This paper is a response readiness paper. This paper will discuss the emergency response plan for New York City. This paper is on the critique of the plan of New York City using available tools such as the Continuity of Operations Self-Assessment Tool, the Template Instructions, and other resources from the FEMA website and the text.
Introduction In cases of tragedies such as hurricanes and floods, governments need to have a clear and plan for the emergencies. During the time for Hurricane Katrina it was clear that cities of the U.S. were not prepared for the response of emergencies. This was because in most of the cities of U.S., many people especially the disabled, poor and the minorities were impacted negatively since Hurricane Katrina needed a quick response to the emergency but there was none. There is need for reviewing the current emergency plans of many cities in the U.S. including New York. The last review of the emergency plans according to Rudy Giuliani, who was the Acting Mayor, was in 2005. Due to the unacceptable impacts that the Hurricane Katrina had on the poor and the disabled without quick response on the disasters, there was need to improve the plans of the New York City emergency response plans. For the review of the New York City emergency response plan, there was need of recognizing the current disasters and issues of the evaluation plan (Brodsky, 2006, p. 6; New York City Office of Emergency Management, 2000).
Critique of the New York City using Continuity of Operations Self-Assessment Tool Using the continuity of operations self-assessment tool, New York City emergency response plan has fully addressed the incorporation of elements such as vital records and databases, authorities’ delegation, communications, plans and procedures implementations. This is because the New York City emergency response plan has delegated the local authorises and private organizations in the dealing with the responses in the cases of the emergencies (Brodsky, 2006, p. 6). New York City emergency response plan have also partially addressed the prioritising of the essential functions is in progress since the occurrence of the Hurricane Katrina that affected many people in the U.S. New York City emergency response plan is also has fully addressed the plans of equipping the preparedness of the emergency response plans in order to review the plans of the emergency response. New York City emergency response plan has also fully addressed the training of the personnel of the emergency response by equipping them on the necessary training that they need for responding to emergencies (Brodsky, 2006, p. 6).
The personnel of the New York City emergency response plan are equipped on the necessary information about the occurrence of the hurricanes in the New York City. This is because the New York City is one of the cities that are at most risk of being hit by hurricanes. The essential functions of the New York City emergency response plan fully addresses the dependency of other organizations such as weather forecast to predict the occurrence of the next hurricane in the future so as to plans for the emergency response with the occurrence of the hurricanes (Brodsky, 2006, p. 7). The annual reviews and updates of the New York City emergency response plan is partially addressed since the last review of emergency response plan of the New York City according to Rudy Giuliani, who was the Acting Mayor, was in 2005 (Brodsky, 2006, p. 6).
The New York City emergency response plan has fully addressed the plan of first making the people to report to the receptions than directly going to the shelters in cases of disasters. The initial plan was to make the people to first report to the reception of the shelter and then to be allowed in the shelter. This was a cumbersome plan that needed review. Due to the cumbersomeness of the plan, many residents of the New York City did not go to the shelters in the cases of the disasters (Brodsky, 2006, p. 9).
The plans of reporting to the reception first then to the shelters was also not an effective plan since it caused a lot of transport problems that were leading to congestion in traffic since people had to travel in public and private transport to reach the safe shelters during the strike of the disasters. Due to the use of public and private transport to the shelters, there was increase of parking problems for the vehicles that were used (Brodsky, 2006, p. 10).
Even though the residents of New York City are taken to the shelters in case of the disaster strike, there are no enough shelters to accommodate every one that is affected by the disaster. This is because the current capacity of the public shelters is 800,000 people while there are more that 3 million people that can be affected by the hurricanes (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 2005, p. 32).
There had been no comprehensible organization of the accountabilities for the abundant activities together with influences concerned in the migration. There was a considerable reliability from the arrangement on communal haulage and enormous dependability of the MTA, administration collections and harbor ability. There was lack of triumphant mass departure without strategies which are given a clear management between agencies and bordering metropolis that have hassles for competing on communal trails and carrying possessions. Therefore, there was emphasizing from the MTA that they did not require their personal emigration preparation but in its place they had to assemble and carry carrying possessions as it was aimed at by OEM (Brodsky, 2006, p. 8).
The program did not provide adequate training to the employees. Though there was a demand for successful implementation of the public training of employees though the established plan. Therefore, despite the requirements by the commission and Transport Worker Union Local 100 (“TWU”), there was no action that was taken. There was an indication that the employees were not provided with adequate devastation avoidance and response training even though there was a suggestion from the central administration of New York ever since 1985. Due to this, the contribution of the civic workers had been a subject of implication in different migrations disaster reaction procedures. Consequently, it is important that the New York City notifies the employees about their reliabilities and also provide them with sufficient preparation (Brodsky, 2006, p. 8).
There is no clear disagreement on the complexity of knowing when migration commences which is the necessary amount of time in advance evacuation to avoid disaster. It is therefore, important to know the period which is essential for the take off and lead mistake limitations. If the period of emigration is begun tardily, there is a possibility of locking millions of New Yorkers in techniques of troubles. Though, early migration could lead to unnecessary migration of millions of citizens and this would be a danger to the security of the civic and also an important burden to the coordination of carrying (Brodsky, 2006, p. 9).
The complications of preliminary peak of the emigration, was the severe changes of the climate which are inclusive of the windstorm powers and also precipitation proceeding to the real disaster action. This strategy does not have the any official representation that provides forecasts of the traveling overcrowdings and the prototypes of impelling throughout the comprehensive migration. Therefore, there is a requirement of a complete representation of all assets of transportation, number of people who can be given transport by each asset. Also the model is supposed to consider the figure of citizens who can be conveyed by the chattels hourly, how the possessions were assembled and distributed, and finally the practical suppositions on the behavior of the residents (Brodsky, 2006, p. 10).
Therefore, the strategy took no notice of the identity assessment effects during urgent situations which are related to the conditions since they are of great damages on the arrangements of transportation which cause major jamming in traveling. The plan does not support travel overcrowding and shelter usage problems which resulted from individual immigration. The plan segregates the municipality into three points of the region of migration and also calls on the residents in secure regions. Therefore, the plan declares that it is important to put the strategy into segments since it is a critical action since, the immigrants in confidential vehicles can cause congestion on streets and also have the possibility of bringing the immigration to a languish (Brodsky, 2006, p. 11).
Conclusion In conclusion, New York City is a place that is vulnerable for the occurrence of the hurricanes because of the geographical location of the city that makes it easier for the occurrence of the hurricanes. The city acts like a funnel and therefore all the waters from the storms will cause a big flood of more that 20 feet affecting most of the streets of the New York City. The other reason why New York City is vulnerable to the hurricanes is because of the tall buildings and bridges. This is because the hurricanes move faster in places where the height is more that 350 feet. Since there are strong winds that can cause the breaking of the windows of the tall buildings, the damage caused to the people is more than in the low level places (Naparstek, 2005). Because of the vulnerability of the hurricanes in the New York City, there is need of the review of the New York City emergency response plan in order to address the plans of responding to the emergency in cases of the occurrence of hurricanes and other disasters (Brodsky, 2006).
References Brodsky, R.L. (2006). Final Report on New York City Emergency Response and Evacuation Plans in the Event of a Weather-Related Emergency. Retrieved December 10, 2008, from http://assembly.state.ny.us/member_files/092/20060323/hurricane_report.pdf
Naparstek, A. (2005, July 20). The Big One. New York Press. Retrieved December 10, 2008, from http://www.nypress.com/18/29/news&columns/aaronnaparstek.cfm
New York City Office of Emergency Management. (2005). Coastal Storm Contingency Plan – EOC Activation List. New York City Office of Emergency Management.
New York City Office of Emergency Management. (2000). Coastal Storm Contingency Plan – Public Information Annex. New York City Office of Emergency Management.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. (2005). New York City Hurricane Evacuation Behavioral Analysis. Overview of findings. Retrieved December 10, 2008, from http://chps.sam.usace.army.mil/USHESdata/NY/NY_city_behave_report.htm.