Beccaria and the Age of Enlightenment During the 18th century, a movement of intellectual change swept throughout Europe and eventually the rest of the known world. People of modern thought believed that human reason could be used to combat ignorance, superstition, and tyranny and to build a better world. These enlightened thinkers combined logic with something they called “reason” which consisted of common sense, observation, and their own unacknowledged prejudices in favor of skepticism and freedom ( The Enlightenment, Paul Brians, 5/18/2000).
One of these intellectuals, Cesare Beccaria, had a lasting impact on the Enlightenment views of the justice system in Europe. In his treatise Crimes and Punishments, he argued for a clear interpretation of the laws for all citizens and a more concrete system in which the laws were based. He saw a need for mass reforms in what was considered a crime and in the way the punishments were handed out for those crimes.
Beccaria also showed that through knowledge and education, crimes could be prevented, therefore decreasing the need for punishments overall. These proposals for reform were based on the ideals of the Enlightenment; that all individuals possess freewill, have equal ability to be enlightened, and the human motive of rational self-interest. While Beccaria believed in the need for a criminal justice system and the right of the government to have laws and punishments, he did not view the current system to be a successful one.
He felt that the government and its laws at the time were just a “few remnants of the laws of an ancient predatory people, compiled for a monarch who ruled twelve centuries ago in Constantinople, mixed subsequently with Longobardic tribal customs, and bound together in chaotic volumes of obscure and unauthorized interpreters” (Beccaria, pg. 3). He also felt that criminal laws should be based on rational thought and not passions. He stated that many of the current laws were just “a mere tool of the passions of some, or have arisen from an accidental and temporary need” (Beccaria, pg. 8).
He believed that an educated and enlightened man should create the laws for the entire society that would lead to the “greatest happiness shared by the greatest number” (Beccaria, pg. 5). Beccaria also saw the importance of change in the language in which all laws were written at that time. Laws in most of Europe were written in Latin, which by that time was already a dead language, making it even more difficult for poorer citizens to understand. He stated that this custom took away the public access and turned it into a private affair that only the wealthy could use to their benefit.
Beccaria argued that for the peasantry, “this placed them at the mercy of a handful of men, for they cannot judge for themselves the prospect of their own liberty or that of others. ” (Beccaria, pg. 13). Beccaria viewed the government as a social contract between the state and its people. This way of thinking gave him the ability to shift the power of the state away from the traditional authorities of government and church, to the people’s representatives and the one creating laws based on reason.
He argued that the law of the state should bind all members of society equally and that punishments ought to be the same for the highest class as well as the lowest class. In this way, the laws would define crime as a breach of the social contract and not of morality. Beccaria thought that the characteristics that defined certain crimes were based too much on morality and religious sin, leaving too much room for differences in interpretation. In crimes of violence, Beccaria felt all too often the aristocrats of society were able to buy their way out of punishment.
He stated “neither the great nor the rich should be able to atone for an attempt against the weak and the poor by means of a cash payment. Otherwise riches, which, under the supervision of the law, are the reward of industry, become the food of tyranny” (Beccaria, pg. 38). Beccaria argued that all crimes against persons should be punished with corporal penalties, no matter what status in society. He also argued that not all cases of debt were caused by the same intentions and that the circumstances should determine the penalty. He believed that “it is important, however, to distinguish the fraudulent from the innocent bankrupt. (Beccaria, pg. 64). In other words, he felt that some instances of debt were unavoidable for the poor and therefore, should not be punished in the same way as those instances made through fraud. Punishing the innocent bankrupt in the same way as a counterfeiter would only compound the problem by creating more debt for the downtrodden. Beccaria again points out that the guiltiness should be found using rational fixed laws, as he stated “The distinction between serious and slight faults, however, should be fixed by blind and impartial laws, not by the dangerous and arbitrary discretion of judges. (Beccaria, pg. 65) During the 18th century, suicide was also considered a crime, which often punished the family of the deceased. Beccaria thought this to be an unfair practice that only punished innocent members of society. He argued that “punishment could only fall upon the innocent or upon a cold and insensible corpse” and since the government cannot punish after death, that right is left with God. The purpose of punishment, Beccaria believed, was to prevent the criminal from causing more damage to society, and to prevent others from committing the same crime.
He discussed in his treatise the issues of the justice system that were in most need of reform. He saw the need for change in the role the courts play in obtaining justice through arrests, trials, imprisonment and the use of the death penalty. His reforms called for a set of laws that were clear and not left up to the interpretation of the judges. The reforms also defined judges as “impartial searchers of truth” and forbid them from becoming apart of the Treasury, so they could not make money off the convictions of those arrested.
Beccaria also called for changes in laws governing the rights of the offender once arrested. He saw the need for detaining in jail those accused of crimes until conviction, but opposed the practice of leading or suggestive questioning in trial. Beccaria also believed oaths to be useless, and that “every judge can be my wittiness that no oath ever make any criminal tell the truth” (pg. 29), and he wrote that “it is frivolous to insist that women are too weak to be good witnesses” (pg. 22).
When detaining those accused of a crime, he saw it more just to give ones charged with harsher crimes less time in trial, but more time in prison if found guilty. Those charged with lesser offenses should be given longer time in trial, but less time in prison if convicted. This proposal came from his belief that the offender of a harsh crime is more likely to be found not guilty, and therefore should only be detained in jail for the minimum Beccaria had very strong views against the use of torture.
He argued that the use of torture in order to obtain a confession made an innocent man suffer a punishment he did not deserve or was not yet proved. He believed that torture also made a weak person more likely to confess to a crime than a strong person, without actually committing a crime. A confession from torture therefore should not be valid since an innocent man might confess just to end the pain. Confessions obtained with torture might make a weak, innocent individual suffer punishment he did not deserve, or possibly allow a strong, but guilty man go free.
Beccaria had many things to write concerning the principles of punishment if once an individual was found guilty of committing a crime. He believed that in order to be effective, punishments must be prompt and certain. He stated that, “the certainty of a punishment, even if it be moderate , will always make a stronger impression than the fear of another which is more terrible but combined with the hope of impunity” (Beccaria, pg. 58). He argued that building a connection between the crime and the punishment it was essential that the punishment be prompt.
He wrote in his treatise that “the more promptly and the more closely punishment follows upon the commission of a crime, the more just and useful will it be”(Beccaria, pg. 55). Beccaria was also strongly opposed to the death penalty. He felt that a laborious loss of liberty was harsher than a quick death and stated that this barbaric practice ” seems to me absurd that the laws , which are an expression of the public will, which detest and punish homicide, should themselves commit it, and that to deter citizens from murder they order a public one” (Beccaria, pg. 0). Beccaria viewed the death penalty, while not only cruel and excessive punishment, was also an ineffective tool in reducing the amount of crime. Beccaria believed “it is better to prevent crimes than to punish them”. (Beccaria, pg. 74). The prevention of crime should be the main goal of any government, which brings the greatest happiness to the greatest amount of people. He argued that the best way to prevent crime was through the open knowledge of the law, education, and limiting the power of the magistrates.
He stressed the importance of laws being clear and known; because he believed a rational person cannot make the rational choice not to commit an act if he or she does not know that the act is prohibited. He stated that, “when the number of those who can understand the sacred code of laws and hold it in their hands increases, the frequency of crimes will be found to decrease, for undoubtedly ignorance and uncertainly of punishments adds much to the eloquence of the passions” (pg. 17). Beccaria also argued that in order to help prevent crime, the body of magistrates or judges must be increased.
By adding more individuals to this group, it no longer can be a small private club where the members only look out for themselves and each other. Beccaria stated that “the greater the number of men who constitute such a body, the less the danger of encroachments on the law will be, for venality is more difficult among magistrates who keep watch on one another, and their interest in increasing their personal authority is less to the degree that the share of power that would come to each of them is smaller” (Beccaria, pg. 98).
