Innocent III’s Papal Influence over the Fourth Crusade Research Paper Brandon Rosty The Crusades-HIST-239 Prof. Moran Cruz For much of history, the papacy has been viewed as a driving force behind the Crusades, the papacy of Innocent III being a particularly good example. Ever since the days of Gregory VII from 1073-1085, and his early ideas of Crusades, and Urban II’s call for the First Crusade in 1095, the papacy has served as an instigator of plans that have often gone awry. The Fourth Crusade is the perfect example of this. Following his election to the papacy, Innocent III, or Lothar of Segni, began preaching a message of rusade to once again take back the Holy Sepulcher. What would follow his calls for crusade was a series of setbacks that would culminate not in the recapture of the Holy Land, but the sack of Constantinople. What was the actual extent of Innocent III and the papacy’s influence in this crusade? How could the papacy control the events of a foreign venture from Rome? Was Innocent III’s inability to control the crusaders a contributing factor to the failure of reaching the Holy Land? The extent of Innocent III’s influence in the Fourth Crusade must be investigated to gain a sense of how and why the crusade transpired as it did.
Innocent III can be credited as the sole source for the Fourth Crusade, as he himself called for the crusade. Innocent first mentioned the idea of crusade to the patriarch of Jerusalem following his ascension to the papacy in January of 1198, when he announced his intention to strive to deliver the Holy Land from the infidels. By August 1198, Innocent had officially proclaimed the Fourth Crusade and declared himself the crusade’s leader. Innocent took the precedent of personal involvement of the pope from his predecessor, Gregory VII, who hoped to have Emperor Henry IV defend Rome, as he worshipped at the Holy Sepulcher.
Innocent lacked such protection of Rome and widespread interest in his crusade to actually attain personal leadership over the crusading army. This may have been a pie in the sky expectation of Innocent’s, but the Holy Father did wish to someday lead the crusade into the Holy Land. Innocent’s call to crusade was such a mastery of imagery and holy undertones that many described its tone as that of a sermon devoted to the seizure of Jerusalem. Unlike his predecessors, however, Innocent III signaled his intent to manage the crusade through the assistance of two papal legates, Cardinals Peter Capuano and Soffredo.
His official call to crusade, his pursuit of leadership of the crusade, and his attempt at micromanaging the crusade through papal legates demonstrate Innocent III’s strong early involvement in the Fourth Crusade. His devotion toward the capture of the Holy Land raises the further question: how did a crusade that underwent much early planning from the papacy, go so far off course? In the early preparations for the Fourth Crusade, Innocent asked that“ All towns, as well as counts, and barons, should provide crusaders for two years at their own expense according to their resources. ” Innocent left out kings, further illustrating his ntent to keep this crusade under papal control. Innocent also offered indulgences for taking the cross as Geoffrey of Villehardouin explained, “all those who take the cross and serve God for a year in the army would be free from all sins they had committed and confessed. ” A key provision to his indulgences and his call to crusade was the expectation that the crusaders would travel largely at their own expense. This would cost Innocent dearly in his army’s ability to execute their crusade. Innocent pursued many means by which to finance the crusade, such as imposing the first church- ide crusade tax on all clerics, but this would do little to alleviate the financial burden on most crusaders. The Second and Third Crusades were largely financed through kings, but this crusade lacked monarchial support, and Innocent had made clear that the crusaders’ financial responsibility was their own.
The failure to fully finance the Fourth Crusade would ultimately thwart Innocent’s dream of crusade ever reaching the Holy Land. Without sufficient finances, the crusaders would have to pursue diversions such as the Venetian attack on Zara, as well as the sack of Constantinople if they ever hoped to ake the trip into the Holy Land. Although these indulgences were highly enticing, just as the indulgences in past crusades were, Innocent III would have to stand by and watch as his summons for a crusading army was ignored by the European powers. War had broken out between England and France, Germany was split between Philip of Swabia and Otto of Brunswick who both had claims to the throne; and Genoa and Pisa, the two powerful sea forces along the Mediterranean, were also at war. 6 Innocent III’s early preparations attempted to dispel the misgivings of the crusade, but little was being accomplished in ssembling a crusading army. Hope for the Fourth Crusade was decreasing as by March 1199, there had been little response to Innocent’s call to crusade. This did not dissuade Innocent as he reached out to the Fulk of Neuilly in order to increase religious fervor for the crusade. Fulk of Neuilly was already preaching the crusade as early as September of 1198, as Innocent allowed the use Cistercian monks in his campaigns. In his letters to Fulk of Neuilly, Innocent revealed his intention of linking moral reformation, evangelical preaching, and the crusade. Innocent made it clear that the crusade was an offering from
God, an opportunity for salvation, but he also asserted that God’s people had to be worthy of salvation, and the seizure of the Holy land was the perfect offering to demonstrate such worthiness. Fulk of Neuilly’s preaching of religious fervor for the crusade was reminiscent of Peter the Hermit in the First Crusade, and greatly assisted Innocent in his pursuit of a crusade for all Western Christendom. Throught 1198 and 1199, Fulk of Neuilly’s works led him to spread the call of pilgrimage throughout Gaul, where he found great success, while Innocent had trouble reaching out to this area.
Innocent III wished to make the Fourth Crusade the gift of salvation needed for Western Christendom, as he felt the heathen control over the Holy Land displeased God greatly. With fervor increasing, Innocent needed an army for his crusade. Meanwhile, Peter Capuano had also pronounced Innocent’s remission of sins in France, and the crusading army’s first enlistment soon followed at a tournament held by Count Thibaut of Champagne and Count Louis of Blois in November 1199. Innocent III was also attempting to assemble a naval source for the crusading army, and to this end he irected Cardinal Suffredo to Venice as well as a dispatching a delegation to make peace between Venice, Pisa, and Genoa. Andrea describes this as a crucial source for the diversions to Zara and Constantinople, as did Gunther. However, Gunther placed the blame solely on the Venetians instead of on the shoulders of the Papacy. The involvement of the Venetians would continue to plague the crusaders throughout the duration of the Fourth Crusade. Things began to move quickly for the crusade by 1201, as Marquis Boniface of Montferrat and Abbot Peter of Lucedio took the cross in the summer of 1201, while the
Doge of Venice, Enrico Dandolo, accepted the cross a year later in September of 1202. Still, the crusaders needed a maritime vehicle to transport the army across the Mediterranean Sea. Innocent III, with some hesitation, expected the Venetians would provide that source, after the legation to Genoa and Pisa failed. Eventually the crusading army came together through French and Lombard nobles forging an alliance along with the Venetians before October 1202. The French and the Venetians had reached an agreement for transportation and provisions for an army of 33,500. In order to complete the provisions of the reaty and meet the demands of building a fleet capable of transporting this army, the Doge of Venice had to suspend commerce in Venice. With such financial burden on themselves, the Venetians sought a high price from the crusaders. Such a high price would prove too much for the crusaders, and they would have to submit to the whims of the Venetians. Innocent’s insistence that the crusaders act with their own resources and expense seemed to drive the crusading army directly into the hands of the Venetians. Gunther of Pairis, describes, from Abbot Martin of Pairis’ perspective, that the Venetians had deceived the rusaders about the price of the acquisition of such transportation. However, Queller describes that the crusaders knew well the terms of their agreement, and that “no ruler of the time, could raise such a force, certainly not without the very greatest difficulty. ” The envoys who had made the agreement with Dandolo, received their instructions from their principals who included the young counts of Flanders, Champagne and Blois. For the oversight of cost, and for not consulting the papacy on such matters, Queller assigns the blame of the terms of the agreement on these Northern French barons. For their part,
Innocent III and his legates illustrated the difficulty of controlling the crusade from Rome, because they couldn’t assist the barons with their finances or with their dealings with Dandolo. There are several conflicting opinions about Innocent III’s reaction to the treaty with Venice in 1201. Villehardouin reports that the pope seemed very “willing” to confirm the treaty. Innocent III’s clerical biographer states that Innocent agreed “cautiously” to the terms of the treaty, with the provision that no Christians be harmed, unless they harm the crusader mission unjustly. Queller seems to believe that while
Innocent was willing to confirm the treaty, he imposed a common prohibition not to harm Christian lands even if they were owned by the king of Hungary, who was at odds with the Venetians. Even if it seemed Innocent had the foresight to see that the Venetians could use the treaty as a way to attack the King of Hungary’s lands, Innocent was making a prohibition that included any and all Christian lands and there were little grounds to prove Innocent’s hesitation with the Venetians according to Queller Regardless of whether or not the Venetians could be trusted, the crusaders were at their mercy as
Innocent hadn’t provided any other alternative. In the midst of Venetian preparations, Innocent III was still greatly concerned about the impact of the war between France and England on the Fourth Crusade. In May of 1203, Innocent wrote to King Philip II of France, and King John of England, in an effort to make a truce between the two powers so that their supporters could focus on the crusade. These efforts support the idea that Innocent was still attempting to influence the crusade; however, upon close inspection of the letters to the two monarchs, it can be in nferred that Innocent knew little of the crusaders’ position or planned course as he hardly even mentions the crusaders to the monarchs, which supports the notion that the crusade was becoming one largely outside of papal control. Unbeknownst to Innocent, the crusaders were beginning their first siege on Constantinople and had already attacked Zara. Adding to the complications of not being able to control the crusaders, the papal legates and their roles appears to have greatly diminished once the crusaders set out. Robert of Clari and Villehardouin rarely even mention Cardinals Peter Capuano and Suffredo or even Pope Innocent III himself.
Even ancient papal sources suggest that the Venetians were uncomfortable with Capuano acting as a legate and asked that he accompany them as just a preacher. Soffredo had gone on to the Holy Land to prepare the way for the crusade. Without his papal legates, Innocent was powerless in executing his wishes, and the crusading army began to act on its own intentions. Innocent, as with the Venetian treaty, was reacting to events instead of shaping them. Innocent did agree to the election of Boniface of Montferrat as the leader of the crusading army , and he also agreed to the desired attack on Alexandria and Egypt before moving on to the
Holy Land, as was a common practice in the later crusades. At this point, a transition began, as a crusade that was once very much the creation of Innocent III slowly became one of secular interest, the focus of which was not the Holy Land, but diversion after diversion. Cardinal Capuano returned to Rome in July of 1202, with the news that the crusading army was considering the Venetian proposal to sail to the city of Zara and take back the city for the Venetians. Since the crusaders were unable to meet their financial obligations set in their treaty, and were desperate to find a solution that as a lesser evil than breaking up the crusade, an attack on a fellow Christian city, suggested by Venice, seemed to be the only answer. Innocent III sent Capuano back to the crusading army, hoping to dissuade them from the deal with the Venetians and resolve the financial situation. Innocent also sent a stern letter threatening excommunication for such an attack and reminded the crusaders of his prohibition of attacking fellow Christians unless in the most severe and just occasions. 27 The letter arrived after the army had already landed in Zara, and the conquest proceeded without mishap in November 1202. The
Franks sought forgiveness for their actions and dispatched envoys to Rome in order to receive papal indulgence. Innocent granted such indulgence to the Franks, but the Venetians, who felt they had done nothing wrong, did not seek such absolution, and they were promptly excommunicated by Pope Innocent III. 27 Problems with communication between the papacy and the papal legates also contributed to the growing disconnect between Rome and the crusading army. Capuano was seeking direction from Innocent about the excommunicated Venetians and the Franks who would have to travel alongside them, but Innocent could not directly answer is concerns as the situation in Rome in early 1203 was becoming dangerous. The city was divided by factional complications, which was contributing to Innocent’s inability to transcribe his intentions to his legates. By the time his directions about the Venetians were sent off to Capuano, the Cardinal had already decided not to join the Army at Zara. This is confirmed by Gunther, as he describes the Abbot Martin and other associates sent on the papal directives regarding absolution to the army. Without his legate present, Innocent’s orders of not pursuing an attack on Constantinople would be ignored.
In the meantime, his other legate, Cardinal Suffredo, had turned down the election of patriarch of Jerusalem, against Innocent’s wishes, but again Innocent could not convey his position. In a letter to Suffredo in August, 1203, explaining the army’s excursion to Zara as well as plans to continue on to Constantinople, Innocent III concluded that the course of the crusade was completely out of his control. Innocent lost control over the army at the most perilous of times, such as during the events with the Venetian Treaty, the Conquest of Zara and the request of Alexius the Younger to divert to
Constantinople. Before the crusading army set sail in October 1202, the young Byzantine prince, Alexius Angelus, or Alexius the Younger, sought help from Western Christendom against the Emperor Alexius III ,who had blinded and overthrown Alexius the Younger’s father, Emperor Issac II. Alexius originally sought help from Philip of Swabia and from King Philip of France, who had ties to Boniface of Montferrat, the leader of the Fourth Crusade. Gunther also speaks about Philip of Swabia and King Philip’s influence over the Germans and Franks in the crusading army. There was some appeal to the younger
Alexius’s call to retake his throne for Innocent III, as the relationship between Innocent and Alexius III wasn’t ideal. Between 1198 and 1202, eight missions and twelve letters were circulated between the two leaders and little came from them. Innocent sought Byzantine support for his crusade, while Alexius III sought papal understanding about an attack against Phillip of Swabia. Innocent in turn, sought papal dominance over the Greek Church . Alexius’s unwillingness to cooperate wasn’t enough for Innocent to hear out Alexius the Younger’s pleas at his appearance at papal court in February 1202. Innocent idn’t view Alexius Angelus as a credible threat to Alexius III, refusing to support a venture to Constantinople, and condemned such an attack by the crusaders in the “strongest language”. Innocent appeared desperate to regain control over his crusade, and seemed to be using the insistence of not pursuing a siege on Constantinople as means to reassert his authority over the crusading army. In February of 1203, Innocent sent a message through Bishop Nivelon of Soissons, prohibiting the army from traveling to Constantinople. Innocent had no reason to doubt the crusading army as they had accepted his terms of recommunion, hich included the prohibition of attacking Christians unless under the most severe of circumstances. In his responses to them having accepted his recommunion, he began to describe the Venetians as the “enemy of the crusade. ” And even referred to the Doge of Venice as “the Pharaoh” in reference to the story of Moses in Exodus. This was the strongest message yet that Innocent III was still very much in control of this crusade and he demanded that they not pursue an attack on Constantinople. Innocent III’s ability to enforce his prohibition was compromised by his own direction to Cardinal Peter Capuano.
When Capuano asked for his direction on the matter of the crusaders pursuing an attack on Constantinople and the Venetians refusing absolution, Innocent directed him to do “as God inspired him” and continue on to the Kingdom of Jerusalem. ” When the crusading army ignored his authority as legate and began to pursue the excursion to Constantinople, Capuano did exactly as directed, and Innocent lost his contact with the crusaders. As described earlier, complications from Innocent’s legates and other miscommunications did little to dissuade the crusaders from assisting Alexius the Younger.
Even with Capuano gone, Abbott Martin, through Gunther’s writing, tells his readers that the army knew of the Supreme Pontiff’s position against the proposed journey to Constantinople. Gunther, however, also discusses Innocent’s distaste for the Greek City and the Church in Constantinople and believed that the Holy Father wished for its capture without catholic bloodshed, but doubted an invasion could take place without the destruction of the army. Sidney Packard concludes, as a result that Innocent sanctioned the diversion: “Innocent III was not the only Pope to be allured by the hope of niting the Eastern and Western Churches, but he is the only one who used frankly military and political agencies for the purpose. ” Whether or not Innocent personally supported the diversion remains to be seen. The only hard evidence that exists points to the contrary. Regardless of Innocent’s views, young Alexius had promised 300,000 marks of silver for the crusading army if he were reinstated to his throne, and this proved to be too much for the poverty stricken army to reject. Gunther also describes that King Philip’s and Doge of Venice’s urging forced their hand, and they felt as though Alexius had been unfairly disinherited.
Because of these assertions, the crusaders “unanimously found in favor of the young man and promised him their aid. ” Innocent had sent mixed signals with his prohibitions, as the crusaders may have viewed the financial burden as extreme circumstances that warranted an attack on Constantinople. Innocent’s past history with Alexius III would suggest that the crusaders could not have possibly known that Innocent was opposed the taking of the city. 35 Ultimately with the insistence of the Venetians and secular leaders that Alexius the Younger retake his throne, the crusaders accepted the ultimate diversion from their quest or the Holy Land. Innocent III eventually stepped aside, ceasing his letters allowing the excursion to Constantinople to take place in July of 1203. Gunther describes that Alexius III attempted to attack the encampment of crusaders, but ultimately failed and fled. Alexius was helpless with the invading Latin invaders and sought flight in his hour of danger. Typical of Innocent’s stubbornness, he and Cardinal Capuano still expected, even with the diversion to Constantinople, that the army to continue their journey to the Holy Land. Innocent’s insistence on the completion of the Holy pilgrimage can be emonstrated by Innocent’s demand that Abbot Martin continue on to the Holy Land even after the sack of Constantinople. Innocent III stood to gain much from the successful placement of Alexius the Younger, now reigning as Alexius IV, onto the throne alongside his father Isaac II. Alexius IV wrote to Innocent in August 1203 that he viewed him as the “ecclesiastical head of Christendom” and that he wished for the submission of the Eastern Church to Innocent. Also with Alexius IV’s promised financial support the crusaders had a new life to pursue the Holy Land. Even so, Innocent III responded to Alexius IV’s notions by tating that without the support of St. Peter his reign would end swiftly. Innocent then directed the crusaders to repent from the sins of departing from the course of his crusade, and even threatened excommunication once again. Innocent called upon them to renew their plan to recover the Holy Land, a prize he valued even more highly than that of the return of the Church of Constantinople. Innocent, in letters to the bishops of Soissons and Troyes, questioned the view that the attack was a genuine attempt by the crusaders to unite the Latin and Greek Churches. Innocent instructed the bishops see to it that the enture into Constantinople ended well, and would not damage the mission of recovering the Holy Land. The Latin position in Constantinople was key to the completion of the crusade. Without the financial support promised by Alexius IV, the crusaders would not have the resources to continue on to the Holy Land. Their position came into question, when on August 19th, 1203, a Greek mob attacked the Latin army. This attack, and the several that followed came from growing frustration with the presence of this foreign army and Alexius’s support for them. The people of Constantinople’s disdain for the Latin nvaders complicated the situation for Alexius IV, because he could not make good on his promises for payment of the crusaders. The Greeks vehemently opposed such payment and his father Isaac II, believed that it was politically impossible to pay the crusaders. Alexius and Isaac could not admit this to the crusaders as without their protection, they would be overthrown. Alexius claimed poverty and sought a delay on his payment to the crusaders. As a result, the prospect of another war with Constantinople was on the rise, and the prospect of its success seemed dim as the city had rearmed itself after the first ttack. The leaders of the crusade began to realize that Alexius had turned on them, and that he would not meet his side of the bargain as laid out in the Treaty of Zara. According to the letters to and from the bishops of Soissons and Troyes, Innocent III was largely in the dark about the situation with Alexius IV and his refusal to pay the crusaders. 48 Innocent’s letters to the young emperor, warning of such actions, demonstrate that he would have been greatly troubled by the actions of Alexius IV. 47 Innocent III’s fears about the diversion to Constantinople were being realized and his crusading army as in great danger, but little is known about the Supreme Pontiff’s actual knowledge of events preceding the second siege of Constantinople. Without such knowledge there was little Innocent could do to shape events. The crusaders sent one last envoy to Alexius IV pleading for him to give them what he had promised, or else they would take what was theirs by force. Alexius IV denied the envoys payment and asked them to leave the city and never return. It appeared that the leader of the anti-Latin factions in Constantinople, Mourtzouphlus, had influenced the emperor to drive away the Latins. This was followed by frequent attempts o destroy the Venetian fleet by the Greeks, but to no avail. Eventually Mourtzouphlus overthrew Alexius IV, and promised his supporters that would rid the Greeks of the Latins within a week’s time. He deceived the crusaders about the death of Alexius IV, but news eventually reached the encampment that their former lord was no longer in control and that Mourtzouphlus ruled. His coup over Alexius IV would not stand as the crusaders prepared themselves for war. Under the cunning leadership of the Doge of Venice, the Venetian Fleet attacked the harbor, destroyed the Greek Fleet, and enabled the crusaders to scale the walls of the city.
They set the city ablaze and with the guidance of the Count of Flanders and the Marquis of Montferrat, the crusaders succeeded in taking the city on April 13th, 1204. The conquest of Constantinople would eventually lead to the disintegration of the Fourth Crusade, much to the disdain of Innocent III, but as is demonstrated throughout the unfolding of events in this second siege, there is little to no mention of Innocent’s involvement. Baldwin I, the Count of Flanders and the newly elected Latin Emperor of Constantinople, took it upon himself to inform the Holy Father in May of 1204 of the ramatic turn of events in Constantinople, promising that after the stabilization of his empire the crusade would continue toward its ultimate goal. Innocent III responded to the conquest of Constantinople with great joy. A Latin leader whom Innocent trusted was on the throne in Constantinople, rather than Alexius IV, whom Innocent distrusted as much as his uncle Alexius III. Innocent responded to Baldwin’s letters without mention of the possible excommunication he had threatened only a year before. Innocent agreed that this victory was a gift from God, and that the crusading army should focus on efense of the Latin empire in Constantinople in order to secure a path to Jerusalem. Innocent, however, reminded Baldwin to protect the ecclesiastical relics that were housed in Constantinople. In his letters to the crusaders in May of 1205, Innocent began to request a delay for the army’s journey to the Jerusalem, hoping to solidify the Latin claim in Constantinople. He even offered indulgences and remissions of sins for those crusaders who stayed to secure Baldwin’s empire. Innocent III had changed direction in his evaluation of events in Constantinople. While he had not condoned the action, he certainly did not condemn the conquest.
This change in position further changed the course of the Crusade, and the prospect of reaching the Holy Land was looking bleak at best. Innocent’s joy over the capture of Constantinople did not last, as he was horrified to learn of the plundering, looting and slaughter of fellow Christians. News of the horrid actions of the crusaders in Constantinople was followed by the realization of “open civil discord among the Christians” in the Holy Land. Bohemond IV, the Count of Tripoli, and King Leo II of Cilician Armenia were at odds over the territory in Antioch. In Adrianople, in April of 1205, a Vlacho-Bulgarian army defeated the crusading army nd Emperor Baldwin was captured. Shortly after, Peter Capuano released those who had defended the Latin Empire an additional year of their obligations with the crusade. With these events the Fourth Crusade quickly died without ever reaching the Holy Land. The failure of the Fourth Crusade can be attributed to a number of factors. Jane Sayers writes, “What was clear from this sorry affair was the failure of the pope and the legates to control the Crusade. ” Sayers is right in concluding this, as Pope Innocent III couldn’t control the crusade from Rome, and his papal legates, Cardinals Capuano and
Suffredo, largely were not present for many of the events of the Crusade. They both eventually left the army and continued on to the Holy Land at the direction of Pope Innocent III. How was Innocent to control the Crusade without his legates present? His miscommunication with his legates as factional strife struck Rome in 1203 also contributed to his inability to control the crusading army. Little to no communication occurred to thwart the diversion to Zara, and Capuano had little authority to actually influence the crusaders, since the Venetians were denying his authority as a legate. The ardiness of Innocent’s letters calling for the abandonment of expeditions to Zara and Constantinople complicated his ability to prevent the diversions. His lack of a clear position on both matters, with the vague provision that only under the most severe circumstances should attacks on fellow Christians be made, forced the crusaders to use their own judgment on conceding to Venetian demands. Another large factor contributing to the failure of the Fourth Crusade was the financial support of the crusaders or the lack thereof. Before the Crusade, Innocent sought a church-wide tax, and scoured all clerical resources in order to upport the Crusade. His inability to provide such resources, as well as his insistence that the crusaders use their own means to finance the Crusade, forced the crusaders to subject themselves to the directives of the Venetians. The crusaders had not the means to pay the Venetians for their naval fleet. Without other options they were forced into the attack on Zara, and heavily swayed into participating in the sieges on Constantinople. Innocent III did call for the Fourth Crusade, and involved himself in much of the early preparations. He also sought personal leadership over the crusading army, but ettled for directing the crusade through his legates. As communication between his legates and Rome dwindled, Innocent lost his grasp over the crusade and the extent of his influence was largely diminished. Innocent could not stop the attack on Zara and he didn’t manage any of the events of the first and second sieges on Constantinople. After the conquest of the city, Innocent could only stand by and watch as his dream of recovering the Holy Land unraveled. The extent of Pope Innocent III’s influence, such as his provisions on attacking Christians and the financial situation of the crusaders, was a ontributing factor to the failure of the Fourth Crusade. His changing positions on Constantinople also contributed to the failure of the crusade, as the crusaders and even Innocent took their eye off the ultimate prize of the Holy Land. Ultimately his inability to control the events of the Fourth Crusade heavily influenced the crusaders’ failure to reach the Holy Land. Works Cited Andrea, Alfred J. “The Registers of Innocent III. ” Contemporary Sources for the Fourth Crusade. Leiden: Brill, 2000. 11-12, 17-33, 39-52, 55-61, 69, 73-88, 90-91, 98-115, & 160-163. Print. Clari, Robert De, and Edgar Holmes McNeal. The Text. ” The Conquest of Constantinople. New York: Octagon, 1966. 38-42, 91-101, & 147-150. Print. Cole, Penny J. The Preaching of the Crusades to the Holy Land, 1095-1270. Cambridge, MA: Medieval Academy of America, 1991. 81-83. Print. Gress-Wright, David Richard. The Gesta Innocentii III: Text, Introduction and Commentary. N. p. : n. p. , 1981. Ch. 84. Print. Gunther, and Alfred J. Andrea. The Capture of Constantinople: The Hystoria Constantinopolitana of Gunther of Pairis. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1997. 38-39, 57-100, 106-111, & 116-117. Print. Innocent, Othmar Hageneder, and Anton Haidacher.
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