The author argues that active euthanasia and passive euthanasia share fundamental similarities.
Rachel’s thesis contends that active euthanasia is frequently more humane than passive euthanasia. The distinction between intentions and actions is emphasized to support this argument. The author maintains that despite differing intentions, inaction ultimately leads to action. In the case of euthanasia, regardless of intent, a person loses their life. Hence, there is no moral disparity between allowing someone to die and actively causing their death. Both actions yield the same outcome, making them morally comparable.
James Rachels argues in his article “Active and Passive Euthanasia” that there is no substantial moral distinction between active and passive euthanasia, challenging the traditional differentiation. Despite recognizing the wrongdoing of needlessly prolonging a dying patient’s suffering, Rachels’ assertion that the difference between the two types of euthanasia is insignificant in medical ethics is misguided. The undeniable mistake lies in perceiving active euthanasia as equivalent to passive euthanasia because there is a moral differentiation between causing death and permitting it.
Assumptions that should be questioned:
– Decisions regarding life and death are made for insignificant reasons based on traditional beliefs. The act of terminating a person’s life is the same as permitting someone to pass away.
Passive euthanasia refers to the doctor not actively intervening to end the patient’s life, but rather allowing them to pass away. Hence, it would be incorrect to assert that the doctor takes no action.
The article “Active and Passive Euthanasia” by James Rachels questions the conventional distinction between active and passive euthanasia. Rachels argues that there is no significant moral difference between the two methods. Although he correctly points out that prolonging a dying patient’s suffering without reason is immoral, he overlooks the significance of differentiating between active and passive euthanasia in medical ethics. This error arises from considering active euthanasia and passive euthanasia as identical, despite the inherent moral contrast between causing death and allowing death.
In his article “Active and Passive Euthanasia,” Rachels questions the differentiation between active and passive euthanasia, expressing disagreement with the prevailing moral norms that allow for passive euthanasia while prohibiting active euthanasia. According to Rachels, active euthanasia is frequently more compassionate than passive euthanasia and he critiques the traditional belief for resulting in judgments influenced by irrelevant factors. Additionally, he asserts that there is no ethical distinction between causing someone’s death and allowing them to die, finding flaws in the arguments supporting this doctrine.
Rachels challenges the prevailing doctrine in the medical world that opposes intentionally terminating a patient’s life. According to this doctrine, prolonging life through extraordinary means is a decision made by the patient or their immediate family, with the physician providing guidance. However, Rachels argues against this belief and presents the case of a terminally ill patient with incurable cancer who wishes to end their life to avoid excruciating pain.
The patient and their family request that the doctor “pull the plug” for a quick and painless end to their suffering. Granting this request would not violate the conventional doctrine since needlessly prolonging the patient’s agony has no justification. On the other hand, withholding treatment may result in a prolonged and more painful death compared to receiving a lethal injection.
This emphasizes that active euthanasia is actually preferable over passive euthanasia. Arguing otherwise would support a choice that causes more suffering instead of less, contradicting humanitarian reasoning behind not prolonging the patient’s life. Rachels’ argument highlights that allowing natural death is typically slow and painful in contrast to opting for a quick and painless lethal injection.
Rachels argues that the belief that passive euthanasia is morally superior to active euthanasia is based on a misconception about the moral implications of killing versus letting someone die. To examine this issue, Rachels presents two similar cases involving individuals attempting to inherit money by eliminating their young cousins. In the first case, a man named Smith intentionally drowns his cousin while making it appear accidental. In the second case, another man named Jones plans to drown his cousin but passively watches as the child accidentally falls and drowns. The only difference between the two cases is that Smith actively kills the child while Jones allows the child to die. Rachels questions if there is a significant difference in the moral behavior of these two men. If killing versus letting someone die has moral significance, one might argue that Jones’s actions are less morally reprehensible than Smith’s. However, Rachels prompts readers to consider if they truly agree with this perspective.I don’t think so.The decision regarding euthanasia becomes purely moral when considering the Smith and Jones case, emphasizing the delicate balance between human morality and self-interest.However,this does not apply to medicine.
Doctors have a sole interest in conducting the appropriate procedure resulting in the patient’s demise, devoid of personal gain or intentional murder. However, there exists an insignificant moral distinction between causing death and permitting it. Our human nature compels us to perceive killing as more abhorrent than allowing someone to die, due to its grave consequences and inherent malevolence. This presents a moral quandary. In the realm of medicine, both deciding to let a patient die and opting for active killing are subject to moral evaluation. Such decisions can be deemed prudent or imprudent, compassionate or sadistic, right or wrong. Doctors should be concerned about this notion since they are bound by strict ethical guidelines mandated by law, rendering them vulnerable if any situation were to go awry.
Rachels acknowledges that active and passive euthanasia may have significant moral distinctions based on their consequences. However, he asserts that these differences ultimately strengthen his argument in favor of active euthanasia as the superior choice.
Part II: One can easily criticize Rachels’ argument by suggesting that the intentions behind an action hold greater significance than the outcome. To illustrate this point, let’s consider a scenario involving parents who make the decision to refrain from having a doctor perform a life-saving surgery for their baby with intestinal issues. Although this surgery would save the baby’s life, it would also result in permanent disability. The act of rejecting the surgery is considered immoral because the parents prefer their baby to be deceased rather than enduring lifelong difficulties. This example highlights that while there may not be a clear differentiation between actively causing death and permitting someone to die, there is always a conscious choice involved in assessing the morality of the situation.
The argument made by Rachels about the moral equality between killing and letting someone die in passive and active euthanasia is flawed for multiple reasons, including the sanctity of human life. While Rachels is correct in asserting that active euthanasia is more compassionate than passive euthanasia in cases where a terminally ill patient is enduring excessive pain and suffering, we must also contemplate the significance of preserving life. Philosopher Daniel Callahan contends that suffering arises not only from physical causes but also from individual values. Hence, it would be inappropriate to employ active euthanasia on individuals who are worsening their condition due to mental discouragement. The existence of survivors with terminal cancer serves as proof that overcoming such illnesses is achievable. Those who relinquish their will to live during challenging times miss out on this potential miracle. The right to life should not be treated lightly, especially when confronted with overwhelming adversity.
According to philosopher Daniel Callahan, the failure to distinguish between killing and allowing to die can have unsettling consequences. Callahan argues that when these two actions are seen as morally equivalent, it may lead physicians to believe they are responsible for any deaths that occur from ending treatment. Instead of reinforcing this belief, Callahan suggests it should be eliminated. He proposes that doctors should not bear the burden of deciding if continuing a patient’s life is necessary. When it is determined that ending a deteriorating life is the appropriate action, there should be no hesitation but rather a sense of relief.
The moral dilemma between passive and active euthanasia is evident in the medical world. Passive euthanasia, also referred to as letting someone die, does not hold the physician responsible. The physician is not obliged to prematurely end someone’s life; they are simply allowing life to run its natural course. Conversely, active euthanasia, which is less well-known, involves actively causing someone’s death. This requires the physician to consider moral ethics and make a decision, as do the patient and/or their family. The physician must assess the value of human life and share their opinion with the individual nearing the end of their life. Choosing active euthanasia goes beyond simply disposing of a body; it involves emotional strain and moral dilemmas. Therefore, it tests the moral compass in making that decision.
