Canada’s first attempt to amend its Constitution, called the Meech Lake Accord, came to an end on June 30, 1990. This was not a result of a dramatic nationwide vote or attributed to one single cause. Instead, it was likened to a gradual demise caused by various unidentified factors. As one important person involved in the Accord pointed out, it perished due to “a death of a thousand cuts”[1]. While the exact causes for its failure remain undisclosed, the accumulation of these multiple setbacks ultimately led to its downfall.
The collapse of the Meech Lake Accord can be attributed to several factors. These include the inclusion of the “distinct society” clause in the Accord, the introduction of language legislation in Quebec in 1988, and the constitutional amending formula itself. To comprehend the failure of the Meech Lake Accord, it is necessary to analyze its evolution as a constitutional amendment and understand why its creation was deemed essential. The need for a constitutional amendment became certain in April 1982, when Queen Elizabeth II enacted the Constitution Act, 1982.
The new Canadian Constitution, which signified the termination of Canada’s colonial bond with Britain[2], was celebrated as a notable achievement for both the country and its Prime Minister, Pierre Trudeau. However, it ultimately resulted in conflict and division within Canada since it had been approved despite strong opposition from the Quebec government. The Parti Quebecois, which governed Quebec during the constitutional discussions in the early 1980s, had a main goal of attaining sovereignty for the province. If that failed, their objective was to establish Quebec as an independent entity apart from the rest of Canada.
Despite Quebec’s objections, Prime Minister Trudeau proceeded with signing legislation that would strengthen ties with Canada and make Quebec equal to every other Canadian province. He believes in provincial equality for the sake of a united nation. However, Quebec’s refusal to acknowledge its inclusion in the Constitution undermines the validity of the Constitution as a whole[3].
The necessity of introducing a constitutional amendment to include Quebec in the Constitution became inevitable for Canada. The opportunity for this amendment arose with the election of two important political figures: Brian Mulroney as Prime Minister of Canada in 1984 and Robert Bourassa as Premier of Quebec in 1985. Prime Minister Mulroney emphasized national reconciliation during his campaign and promised to incorporate Quebec into the Constitution in a speech in 1984.
Federalist Premier Bourassa came into power after a province tired from constant conflicts over sovereignty. In May 1986, at the request of Prime Minister Mulroney, Premier Bourassa presented a set of requirements for Quebec’s inclusion in the Canadian Constitution. These requirements included having a veto power over constitutional changes that could impact federal institutions, gaining more authority over immigration, the ability to opt out of federal spending programs related to provincial matters, being involved in nominating members of the supreme court, and acknowledging Quebec as a unique society[6].
Quebec has set the agenda for future constitutional reform, leading Prime Minister Mulroney to convene a meeting of provincial Premiers on April 30, 1987. The meeting, known as the First Ministers meeting, occurred at a federal government resort located on Meech Lake in the Gatineau Hills of Quebec[7]. The resulting agreement, known as the Meech Lake Accord, promised to provincialize all of Quebec’s demands except for the distinct society clause, which would be reserved exclusively for Quebec. In exchange, Quebec would officially accept the 1982 Constitution[8].
During a First Ministers meeting in Ottawa on June 2-3, 1987, the legal language of the Meech Lake agreement was formalized and signed by Prime Minister Mulroney and all ten provincial Premiers[9]. Following this, Quebec’s provincial legislature ratified the Accord on June 23, 1987. The ratification established a deadline of June 23, 1990 for every provincial parliament, the House of Commons, and the Senate to also ratify the amendment[10]. By spring of 1988, Alberta, Saskatchewan, and PEI had ratified the Accord as well. In September of that same year, the House of Commons voted in favor of it[11].
Shortly after, issues started to arise with the ratification of the Accord. Newly elected provincial governments in New Brunswick, Newfoundland, and Manitoba were led by Premiers who had not signed the original Accord and now wanted to negotiate terms before pledging their support. By early 1990, Prime Minister Mulroney realized that the Accord was at risk of not being ratified. In a final effort to gather support for the legislation, he called for a First Ministers meeting in Ottawa in June, right before the Accord’s deadline[12].
On June 23, 1990, the Meech Lake Accord faced opposition from Newfoundland and a technicality in Manitoba, resulting in its failure to be ratified[13]. The main reason for this failure was the clause acknowledging Quebec as a “distinct society” within the proposed amendment. Although the clause itself seemed harmless, it became contentious due to Quebec government’s refusal to define it, leaving room for interpretation[14].
Even Premier Bourassa‘s explanation, that the refusal to provide an explicit definition of “distinct society” prevented the courts from severely restricting its application, only reinforced the perception among Canadians that Quebec intended to use the clause to advance its agenda of promoting only one language. The federal government’s explanation of the distinct society clause did not offer much assistance and often added further confusion. Prime Minister Mulroney faced a challenging dilemma: how to convince French-speaking Quebecers that the inclusion of the clause was important, while simultaneously reassuring English Canada that it was merely a symbolic phrase with no real significance[15].
The issue with this marketing campaign that had two approaches was that both Quebec and the rest of Canada were not isolated from each other. The federal government couldn’t convince Quebec that the Accord provided numerous opportunities for the province without Ontario noticing the contradiction. Similarly, they couldn’t persuade Western Canadians that the Accord simply protected current political rights without Quebec realizing the downplaying.
Given the conflicting arguments from government officials, Canadians and Quebecers were unsure about whom or what to trust. The ambiguity of this significant and potentially influential statement spawned accusations and animosity from both factions. Quebecers particularly appreciated the symbolism of the statement as it reaffirmed their belief that Canada was established by two nations and two peoples: England and France, Anglophones and Francophones[17]. Quebec saw opposition to the Meech Lake Accord as being against Quebec, anti-French, and potentially racist.
The refusal to clearly define the meaning of Quebec’s “distinct society” in many parts of Canada, particularly in the West, led to the belief that it was not simply a recognition of the province’s unique social and cultural identity, as most Canadians already accepted, but rather a demand for special privileges. This clause, which became the source of much anger in English Canada towards the Accord, also upset people other than Anglophones who felt that Quebec was being granted a special status.
Minority and women’s groups, along with aboriginal peoples, were dissatisfied with their exclusion from the negotiations of the Meech Lake Accord. This further aggravated aboriginal leaders who were already upset about the failure of previous negotiations for aboriginal self-government. The ease with which the accord was negotiated emphasized Canada’s willingness to satisfy Quebec by designating them as “distinct,” while disregarding the indigenous people’s struggle for acknowledgement and legal standing.
Canadians began expressing their frustration as tensions increased, primarily through the public desecration of a Quebec provincial flag in Brockville, Ontario[21]. This hostile display left many Quebecers feeling betrayed, as they had previously voted in favor of remaining part of Canada during the 1980 sovereignty referendum[22] and were now willing to accept the Canadian Constitution. However, Canada was no longer willing to grant Quebecers their desired agreement, known as the Meech Lake Accord, in return for their commitment to unity.
The Accord’s downfall was caused by multiple factors. One of the main reasons was the federal government’s inability to clearly define the scope of the distinct society clause. This lack of definition led to a general sense of suspicion surrounding the clause, making its inclusion in the Accord contentious. Additionally, the exclusion of other special interest groups further fueled bitterness towards Quebec. Many factors played a role in the Accord’s demise during the ratification process, but the most detrimental event to both Meech Lake and French-English relations in Canada was Quebec’s language legislation introduced in December 1988.
Bill 178, also referred to as this legislation, required that all outdoor commercial signage be exclusively in French. Any signs in the province that contained English, even if it was of lesser importance compared to French, were considered illegal[23]. Its implementation sparked widespread controversy across Canada and reinforced worries about the “distinct society” clause, suggesting that Quebec might employ it to eradicate English from the province. Numerous individuals regarded it as unconstitutional since it violated both the Canadian Constitution and Quebec’s Charter of Rights[24].
The legality of the legislation was contested by multiple Quebec courts, as well as the Supreme Court of Canada. Nonetheless, Premier Bourassa employed the notwithstanding clause to delay the enforcement of the Supreme Court’s ruling for a duration of five years, citing apprehensions over a rise in nationalist feelings. This action was perceived as Quebec’s rejection of adhering to Canadian law and further fueled the existing anger within the nation.
Within Quebec, 67% of the population disagreed with Premier Bourassa’s use of the notwithstanding clause, resulting in the resignation of three esteemed cabinet ministers[26]. Additionally, during the Quebec language legislation controversy, public approval of the Accord dropped from 52% in June 1988 to 31% in January 1989[27]. The negative response extended beyond Quebec, with various municipalities in Ontario, including Sault Ste., experiencing backlash.
Marie and Thunder Bay, in an attempt to express their discontent with the Quebec language legislation[28], announced that they were unilingual. Although their intention may not have been to offend French Canadians, it is understandable why many interpreted it that way. Ontario was not the only province to react negatively towards Quebec. In response to growing frustration with the province, other regions of Canada began voicing their previous objections. The people of Manitoba, for instance, remembered losing an aircraft maintenance contract to Quebec despite a better proposal by a Winnipeg company[29].
The citizens of Newfoundland remembered their unfortunate deal with Hydro Quebec at Churchill Falls, which resulted in the loss of tens of millions of dollars in revenue. Overall, Canadians were weary of federal politicians appearing to give special treatment to Quebec in exchange for political backing[30]. In response to their pride being wounded by Ontario’s unilingual language laws and the increasing hostility in other parts of Canada, French Canadians in Quebec heightened their nationalist sentiments and rhetoric about sovereignty, just as Premier Bourassa was concerned about.
The Meech Lake Accord’s failure was ultimately caused by the 1988 language legislation introduced in Quebec, which greatly impacted public opinion and strained relations between Quebec and the rest of Canada. Additionally, the constitutional process for amending the Canadian Constitution was a primary factor in the Accord’s downfall. The negotiation procedure and ratification formula ensured that the Accord would fail, regardless of its content.
Meech Lake was negotiated within the context of executive federalism, which involves high level negotiations between top bureaucrats from both the provincial and federal governments[31]. This approach can be highly successful when there is a strong consensus among the parties and the constituents they represent[32]. However, in the case of Meech Lake, it proved to be disastrous due to the great public divide caused by the issue. The negotiations at Meech Lake were extremely secretive[33].
The original meeting was attended by only the ten First Ministers and Prime Minister Mulroney, who acted as mediator[34]. Aides, policy wonks, and legal experts were excluded from the negotiations, possibly to prevent their interference in the spirit of reconciliation among the ministers. The June 2-3, 1987 Langevin meetings had few officials present, which was necessary to work out the legal details of the amendment. In essence, those with the knowledge and expertise on how to structure and market an important amendment to the Canadian people were absent. If political experts had been present, it can be assumed that they would have addressed the landmine issue of Quebec’s “distinct society” either through definition or clarification. The secrecy extended to communication with the general public as well. There were few, if any, public consultations held prior to negotiating the Accord[36]. More concerning was that the Accord was presented as a “fait accompli”[37]. Canadians were informed that hearings regarding the proposed legislation could be held if desired but only “egregious errors” in the original Accord would be corrected[38].
Anger was sparked among Canadians due to their exclusion from the negotiation process, despite their significant contributions during the constitutional negotiations in 1980-82[39]. The mock hearings provided a platform for Canadians to express their concerns about Meech Lake, but their elected officials ignored or disregarded these concerns, leading to an increase in public resentment. Feeling that their opinions were irrelevant, Canadians directed their frustration and anger towards the Meech Lake Accord.
Despite damaging public opinion of the Accord, the exclusion of the general public in the negotiation process was not as detrimental to Meech Lake as the amending formula adopted by the federal government. The 1982 Constitution outlines various amending formulas depending on which section of the Constitution needs to be amended[40]. The general amending formula requires ratification in the Senate, the House of Commons, and two thirds of the provincial legislatures representing at least 50 percent of Canada’s population, within a three year time limit[41].
If the general amending formula had been used for Meech Lake, it is highly likely that the Accord would have been ratified. However, it was decided that unanimous ratification was required to amend the Canadian Constitution in such a significant manner[42]. This decision resulted in the politicization of the Accord and its exploitation as a tool for political advantage by those whose approval was needed for ratification. Candidates who campaigned against Meech Lake successfully won provincial elections in New Brunswick and Newfoundland, which took place after the Accord was negotiated[43]. They capitalized on the substantial decline in public support. Additionally, Premiers and their political parties realized that threatening to eliminate the Meech Lake legislation would give them substantial leverage during ongoing negotiations with the federal government on matters of provincial importance, such as federal transfer payments. The failure of the unanimity clause becomes apparent when you consider the statistics: even though the Accord was ratified by the House of Commons and eight provincial legislatures, representing 94 percent of the Canadian population, it still did not succeed[44].
According to Katherine Swinton, there appears to be a problem with the amending formula when an amendment can fail despite having widespread support[45]. The failure of Meech Lake had significant and lasting impacts on both Canadian constitution-making and Quebec’s relationship with the rest of Canada. It posed a serious threat to Canadian unity[46], as Quebec felt humiliated by what they saw as Canada’s rejection of them.
Following the demise of the Accord, there was a surge in separatist fervour, which led to the establishment of the Bloq Quebecois in the House of Commons. This political group consisted of eight members of parliament from different parties and was led by Lucien Bouchard[47]. The main objective of the Bloq was to gain sovereignty for Quebec from the rest of Canada, even if they had to use their political power in the Canadian federal government to achieve it. Meanwhile, conservative Western Canadians expressed their dissatisfaction with Quebec’s “special status” and Prime Minister Mulroney’s conciliatory approach by creating the Reform Party of Canada.
The Reform Party was founded on Western values and had a support base consisting of frustrated Canadians in Alberta and British Columbia. These individuals were tired of the injustices experienced by Western provinces due to the actions of Quebec and consecutive French-Canadian prime ministers. Surprisingly, a constitutional amendment aimed at strengthening Canadian nationalism ended up dividing Canada’s three-party system into five, with the two new federal parties being in direct opposition to each other and the rest of Canada.
The end of the Accord indicated the need for new Constitutional negotiations, which started in September 1990[49]. These negotiations led to the development of the Charlottetown Accord, which became crucial for federalist Canadians after Quebec passed a law that mandated a sovereignty referendum by the end of 1992[50]. The only way to prevent a successful sovereignty motion, considering the current political division and the growing separatist movement, was to approve a constitutional amendment that included Quebec[51].
Regrettably, the time constraints imposed to draft the amendment resulted in the disregard for valuable lessons learned from Meech Lake. Although the federal government acknowledged that the Accord’s creation process, conducted in secrecy, was a major factor contributing to Canadians’ dissatisfaction, they still neglected to conduct legislative hearings or seek input from influential interest groups that played a crucial role in shaping public opinion[52].
Furthermore, the Charlottetown Accord addressed national matters such as the distribution of power between the federal and provincial governments. However, the contentious distinct society clause, which was strongly opposed by many Canadians, was still included in the Constitution. Additionally, the ratification process was modified to a national referendum, which was favored by populist Canadians. Nonetheless, the legislation required approval from a majority of citizens in each province for it to be ratified.
The Meech Lake process was marred by political hostage-taking, but the referendum prevented the same from happening during the Charlottetown Accord. However, despite receiving strong national popular support, the requirement for unanimous provincial majorities meant that the Charlottetown Accord could still fail. The flaws in the Charlottetown constitutional reform process were evident, and it failed to gain the support of Canadians, ultimately being rejected in a national referendum on October 26, 1992. Unfortunately, the lessons from the Meech Lake process were disregarded, and the consequences were faced.
While initially intended to integrate Quebec into the Canadian Constitution, the effort has turned into a tense standoff: Canada struggles to ratify a constitutional amendment that will satisfy Quebec, and Quebec fails to obtain the required majority for sovereignty. The collapse of the Meech Lake Accord has undoubtedly influenced future constitutional reform, the sovereignty movement in Quebec, and French-English relations at large.
The failure of the Meech Lake Accord has had a significant impact on shaping Canada as we know it, and its effects may continue for generations. The distinct society clause, Quebec’s unilingual language legislation, and the constitutional amending formula used are the primary causes of this failure. (Monahan, Patrick, p.12) The book “Meech Lake and Shifting Canadian Federalism” provides further insight into this topic. (p.8, p.9, p.10, p.15, p.59) Another source, “The Two Canadas,” also discusses the implications of the Meech Lake Accord.(p.75, p.76) Additionally, “Improving the Process of Constitutional Reform” delves into the issues surrounding this failure.(p.317, p.320) After the Meech Lake Accord’s failure, there have been discussions about sovereignty association.(p.26) The importance of outsiders and insiders in constitution-making is also highlighted.(p.S136) With 40% supporting sovereignty association and 60% against it, these divisions in opinion have fueled further debates.(p.40) (Two Canadas) The book “Why Meech Failed” offers additional analysis on this topic.(p.10, p.45, p.8)
Two Canadas [26]
Why Meech Failed (8-9) [27]
Why Meech Failed (8) [28]
Two Canadas (78) [29]
Why Meech Failed (12) [30]
Two Canadas (78) [31]
Getting Things Done in the Federation (5) [32]
Getting Things Done in the Federation (4) [33]
Getting Things Done in the Federation (6) [34]
Meech Lake and Shifting Canadian Federalism (S21) [35]
Meech Lake and Shifting Canadian Federalism (S21) [36]
Meech Lake and Shifting Canadian Federalism (S21) [37]
Meech Lake and Shifting Canadian Federalism (S22) [38]
Improving the Process of Constitutional Reform (319) [39]
The Charter, Interest Groups, Executive Federalism, and Constitution Reform (23) [40]
Amending the Canadian Constitution (141) [41]
Amending the Canadian Constitution (141) [42]
The Two Canadas (76) [43]
Improving the Process of Constitutional Reform (320) [44]
Amending the Canadian Constitution (145) [45]
Amending the Canadian Constitution (145) [46]
The Two Canadas (72) [47]
The Two Canadas (81-82) [48]
The Two Canada (83) [49]
Improving the Process of Constitutional Reform (321) [50]
Amending the Canadian Constitution (165) [51]
Amending the Canadian Constitution (165) [52]
Improving the Process of Constitutional Reform (327) [53]
Amending the Canadian Constitution (155) [54]
Improving the Process of Constitutional Reform (327)
