The Renault Nissan Case Study
Phases and aims
In March 1999 Renault and Nissan signed a comprehensive partnership agreement which formed a bi national automobile group of global scale. This agreement was the kick‐off for a win ‐win partnership because it gave Nissan on the one side the so much needed cash infusion, the alliance allowed Nissan also toexpertise in marketing,market and to enjoy synergies with Renault Nissan gained from it brought them concentrate on the US design and platform strategy.
Moreover in Europe as well as Renault’s greater know ‐how in small passenger cars. For Renault on the other side the alliance gave the global scope to stay competitive, so it gave them access to the Asia‐Pacific market and allowed the return to Latin‐America. The alliance also helped to round up Renault’s product portfolio, especially with Nissan’s light commercial vehicles and large passenger cars. Furthermore Renault could gain from Nissan’sknow ‐ how in the manufacturing process.
To sum it up the alliance showed an exceptional fit based on the partner’s complementary strengths and formed the fourth largest automotive company in the world with an output of 4.9 million vehicles and 9.1% market share worldwide in 1999. From the very beginning three overwhelming principles have accompanied the alliance: To share resources in order to realize economics of scale, to leverage the complementary strengthsin terms of products, markets and know ‐how in order to improve efficiencyand finally to preserver the separate brand principles in order themaintain a strong brand image and but contrasting corporate cultures to These identities allowed to two companies with similar seize, appeal to a broader customer base. pursue a common strategyof profitablegrowth.
In detail the alliance was processed in two phases. In the firstphase in 1999 Nissan took an 36.8% equity stake in Nissan for EUR 4.4bn with the option for Nissan to take a stake in Renault at a later date and for Renault to increase its shareholding to 44.4%. At this time also three directors of Renault joined the board of Nissan, among them Carlos Ghosn who was appointed chief operating officer.Ghosn unveiled quickly the so‐called “Nissan Revival Plan” which aimed to restore Nissan’s profitabilitywithin three years and halve its net debts. Simultaneously eleven cross‐company teams startedto identify potential synergies to be implemented which have already started to be considered eight month before the agreement. For the period 2000 to 2002 alone, the synergies should produce total savings of USD3.4bn. The second phase startedthree years later when it was announced in October 2001 and finished in May 2002 that Nissan would take a 15% stake in Renault without voting rights and Renault would use its option to raise its shareholding. Within these transactions the French government’s stake in Renault would fall to 25.9%.
This phase started one year ahead of schedule because of Nissan’s faster than expected progress, so the net debt was decreased from JPY1,349bn in 1999 to only JPY432bn in 2001. The aim of this phase was to enhance both companies’ performance by creating a community of interests,underpinned by the stronger cross shareholding. This community found its expression in the Renault‐Nissan b.v., which is equally owned by Renault and Nissan and operates under Dutch law. Renault‐Nissan b.v. handles all common strategicdecisions of the alliance, from strategicplanning over financial policies to the management of common subsidiaries. But still the two companies retain their management autonomy, their brand identities, their employees and the results of their performances. Though the second phase should strengthen the equal alliance, Renault still remains the senior partner, so e.g. the number of Nissan directorson the Renault board of directorsis two out of 17, but there are now three out of seven directors of Renault on the Nissan board, including Carlos Goshn, who was
The Renault Nissan Case Study
appointed in June 2000 President and CEO.
The areas of cooperation handled by Renault‐Nissan b.v. are wide and have high objectives. Common platforms and powertrains are one key to share parts in order to generate economies of scale. Till end of 2002 there are already two common platforms and powertrains in use and by 2010 there should be ten platforms and eight engine families. This involves beside merged manufacturing processes also a joint purchasing, for which the alliance created in April 2001 their firstequally joint company – the Renault‐ Nissan Purchasing Organization. The organization will handle 70% of both group’s purchases in the long term – by end ‐2002 already 43%. Furthermore also production capacity is shared, e.g. in Nissan’splant in Barcelona for Renault’s compact van or for Nissan’s light commercial vehicles in one of Renault’s Brazilian plants, and a common distribution policy in Europe was set up. Beside the synergies in production and procurement also a joint IS/IT
organization should harmonize both groups’ systems and
make it more effective.
The challenges in this alliance can be seen in the intercultural side. Especially the so contrasting French and Japanese culture could have made it difficult realize the economic merits of the alliance and to do to
the turnaround at Nissan. But with the charismatic Brazilian‐born Lebanese Carlos Goshn at the top of Nissan it was much easier to do so because he was recognized as a foreigner in Japan and therefore could set through his objectives much easier. So Nissan changed from a collective organization with
consensus decisions, which is typical for Japan, to a more individual one with a decision making process without consensus. This was realized among other with the help of a new reward system assessing on individual results. The needed massive lay‐offs of 21,000 people and the closing of five factories as defined in the Nissan Revival Plan stood in strong contrast to the employee’s loyalty to Japanese enterprises and the lifetime employment system – they were only possible because of the person Goshn.
As well as the demanded 20% savings from the suppliers over three years combined with the aim to halve their number and to use more global contractors, which were unbelievable before in the Keiretsu system, where Nissan was also part of. The introduction of English as a common working language and the great exchange of personnel in all departments have helped to get to know each other better,too.
In the end the commitments of the Nissan Revival Plan have been met one year ahead of schedule in 2001, but not only the cost cuttings above are responsible for Nissan’s return to net profitability,but also because of the massive launch of new models (overall 28 since 1999) thanks to the common platform strategyand their new design. The Nissan 180 plan announced in early 2002 should ensure a sustainable development by selling an additional one million units worldwide, realizing an 8% operating margin (in 2001 already 7.9%) and achieving a zero net debt all at the end of 2004.
Due to Nissan’s return to profitabilityit is making a growing contribution to Renault’s income, so in 2002 EUR 1.3bn of Renault’s net income of EUR 1.9bn resulted from Nissan with an even brighteroutlook. Now the alliance has a global presence with nearly no overlapping and only direct competition in Europe. In 2002 they sold 5.0 million vehicles (2.3 million from Renault and 2.7 million from Nissan).
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