Denying a person of his hopes because of the color of his skin, the race he belongs to, his religion, or the place of his birth is not a simple injustice. Rather, it transcends far into dishonoring those people who gave their lives for American freedom. Our forefathers believed that “the most basic right of all was the right to choose your own leaders” (Johnson 1965, 272).
The harsh fact remained that in many places then, people were not allowed to vote just because they were Negroes. Every possible way of denying them their right to vote had been executed. One Black may have gone to the civil register only to be told that the day for registration was wrong, or the right hour had passed, or that the person in charge of registration was absent. In some instances, he might be asked to recite the Constitution, or to explain the complexities of state law provisions. These were the scenarios that prompted the Johnson Administration to push through with the Voting Rights Act in order to secure the Blacks’ constitutional right to suffrage (Johnson 1965, 273).
The Voting Rights Act was passed into law in 1965 during the administration of President Lyndon Johnson. Its primary objective is to destroy the barriers that hinder the full exercise of the right to suffrage of the Blacks. The Whites have found many other mechanisms to prevent Blacks from full participation at the nomination process. Later on, they would have discovered ways to lessen Black voters’ effectiveness. Whites have used various strategies to dilute or curtail the potentials Blacks have as they joined the electoral process (Davidson 1994, 22).
It important to notice that there is a difference between disfranchisement and dilution. The former entails the execution of certain acts such as making it hard for minorities to register, barring potential voters’ entrance to polling stations, tallying votes inaccurately, and other overt acts. The latter, on the other hand operates even if minorities have full access to polling stations, or are guaranteed that votes will be counted accordingly (Davidson 1994, 22).
Vote dilution in general is the process of election laws and practices that were done in concert with systematic bloc voting among a distinct group to decrease the voting power of another group. In this scenario, a group cohesively voting for its desired candidate is outvoted by a larger one, who is also voting in cohesion (Davidson 1994, 22).
More specifically, minority vote dilution occurs when a majority of voters cohesively voting for their candidate systematically thwarts members of the minority, may it be ethnic, racial, or language minority, from electing most, if not all, of its desired candidates. In this light, minority vote dilution does not only devoid the minority of its chance to better representation, but also deprives them of a staunch advocate in the government offices (Davidson 1994, 23).
There are numerous ways to employ minority vote dilution. Some are even within the aegis of legal election rules and practices. Perhaps one of the most popular ways to dilute votes is through gerrymandering. This takes place when district reapportionments yield to districts with very low minority proportion, or when minorities are concentrated in one district, thus lessening their visibility in other districts. In the latter, minority groups were deprived of higher chances of representation in other districts. Another type of election process that has the goal of diluting minority votes is the at-large election plan. Instead of having several single-member districts, which could possibly have at least one minority group dominating a single district, elections are done at-large. In this system, the majority will be able to vote all of its desired candidate leaving the minority with none (Davidson 1994, 23).
Another election that dilutes minority votes is the majority run-off requirement. In a run-off, there is a two-stage election procedure where the second stage occurs only if none among the candidates received the majority of the votes. In this manner, the White majority may split into several factions in the first election, with the result that the candidate desired by the minority would get a plurality. Under the plurality-win arrangement, which is a common practice in most U.S. cities, the minority candidate would win the elections. However, in the majority-win rule, a run-off would be required if no majority is obtained in the second elections. Even if the minority candidate leads the first election, having several whites as runners-up, the White bloc can often defeat the front-running candidate of the minority. The majority usually executes this type of process when the minority enters the electorate in large numbers (Davidson 1994, 23).
Probably last in the list of minority vote dilution tactics is the implementation of the anti-single shot device. Minority groups can have a strong clout by withholding their other votes to offices that require more than one official. By withholding their vote, they are forgoing the chances of other candidates, who belong to the majority, to obtain their votes, hence, giving the minority candidate an advantage. However this chance of getting leverage is easily spoiled by the majority through certain election rules. One would be the requirement of completing the slate, otherwise the ballot would be deemed void. This practice prohibits the minority from withholding their votes to other candidates (Davidson 1994, 24).
The majority had long known the diluting effects of these election rules and practices, especially in racially polarized areas. The majority had used them into their own advantage. While it can be assumed that ordinary voters could not care less to the complexities of these election rules and practices, politicians had been studying the intricacies of such as it is given that it could help determine who wins or loses in an election (Davidson 1994, 24).
Many attempts had been staged to dilute minority votes. While it is true that it cannot be said that all were prevented, a number of instances have been reported and were brought into law suits. A sizeable amount of legal literature from Supreme Court decisions show the state’s interests in curbing such tactics. Most, if not all, of these law suits has anchored their legal bases on the Voting Rights Act.
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act prohibits a state or a political subdivision thereof from imposing standard, practice or procedure as a voting qualification or prerequisite to “deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.” The Voting Rights Act further protects language minority members by requiring some jurisdictions to print the ballot and other election paraphernalia in the minority language and also in English, and to have an oral translation available at the polling stations when the need arises. Among the minority languages are Spanish, Chinese, Filipino, Japanese, Vietnamese, and other Native American and Alaskan Native languages (U.S. Department of Justice 2008, n.p.).
Interpretations of vote dilution have evolved throughout times. This claim is evidenced by various Supreme Court rulings regarding minority vote dilution.
In Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971), the issue of racial dilution was argued upon in the highest court of the land when Black voters from Indiana questioned the validity of the multimember district set-up for electing state senators and representatives. Despite the allegations of the minority group that Blacks’ votes were being diluted, the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs lacked evidence to show that such multimember district scheme was unconstitutionally set up in a way that it is a purposeful devise to further the discrimination of Blacks. The Supreme Court has imposed that for a possible dilution to be illegal, it must have discriminatory purpose or effect. After two years, in White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), the court held that multimember districts in Texas discriminate Blacks and Mexican-Americans. Although there was no mention that multimember districts per se are unconstitutional, preponderance of evidence show that there has been a long history of racial and ethnic discrimination. The Supreme Court further found out in the “totality of circumstances” that the multimember district set up has excluded the Blacks and the Mexican-Americans from effectively participating in the electoral process. The Court has laid certain guidelines with regard to vote dilution in the appellate case Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (1973) by codifying its precedent White case.
City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) made history when the Supreme Court reaffirmed the intent requirement of the electoral system to discriminate as the test to show vote dilution. The Supreme Court required the minority plaintiffs to show intent to discriminate in challenging the validity of the at-large system. This seems to have laid down more stringent rules in seeking refuge under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. However, a better test of validity was laid in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). The Court gave a three-part test of validity to make it easier for minority groups to challenge dubious electoral schemes to wit: (a) the minority group should be proven to be large and geographically compact to form a majority in a single-member district, (b) that it should be proven that the group is politically cohesive, and (c) it must be proven that the majority bloc has the capability to defeat the minority candidate given the diluting circumstances. In essence, this Supreme Court case has somehow moved the Court a notch closer to proportional representation.
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, on the other hand, provides that state and local governments in certain parts of the country must federal approval or preclearance before its implementation changes in their voting procedures. For the changes to be approved, it must be proven that they do not have a racially discriminatory purpose, and will not worsen the conditions of the minority as compared prior to its implementation. Among the States under the jurisdiction of Section 5 are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, and Virginia (U.S. Department of Justice 2008, n.p.).
Litigations seeking refuge under Section 5, like that of Section 2’s have evolved through times. In Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969), the Supreme Court held that Section 5 should be given the broadest possible scope to reach any state enactment, which has the intentions of altering the election law of a covered jurisdiction even if in a very minor way. This doctrine established in the Allen case was reasoned out in Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 (1971). In this case at bar, Blacks asked the court to prevent the occurrence of election for mayor and alderman when certain electoral changes were applied without the prior preclearance required. The doctrine established in this precedent cases had remained significant in the construction of antecedent cases.
Developments in the Supreme Court decisions, especially with regard to Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act shows the malleability of the Court to varying trends in politicians’ efforts to dilute minority votes. It is logical to assume that the Supreme Court, despite precedent cases, has instituted new doctrines that would better address the adversities being faced by the minority. Pursuant to the goal President Johnson envisioned decades ago, the state, through its legislative and judiciary arm, has been doing its part in protecting one of most sacred right ever bestowed to mankind – the right to suffrage.
Works Cited
Davidson, Chandler. “The Recent Evolution of Voting Rights Law Affecting Racial and Language Minorities.” Quiet Revolution in the South: The Impact of the Voting Rights Act, 1965–1990. Ed. Chandler Davidson and Bernard Grofman. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994. 21–37.
Johnson, Lyndon B. “We Shall Overcome. March 15, 1965.” Ripples of Hope: Great American Civil Rights Speeches. Ed. Josh Gottheimer. Michigan: University of Michigan Press. 270–74.
United States Department of Justice. Voting Section Frequently Asked Questions. 19 May 2008. Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice. 2 December 2008. <http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/misc/faq.php>
List of Cases
Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969)
City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980)
Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 (1971)
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986)
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971)
White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973)
Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (1973)
