On November 13th, 2010, Aung San Suu Kyi, a pro-Democratic political leader in Myanmar was released from house arrest after 15 years of imprisonment. On November 12th, 2010, one day before her release, a group of her supporters gathered outside her home, holding portraits of her, and wearing t-shirts with the words “We stand with Aung San Suu Kyi’fl‘ Her anticipated release caught Western attention and was eagerly awaited by citizens of Myanmar. Her original placement under house arrest had come one year after the “8/8/88 Uprising”, which was preceded by a series of pro-Democratic protests against military rule and riots in August of 1988, peaking on August 8, 1988, with the crackdown by the military on the demonstrators and the loss of almost 3,000 of those demonstrator’s lives. An examination of the history of political and military power in the state of Myanmar in the years leading up to the arrest and later release ofAung San Suu Kyi from house arrest helps us to comprehend the importance of this event.
This essay will discuss the nature of personalized political power in Myanmar, as well as the dominating presence of military power in politics and society, and how those two influences together allowed an authoritarian government in Myanmar to obtain power, and keep it Personalized power in Myanmar also provided a platform for a pro-Democratic political uprising, symbolized by the charismatic leadership of Suu Kyi of the National League for Democracy (”NLD”) Aclose analysis of both personalized and military power in Myanmar reveals that used together this structure has successfully suppressed dissidents and kept power in the hands of an authoritarian few, even as the country faces extreme economic hardship and despite the people‘s strong desire for democratic change.
Historically, one way that political power is held is by individual people. Even since the eleventh century, in the days of Myanmar’s Pagan kings, loyalties and power were given to the individual ruler, rather than the power deriving from the position itself,Z It was not uncommon, even after stepping down from a position of political power, for a particular individual to still have a large amount of influence over their followers, or even the institutions of government directly. This patriarchal power construct is present in and demonstrated by modern day Myanmar leaders such as Ne Win, the founder of the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), and the de facto leader of Myanmar for 26 years. General Ne Win, a revolutionary in his time, took power in Myanmar in a military coup d’etat in 1962, which lead to the formation of the BSPP.
His individual authority was solidified by military-backed authoritarian rule. His power was personalized in the sense that he surrounded himself by highly loyal military associates who ensured his continued authority. For example, Win kept control of the Fourth Burma Rifles, a regiment in the Myanmar military, comprised only of his closest friends and acquaintances to enforce his will. Also, in removing a rival, Tin 00 from military intelligence, he also removed all men thought to be associated with Tin Oo.‘ The role of personalized power is aptly demonstrated by Ne Win’s continued influence over the Myanmar government even after he was supposed to have retired in 1988. Evidence suggested that Ne Win was still consulting with State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) officials, the group that was responsible for suppressing the pro-democratic movement in the 1988 massacre of demonstrators and which took political control thereafter. Win demonstrates the personalized power coupled with militarized power — being able to establish power in office by elevating his comrade’s status and terminating the jobs of his enemies, using the threat of military might and remaining influential even when not in office — that characterizes Myanmar‘s rule.
The rapid growth and use of Myanmar’s military, after the 8/8/88 demonstrations reinforced the military’s political role, particularly with the creation of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC),5 The SLORC, though a political organization, is comprised of almost all military officers.6 By 1995, the SLORC aided and guided by its dominant leaders General Saw Maung and General Khin Nyunt, had expanded the size of the military by 170,000 to 300,000 men, and by the year 2000, they had planned to expand to about 475,000 men,7 After Ne Win’s coup d’etat in 1962, army resources were divided, but through reparations, twenty seven new battalions formed, and by 1988, the Myanmar military consisted of 165 regular infantry battalions, two armored battalions, four artillery battalions, and one light anti-aircraft artillery battalion.“ The person in charge of all the battalions was the highest ranking military officer, which placed enormous power in the hands of one official, bearing incredible similarities to the personalized power construct.
The practice of using personalized power and military power in unison, such that military power acts as an extension of personalized power, demonstrates how the military junta has been able to suppress dissidents in Myanmar for decades. Calculated suppression of political dissent, by the authoritarian government of Myanmar, is clearly a product of both personalized and military power. Opposition in Myanmar has been effectively suppressed not only by the jailing and imprisonment under house arrest of dissident leaders like Aung San Suu Kyi, but by the fundamental elimination of independent branches of Wmar Army Since 1988: Acquisitions and Adjustments,” Contemporary Southeast Asia government, the purging of competent public servants in favor of loyal followers, by preventing elected leaders from performing their duties and by the signing of truces with minority groups in an effort to placate them and suppress revolt of the periphery of the country.
Additionally, traditional sources of independent thought and action, university campuses, were simply closed by military leaders with the result both of preventing student protests and depriving the country of trained professionals capable of leading Myanmar through economic crisis, Military leaders responded by selling off the country’s natural resources with an initial boom and then economic bust result Foreign leaders in an effort to obtain reform against human rights abuses, imposed economic sanctions against the country, Military leaders incapable of understanding and implementing economic change or real political reform continued Myanmar’s steady decline. In response to foreign pressures, the authoritarian government in Myanmar formed a “mass—based political organization” which aimed to legitimize the position of the existing power structure and its leaders.”
One of the often repeated pledges of Myanmar’s military government in response to foreign pressure about reaching a compromise with the National League for Democracy (who had been elected in 1990 but whose result was annulled by SLORC) was that power would be transferred to an elected government once the country completed a new constitution. The government then sought to delay the writing and implementation of any such constitution, Instead, it built tip its own political organization in an effort to weaken the influence of the NLD. However, Myanmar’s leaders continued its tactics of suppression. Protests that were meant to parallel the events of the ”8/8/88” uprising, on “9/9/99” were effectively quelled by a “pre-emptive strike” in which “thejunta vowed to ‘annihilate’ any agitator’i” Aung San Suu Kyi as the imprisoned leader of the National League for Democracy continued to be a strong symbol for pro»Democracy dissidents. Despite her many years of house arrest, when the military junta released her at the end of her term in 2002, expecting that she no longer had a strong following because of her absence, they were proved wrong.
Suu Kyi was greeted by large crowds of supporters wherever she went. She was soon returned to house arrest to suppress the resurgence of a pro-democracy movement. Simultaneously, the junta was working on building its own political party to legitimize their authority.‘2 By August of 2009, Suu Kyi’s house arrest sentence was coming to a close, but was extended by 18 months, until after elections sponsored by the military government could take place, Aung San Suu Kyi‘s house arrest served the purpose that the military junta desired: it suppressed the radical ideas of the NLD, but it did not martyrize her, which would have provided a catalyst for revolution. Restricting democratic ideas through the continued long-term house arrest of Suu Kyi allowed for the regime to maintain power for decades, establish a “legitimate” civilian backed party and see that party elected while still maintaining single party rule, resulting in no power shift. Her release in 2010 under these circumstances, granted the Myanmar government relief from foreign political pressure without inordinate fear that their power could be taken.
Aung San Suu Kyi, herself an example of personalized political power (her legitimacy as a political figure derives from the fact that her father helped to lead and form Burma’s army during its struggle for independence from the United Kingdom in 1947) has consistenLly remained a strong symbol for the pro»democratic movement. However, her release from house arrest in 2010 to smaller crowds of followers was significant in that it demonstrated that though the hope of democracy was still strong amongst many of the people of Myanmar, its strength had been jeopardized by the deeply embedded political power of the military government Suu Kyi’s popularity itself seemed reduced as did realistic attainment of a truly democratically elected civilian government Suu Kyi continues to work towards democratic principles and to challenge the authority of a civilian government dominated by military personnel. It remains to be seen whether, by the strength of her own personalized power, Suu Kyi can move Myanmar towards legitimate democracy.
