This paper aims to analyze the right to life of an embryo, as explored in the article “Abortion: Is it Possible to be both ‘Pro-life’ and ‘Pro-Choice’?” written by Carl Sagan and Ann Druyan. It argues that, based on their perspective, an embryo’s lack of human characteristics justifies its abortion. However, I will present evidence supporting the idea that an embryo is at least a potential person and therefore deserves the right to life.
I would like to argue that an embryo may not be considered a person. If we define a “person” as biologically being a member of the human species, then after 14 days with the development of the primitive streak, or after 16 days with gastrulation, the embryo becomes a person as it undergoes irreversible individualization. At this stage, the embryo can be identified as a distinct human being. Therefore, in terms of biological definition, I believe an embryo becomes a person after 14 or 16 days. However, Boethius defines a “person” as a “natur? rationalis individua substantia” (Boethius 74). This means that if someone does not possess rationality or loses it permanently, it becomes uncertain whether they are a person. Considering Boethius’s perspective, I argue that an embryo may not be considered a person but instead a potential person. However, if we define a “person” as someone who possesses personhood, then the issue changes. Mary Anne Warren introduces the concept of personhood (Warren), which presents another perspective.
- Consciousness (of objects and events external and/or internal to the being), and in particular the capacity to feel pain;
- Reasoning (the developed capacity to solve new and relatively complex problems);
- Self-motivated activity (activity which is relatively independent of either genetic or direct exte… middle of paper …ng, this does not exclude essential changes in some individuals, make it from something becomes something else, perhaps, more appropriate and less likely to cause misunderstanding of expression should be “has the potential to develop into a person.
“To summarize, it has been contended that an embryo possesses the capacity to evolve into an individual. Consequently, an embryo retains the potential for personhood, albeit not yet considered an actual person. Consequently, the entitlement to life applies to an embryo.”
Works Cited
- Boethius. Liber Contra Eutychen et Nestorium. Turnhout: Brepols, 2010.
- Buckle, Stephen. “Arguing from potential.” Bioethics 7 1988: 227-253.
- Damschen, Gregor, Alfonso Gomez-Lobo and Dieter Schonecker. “Sixteen Days? A Reply to B. Smith and B. Brogaard on the Beginning of Human Individuals.” Journal of Medicine & Philosophy April 2006: 165-175.
- Warren, Mary Anne. On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion. 22 03 2004.
