Historically, the issue of police misconduct has been a sensitive topic that people avoid discussing openly. Unfortunately, its impact on our criminal justice system is often underestimated. Corruption and misconduct allegations are frequently ignored or silenced through legal actions and betrayal from within the system itself. Surprisingly, suppressing or being indifferent to police misconduct ultimately empowers those engaged in such behavior.
Many people believe that allegations of police misconduct are often ignored because they go against the Charter. The Charter of Rights and Freedoms serves as a comprehensive framework for our criminal justice system, safeguarding fundamental rights like life, liberty, freedom, and fair trial. Nevertheless, some critics within the criminal justice system argue that the Charter presents difficulties and allows criminals to avoid being prosecuted.
The legislation poses obstacles for police procedures, impeding their ability to fulfill their duties effectively. It is crucial to recognize that this law, criticized by many police officers, is often used as a way to avoid charges of police corruption. In an article addressing the suppression of cases involving police corruption, former Toronto mayor John Sewell emphasizes that “the silence implies an undeniable presence of police corruption in Toronto that those in power are unable to adequately address” (Sewell, 2010).
In his argument, Sewell highlights the significance of tackling police corruption to avoid its integration into our criminal justice system. He notes that each police force has a disciplinary system that highly values treating superiors with respect and displaying suitable conduct. These individuals are esteemed members who have been given leadership duties and must demonstrate their qualifications for such positions.
Experience and knowledge are vital for success in this setting. The role of a leader is crucial in effectively managing a team, which involves mentoring and teaching officers while overseeing their actions. It is clear that senior officers expect their juniors to adopt the attitudes and beliefs of those in command (Skolnick, 2002). According to John Sewell, senior officers have disregarded police corruption for a long time.
Sewell (2010) argues that police corruption is not taken seriously enough, as illustrated by two cases in Toronto. The first case occurred eleven years ago and involved allegations against Toronto officers who were accused of assaulting drug dealers and stealing their money. John Neily, overseeing the RCMP task force, conducted four internal investigations into John Shertzer and his drug squad team. Neily identified twelve officers acting independently and recommended criminal charges against them.
In response to Neily’s report, charges were filed against six officers, including Shertzer. However, the other half of the accused officers did not face any legal action. In 2008, a judge dismissed Shetzer’s case due to significant delays that violated their right to a fair trial, leading to all charges against the six officers being dropped. The prosecution has appealed this decision in hopes of securing a new trial.
Sewell also highlighted an additional incident in May 2004 where four officers were alleged to have solicited and accepted protection money from club owners in the downtown area.
Rick McIntosh, president of the Toronto Police Association, and William McCormack, son of former Toronto police chief, were among a group of men charged with influencing peddling and accepting a benefit. However, their charges were dismissed by a judge due to excessive delays and this ruling remains unchallenged. As a result, they did not undergo a proper trial and managed to avoid being convicted (Sewell, 2010). It is important to mention that in this case, the police faced difficulties in gathering evidence against all four individuals despite considerable pressure from the crown.
The trials were ended due to substantial delays (Sewell, 2010). It may be speculated that the police intentionally held back sufficient evidence in order to extend the trial, with the knowledge that it would lead to the charges being dropped. Their objective was to protect their fellow officers from facing prosecution. As a result, despite their attempts to build a case, the Crown or prosecution was left without any evidence. The Crown Attorney is an individual appointed by our government who serves as the representative of either the Queen or country. The gathering of evidence is not within the responsibilities of the Crown.
Police officers collect evidence and submit it to the Crown, who presents it in court if there is sufficient evidence for a conviction. It should be noted that in most instances, the burden of proof rests with the prosecution. Therefore, if the prosecution lacks evidence, the case is likely to be dismissed (Schuller & Ogloff, 2002). Despite the gravity of these cases, no attention was given to the allegations at any stage. It is perplexing how such serious accusations are disregarded due to technicalities, which raises concerns about recurring issues in cases involving police misconduct.
Sewell (2010) proposes that the excessive delays in these cases may be intentional, citing three potential reasons. The first reason is a possible shortage of staff in the task force handling these cases. The second reason is hesitancy among the task force members to prosecute their fellow colleagues. Lastly, Sewell emphasizes that police culture plays a significant role in fostering support for one another regardless of the circumstances. Hence, Sewell’s analysis underscores how police culture influences these allegations.
Jerome H. Skolnick (2002) explores the concept of the blue code of silence and its implications in his article “Corruption and The Blue Code of Silence”. The blue code, also known as the blue wall or the blue curtain, refers to the reluctance of officers to press charges against their fellow officers. Skolnick acknowledges that this code can have positive aspects such as fostering loyalty and brotherhood among police officers, which can help with policing and protect against potential threats (p. 300).
Nevertheless, the presence of loyalty and camaraderie allows for the flourishing of a counter-cultural criminal subculture. This subculture protects officers who decide to deviate from their professional responsibilities and engage in illegal activities. The nature of police work often involves unpredictable situations, forcing officers to swiftly make decisions while understanding that one mistake could have serious consequences. One could argue that without this code of silence or blue code, police officers would continuously doubt their actions.
According to Skolnick (2002), the code of silence presents a major obstacle for law enforcement officers as it allows them to use their judgment and rely on their instincts in performing their duties. However, it is essential to determine how far this code should protect members engaged in serious criminal activities. Right from the start of their training at the police academy, officers are taught about loyalty and the significance of unity among fellow officers.
Skolnick (2002) states that police officers have a strong understanding of the significance of safeguarding their fellow officers, which becomes deeply rooted in them. Consequently, there might be an inclination to refrain from pressing charges against their colleagues. This can result in an “us against them mentality,” where the police perceive the courts and citizens as a potential danger. Although senior officers endeavor to discourage this mindset, it continues to persist within the police force.
Sewell discusses the anticipated response to the excessive delays witnessed in the two referenced cases. It is expected that senior officials would acknowledge the need for prompt action and reassure the public accordingly. Furthermore, it is expected that appropriate personnel changes are implemented to emphasize the significance of addressing police corruption. Regrettably, these expectations often go unmet as senior officers frequently choose to ignore these cases and preserve their reputation.
In Toronto, police Chief Bill Blair and members of the Toronto police service board did not take any actions or implement any modifications to ensure that cases similar to the Shretzer case were expedited, as mentioned by Sewell (2010). As per Section 11(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedom, individuals accused of criminal offenses possess the right to a trial within a reasonable timeframe. The determination of reasonableness varies in each unique circumstance, although legal precedents have set forth guidelines.
According to the Supreme Court of Canada, summary offences should ideally be resolved within eight to ten months. However, more serious crimes that require a preliminary hearing and are tried within the Supreme Court can take an additional six to eight months (Rouben, 2009). It is important to acknowledge that these timeframes are merely general guidelines, as each case may experience delays or expedited proceedings for its own unique reasons. Sewell analyzed multiple cases that significantly surpassed the reasonable trial time range. Consequently, it can be inferred that the judges overseeing these cases had legitimate grounds for dismissing them.
It is possible that the investigating officers did not have enough time to gather the necessary evidence, despite expectations of prompt trial preparations for serious accusations. The Crown attorney is pushing for the presentation of evidence, and the courts have allowed these cases to proceed for a longer period, making it hard to believe that the investigating officers had insufficient time to find evidence.
There are two potential reasons for this situation: either there was insufficient evidence to pursue charges or the investigating officers were reluctant to present the evidence to protect their colleague. To comprehend how inadequate investigative measures can lead to significant delays, it is crucial to acknowledge the resources required for a prompt trial. A dependable and committed investigative unit that remains unbiased in handling cases of police misconduct is vital for a thorough investigation.
It is crucial to conduct a comprehensive investigation and provide ample resources to the investigating officers for resolving the matter. The investigation should be carried out by the police without any uncertainties, addressing these concerns with equal resolve as other cases. It is important for the police to refrain from adopting an adversarial mindset. (Sewell, 2010). Moreover, court delays frequently occur due to scheduling conflicts between the Crown and Defence. It is worth noting that the defence holds the right to scrutinize all evidence presented against them before trial.If the defense does not receive all evidence, they can request a trial postponement. However, if the defense has access to the evidence, they must provide a valid reason other than lack of evidence for a delay. If this reason is deemed valid by the court, the trial may be rescheduled. Insufficient evidence collected by investigative units often leads to delays in cases related to police misconduct (Campbell et al., 2004). A nationwide study conducted by Transparency International in 2001 and research carried out by the RCMP suggest that police corruption is not considered a significant issue.
Canada has been grappling with police corruption in its law enforcement agencies for a considerable period. An article from 2004 titled “Canada’s Approach to Battling Police Corruption” highlights recent incidents that have brought attention to this problem. These incidents include assaults carried out by Vancouver police officers, the participation of the police in the freezing deaths of aboriginal men in Saskatchewan, and various corruption-related charges against members of Toronto’s Police Force (Campbell, et al., 2004).
It is hard to believe that these cases truly demonstrate police corruption within Canada’s law enforcement. It is possible that these cases only represent a minority of individuals who have acted improperly within the system. However, in a report on the corruption crisis affecting the Toronto Police Service in January 2003, the Honourable George Ferguson, Q.C., stated that “there is sufficient evidence that significant police services have been infiltrated by serious police misconduct and corruption.” Despite incidents of police misconduct still being underreported, the media is starting to shed light on numerous corrupt officials in law enforcement.
Although the media sometimes contains inaccuracies, it is uncovering more instances of police misconduct and the breaking of silence (Campbell, et al., 2004, p. 3). The growing focus in the media on cases of police corruption and misconduct has likely led to a decline in public trust in our authorities. While not all acts of police corruption lead to criminal convictions, there are established protocols for dealing with corruption within law enforcement.
The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) follow internal disciplinary procedures to handle cases of police misconduct, as required by the RCMP Act. Whenever there is suspicion of a breach in the code of conduct, higher-ranking officials are empowered to launch investigations. If the accusations are proven true, there are two possible disciplinary actions that may be taken against the officer involved. The first alternative is an informal form of punishment.
The options for addressing misconduct include counseling, a recommendation for specialized training, a recommendation for professional counseling, a recommendation for transfer, working under close supervision, forfeiting up to one day of regular time off, and/or receiving a reprimand.
In more serious cases, formal discipline is necessary and involves a hearing with three senior members of the RCMP. Unlike a regular criminal hearing, the allegations need to be proven based on probability rather than beyond a reasonable doubt.
The sanctions imposed may include any of the informal disciplinary actions mentioned previously, as well as dismissal, direction to resign and subsequent dismissal if the officer does not resign within 14 days, demotion, or forfeiture of pay for a period not exceeding 10 work days. Appeal is possible for both informal and formal sanctions (Campbell, et al., 2004). Despite serving as a deterrent for police misconduct, these internal sanctions may not have the same level of influence as public sanctions.
Assuming that police misconduct is concealed within the police force, it can create an impression among officers that they are exempt from the law and can evade public scrutiny if caught engaging in criminal activities. Therefore, it is crucial to consider the significance of public trust in the field of policing. Without the trust of citizens, police officers are unable to effectively investigate crimes, actively engage with their community, and exercise discretion when charging individuals. Moreover, a lack of trust towards law enforcement personnel perpetuates the divisive mindset of “us versus them” prevalent among many aspiring young officers.
It may be important for the police to keep allegations of corruption silenced as exposing them may cause citizens to lose trust in them. If the public is made aware of these allegations, the media will continuously highlight the negative aspects of the police force. Therefore, it is crucial for the police to address cases of corruption seriously without compromising the level of trust that citizens have in them.
References
Campbell, E, Mahaffy, N, Stewart, D, & Trepanier, M. (2004). Canada’s approach to battling police corruption. Miller Thomson LLP, 1-3.
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 5, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982(U. K.), 1982, c. 11.
Rouben, A. (2009, June). Trial within a reasonable time. Retrieved from http://allanrouben.com/blog/2009/07/trial-within-a-reasonable-time/
Schuller, R, & Ogloff, J. (2002). Introduction to psychology and law: Canadian perspectives. Toronto: University of Toronto press.
Sewell, J. (2010, January 11). Swell: silence on police corruption cases. Toronto Star.
Skolnick, J. (2002). Corruption and the blue code of silence. Policing corruption: international perspectives, 300-308.
