Second Treatise on government
The political philosophy of the Second Treatise, like all political philosophies, rests upon an interpretation of human nature. Locke viewed man as a pretty decent fellow, far removed from the quarrelsome, competitive, selfish creatures found in Hobbes. He has more inclination to society and is more governed by reason, “the common rule and measure God has given to mankind.” (Section 11)
The rationality ascribed to man by Locke is a pervasive characteristic going beyond the cunning calculation of interests upon which Hobbes depended to induce individuals in the state of nature to inaugurate society by a compact after which they must be held in society largely by force. It could be relied upon to produce a good deal of order even without the sanctions of government and to help maintain government once it was set up. This was especially so since Locke saw that man prefers stability to change. For “people are not so easily got out of their old forms as some are apt to suggest.” (Section 223)
From this interpretation of human nature, it followed rationally that the state of nature (that is, the condition in which men were before political government came into existence or would be if government did not exist) was no condition of war and anarchy as Hobbes had declared. On the contrary, “men living together according to reason, without a common superior on earth with authority to judge between them, is properly the state of nature.” The state of nature thus understood is pre-political since it lacks “a common superior on earth with authority to judge.” But it can hardly be called pre-social. In it men live together under the guidance of the
The conception of the law of nature is fundamental in Locke and marked one of the numerous respects in which he may be said to link emerging British constitutionalism to traditional ways of thought. For him it was really an objective rule and measure emanating from God and ascertainable by human reason. It provided a test or criterion by which political institutions and behavior could be limited and judged. It was prior to and more fundamental than the positive laws enacted by the state. And it bound men to obedience to just government once inaugurated by consent. “For truth and keeping of faith belongs to men as men, and not as members of society.” Here was Locke’s main solution to the problem of why men ought to obey.
In one very important respect, however, Locke certainly contributed to a fundamental reformulation of the law of nature. He gave it a sharp bias toward individualism. The precepts of the law of nature as stated by him are concerned mostly with individual rights rather than with individual responsibilities to society. Under the Stuarts the scales of government had been weighted heavily on the side of authority. The balance was to be more than redressed in the era whose birth was signalized by the Revolution of 1688. And so the chief lesson John Locke learned from the law of nature was that even before government existed men were free, independent, and equal in the enjoyment of inalienable rights, chief among them being life, liberty and property.
Among these rights, property receives the most attention in the Second Treatise. Its protection is represented as being the primary function of government.
Responsibility to its citizens
What is commonly regarded as important in Locke is his share in establishing the principle of government by consent. This is a time honored phrase, but, an unfortunate one. We have seen already that, as Locke himself used it, it is self-contradictory and breaks down. The nineteenth-century idealists tried to preserve the idea of consent by their theory that the actions of government are in accordance with the “real will” of the individual; but, ingenious as this theory is, its effect is scarcely an improvement on Locke. Nowadays the principle of consent is generally applied to representative or parliamentary forms of government, but it does not give the real explanation either of their operation or of their advantages. What seems to me the lasting value of Locke (though he does not state it thus), is his insistence on the responsibility of the state to the community — ultimately its responsibility for the welfare of the community. This principle is now commonly admitted, and we have elaborated the political mechanism by which responsibility is made effective — this, rather than consent, is the real point of elections and representation. Debate has now shifted to the means by which the state may best promote welfare, and on this there is still room for disagreement; but even the most conservative opillion to-day expects far more state-control than the Whigs thought necessary in Locke’s time. About the end of the state, the welfare of mankind — “the public good”, as he put it Locke’s view was fundamentally sound. In this respect he anticipated the Utilitarian’s; and if we eliminate the fallacies which arose from his contractual approach to politics, what remains is an essentially utilitarian theory.
Locke’s plea for toleration rested on the same basic principles as those on which he built his political theory, and the subject had occupied his mind for many years before he wrote the letter to his Dutch friend Limborch. As early as 1660 he had written, but not published, a short treatise on the question “Whether the civil magistrate may lawfully impose and determine the use of indifferent things in reference to religious worship?” 1 In the preface to this he remarks
that all his life hitherto he had lived “in a storm”, and, welcoming the prospects of approaching calm, he felt bound to urge men to obey the government which brought the blessing of a quiet settlement to a country which “giddy folly” had plunged into confusion. He was not inclined, therefore, to look kindly on extreme claims for “general freedom”. Liberty should not be “a liberty for ambitious men to pull down well-framed constitutions, that out of the ruins they may build themselves fortunes; not a liberty to be Christians so as not to be subjects.” But if in 1660 he was inclined to support the Restoration government, seven years later, when he composed the draft of his unpublished Essay concerning Toleration, 1 he had reached the point of view that he steadfastly maintained from then onwards.
His main argument for toleration is a corollary of his theory of the nature of civil society. The commonwealth exists for limited purposes: it is “a society of men constituted only for the procuring, preserving, and advancing their own civil interests”, by which he means “life, liberty, health, and indolency of body; and the possession of outward things, such as money, lands, houses, furniture, and the like.” Civil magistrates are given power to execute laws to promote these interests, but the salvation of souls is no concern of theirs. Indeed it cannot be, for true religion “consists in the inward persuasion of the mind”, while the magistrate’s power “consists only in outward force”. Locke then defines a church as “a free and voluntary society” which men join of their own accord — nobody is born a member of any church -“in order to the public worshipping of God in such manner as they judge acceptable to him, and effectual to the salvation of their souls”. A church, then, is similar to a state in being formed voluntarily for specific purposes, and like any other society it must have its own laws to regulate its affairs; but ecclesiastical laws must be confined to their proper sphere, which excludes anything “relating to the possession of civil and worldly goods”, or the use of force “upon any occasion whatsoever”. A church may maintain its own internal discipline by expelling any member who “continues obstinately to offend against” its laws, but such excommunication is not to involve any deprivation of “civil goods”. The fact that the civil magistrate may become a member of a church does not affect its status as a voluntary
Theory of government and its relationship with the governed
A feature of Locke’s use of the social contract was majority rule. The decisions of a going community cannot depend upon unanimity. For this reason, Locke sensibly assumed that the majority would rule once the social contract was entered upon. But in what sense are the free and equal minority really governed by consent when they must bow to the will of the majority? How are they to be protected against a tyranny of the majority? There is a difficulty here which is not resolved merely by saying that they consented to majority rule at the time of the social compact. Such consent could soon become a very unreal thing. Locke slides over this difficulty.
One reason was that institutions were always secondary to principles in Locke. So long as government was based upon consent and conducted within proper limits he was not vitally concerned about forms. His own preference clearly went to the English system after the Revolutionary Settlement. Under this the People’s role in normal times was confined to the choice of a representative assembly which was then supreme. The executive power was placed in separate hands, but was also given a share in lawmaking.
The conception of government as a trust exercised on behalf of the governed is an old one. It is deeply imbedded in the European political tradition. But where the middle ages fell short of modern times was in precision of statement concerning the limits on the power of rulers and in the provision of institutions by which rulers might be held responsible. In both respects the seventeenth century made important advances. Locke Second Treatise contributed to this advance in several ways. For example, it set down specific limits on government. Thus the legislature, while the supreme organ, must exercise its supremacy through laws properly promulgated and applying equally to all groups and classes. It must not raise taxes without the consent of the people or their deputies. Nor can it delegate its legislative powers. The other branches of government are still more sharply limited.
Locke proposes that the public good is distinct and superior to the rights of particular persons. Locke also suggests that each person has only surrendered the power to punish interference with individual rights, in order that the government can justly make laws and punish offenses. The government is merely an umpire, settling disputes over the rights of its citizens.
Works Cited
Locke John, The Second Treatise of Civil Government (1690) view on August 01, 2008 @ http://www.constitution.org/jl/2ndtreat.txt
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