize that they weren’t prepared to take on the NVA orVC in the long run. (5)Though most of the battles of the Tet Offensive were short, and the cities taken bythe NVA and VC were retaken quickly, there was one that dragged on, and used asignificant amount of man-power to retake. Hue, Vietnam’s third-largest city, was wherethe greatest amount of fighting took place in retaliation to the offensive. (6)The first major problem was that there was little help available for the few ARVNtroops posted in the city (7). Brigadier General Ngo Quang Truong, commander of the1st ARVN Division, had sent most of his troops elsewhere. (6) Secondly, the city wasdivided by the Perfume River. On the north side was the Citadel, a three square-milesection of the city surrounded by twenty foot walls. Inside was the Imperial Palace andheadquarters for the ARVN 1st Division and the Tactical Area of Responsibility for U.S.
Marine forces. On the south side was a Military Assistance Command-Vietnam (MACV)HQ. There were only two ways to get from one side to the other: a rail-bridge and avehicular bridge. (6)The first military objective of retaking Hue from the communists was to take thesouth side of the Perfume River, and retake the MACV building. After retreating on thevehicular bridge to the Citadel, NVA and VC forces destroyed the bridge, making air-dropthe only way to retake the city. (1) ARVN 1st Division, 1st company was the only ARVNforce present. They started moving in the Northeast section of the Citadel. USMC 2ndDivision, 5th Company dropped in the southeast section. Neither was prepared for urbanfighting, since all of their previous engagements had been in a jungle environment. (7)A month of fighting had passed before the Citadel was taken. Progressing into thecity meant clearing out every building room by room. (6) Snipers were positioned toprevent U.S. infantry movement throughout the streets, and NVA rocket-launchers andmortars stationed throughout the city prevented tank support coming from north of thecity from reaching the U.S. and South Vietnamese troops. There were days when theMarines wouldn’t make it farther than ten feet from where they had started. (7)In the end, the NVA and VC suffered about ten times the casualties as the Marinesand ARVN. (6) But the long period of fighting had broken the U.S. and ARVN men, andas Tom Mitchell, a corporal in the 5th Marines said about the duration of the fighting, “Itwas an insult.” (7)Besides arduous fighting, the democratic armies had to deal with the threat of theVC guerillas laced throughout South Vietnam. Sometimes they would plan solo suicideattacks, and in other cases an entire town would open fire on the ARVN or U.S. forces. Before Tet, the VC had never planned a major assault (1). Therefore, the true potential ofthe VC had never been truly realized. After Tet, however, many U.S. troops were scaredto death of every new town or village that they entered. Only a month after all of the”mop-up operations” of retaking the cities were completed, the My Lai Massacre tookplace (6). A village under suspicion of being VC, was mostly populated by old men, womenand children. On March 16, 1968, Company C of the 1st Division Marine Infantry, sweptthrough the town before diverting off to Binh Tay. (6) Under the orders of LieutenantWilliam Calley three hundred of the townspeople, as well as their livestock, were shot andkilled. The village was burned to the ground. (5) Once in Bihn Tay, they performed thesame acts of brutal murder . Just recently, there have also been reports of U.S. SenatorBob Kerrey being responsible for a similar execution of thirteen civilians in Thanh Pong onFebruary 25, 1969.
As shown by incidences like these, the real victims of the war were shown to be Vietnamese civilians. They were exploited for their resources, and abused by both sides.
Earl Martin was a volunteer civilian worker for the Mennonite Central Committeeand Church World. He spent his time giving aid to the Vietnamese farmers who wereforced to leave the countryside and seek refuge in towns and cities. On January 31, 1968he was stationed in Quang Ngai, one of the major attack points of the assault. (4)From what he saw, prior to Tet, the South Vietnamese civilians had morecontempt towards the U.S. than towards the North Vietnamese. “They didn’t likeAmericans too much. They didn’t think we had any right to be there. It wasn’t our war.”(4) The Tet Offensive changed those feelings for the civilians with whom he came intocontact. In Quang Ngai, the VC had taken over the local high-school. This was situatedon the main road of the village, and the blockade they set up prevented access to thehospital from the residential areas. “We got word that at the civilian hospital many peoplewere desperately needing help and they were short on medical people to help. A lot ofthem were shot in the fray. They wondered whether we might help out. But that meantdriving our Land Rover across town which might mean driving past guerrillas soldierswho were dug in. Would they shoot at any American they saw, even though we were notin the military?” (4)After hours of arguing with the VC guerrillas, Martin and the volunteers he waswith managed to make their way to the hospital. Most of the wounded had died already,so they helped carry the corpses to the morgue. They had arrived too late.(4)After the town was retaken, Martin noticed a new attitude towards the war. Thecivilians had a new sense of trust in the Americans, and much more contempt for the VCand NVA. (4) The offensive had shown the world that the North didn’t care too muchabout preventing civilian casualties. Soon however, the same reputation was given to theU.S. Their raids on towns and villages earned them just as much contempt as the North.
(5)The United States made some changes after the offensive, changes that showedthey weren’t willing to take risks that might lead to further fighting. President Johnsonreplaced General Westermoreland as Military Assistance Commander with his deputy,General Creighton W. Abrams. (5)As for support functions, a major mistake on the part of the U.S. was removing allwomen in uniform from South Vietnam after the offensive took place (5). The malecommanders felt it was too dangerous for them be in the vicinity of the fighting. (5) Thewomen, who were mostly volunteers, felt that they were being labeled as weak, and notable to hold together in times of pressure. “Actually, women often held up better thansome of the men under stressful conditions.” (5, pg. 404)The slogan “Hey L.B.J., how many kids did you kill today?” put a dent inPresident Johnson’s attack plans. (2) He realized that antiwar sentiments were too high,and gathered a group of statesmen and soldiers whom he trusted, and whose opinions hevalued. They were known as the “wise men.” They had been the original designers of thepost-W.W.II fight against communism, and the shapers of the Domino Theory. (2) OnMarch 26, 1968 the group met with the President for lunch and gave Johnson counsel tomove towards peace, and cut back on military attacks (2). After that he halted allbombing north of the 20th parallel. This was an attempt at influencing the NVA to cometo a peace agreement (3).
Without moral support, no war can be won. The United States had lost supportboth at home, and in South Vietnam. Coupled with the being bogged down militarily, lackof support was the main key in the U.S. failure to win the war. At the start of the war,antiwar feelings were low. Tet saw the birth of a new wave of antiwar feelings. No onewanted to be a part of Vietnam; not even the commander in chief of the armed forces.
Term Paper: Bibliography1. Seinman, Ron. The Soldier’s Story. New York, New York. TV Books, L.L.C. 1999.
This book has detailed accounts of battles told by the soldiers themselves. Thereare several different stories about the Tet Offensive, and each soldier tells his ownmemories of what happened.
2. Morrison, Wilbur H. The Elephant and the Tiger. Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania. Combined Books, Inc. 1990.
This book goes through the war in stages, beginning with the struggle betweencommunism and capitalism, and moving through the entire conflict to the end of theVietnam War. The book tells where the Tet Offensive stands in terms of the length of thewar, as well as how it impacted the situation.
3. Hemphill, Robert. Platoon: Bravo Company. Fredricksburg, Virginia. SergeantKirkland’s Museum and Historical Society, Inc. 1998This book is written by the commanding officer of Bravo Company. It goesthrough the happenings of a platoon through the Vietnam War, and describes the eventson the first night of Tet, and carries the topic for the two weeks that followed.
4. Pimlott, John. Vietnam: the Decisive Battles. New York, New York. MacmillanPublishing Company. 1990This book goes through the planning, and execution of the Tet Offensive, anddescribes in detail the effects of the attack, and how it was “decisive.”5. Knopf, Alfred. Walter Cronkite: a Reporter’s Life. New York, New York. Randomhouse, Inc. 1996.
Since Cronkite was one of the most influential political commentators during thesixties, his opinion was valued highly. This book gives an overview of how his opiniontoward the war changed after the Tet Offensive, and how that changed the feelings of theAmerican public.
6. Martin, Earl. Personal Interview. 21, March 2001Martin was a civilian relief volunteer during the war. He gave me an account ofthe change in moral of the volunteers and the civilians under pressure after the TetOffensive had taken place.
