In 1978, President Jimmy Carter invited President Anwar Sadat of Egypt and Prime Minister Menachem Begin of Israel to a meeting at Camp David in Maryland’s Catoctin Mountains. The purpose of this meeting was to address the thirty-year war between Egypt and Israel, which centered around the West Bank of the Jordan River and the Gaza Strip. Both nations claimed rights to this land – Israel based on biblical reasons and Egypt based on political grounds. Carter acted as mediator between Sadat and Begin in an attempt to establish a peace agreement called the Camp David Accord. The success of this accord was crucial for both leaders as it would determine their reputations and impact their countries’ futures. Additionally, it had the potential to inspire neighboring Middle Eastern countries to seek similar agreements.
A successful summit faced numerous challenges. Firstly, there was a deep-rooted animosity and mistrust between President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin. Additionally, external forces exerted significant pressure, hindering prompt resolutions to longstanding historical conflicts in the region (Mideast 26). Lastly, there was a hope that President Carter could disregard the psychological assessments conducted by the CIA on both Begin and Sadat, as their influence could have negatively impacted his mediation abilities.
The enduring hostility between Sadat and Begin was not personal, but rather based on political disparities between their nations. Israel contended for its rightful possession of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, citing the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 and its religious significance as God’s promised land to Moses for the Jewish people. Conversely, Egypt asserted ownership over these territories by virtue of Egyptian citizens residing there during Israel’s formation, thus asserting Egypt’s legitimate claim.
Before the summit, detailed psychological profiles of both Sadat and Begin were provided to the President by the CIA (Blitzer 48). The American delegates emphasized the importance of understanding the mindset of the Egyptian and Israeli leaders in order to make any progress (Blitzer 48).
The organizers of the Camp David meetings decided to have a completely unstructured format, lacking even an agenda to initiate discussions. (Three 227) This approach aimed to foster a more open and fluid exchange of thoughts and ideas.
At the start of the summit, Rosalynn Carter, President Carter’s wife, acknowledged that the three men shared a common trait: their strong religious beliefs (Blitzer 48). Mrs. Carter proposed that the summit commence with a prayer. On September 6, 1978, as the summit commenced, the three leaders issued a prayer for global peace, stating: “Acknowledging the seriousness of the challenges before us, we place our faith in the God of our ancestors, seeking wisdom and guidance.” (Mideast 29) Thus, the Camp David summit began. Initially, both Sadat and Begin seemed open to engaging in direct, face-to-face discussions regarding the pressing issues. This willingness could be inferred from their presence at this stage of the summit. However, it soon became apparent that convening a three-way meeting between President Carter and the two leaders would be unproductive. In the first ten days of the summit, Sadat and Begin only had two meetings together, which totaled seven hours (Mideast 26).
This was primarily because of some disagreements between the two leaders. Sadat insisted that Israel agree to eventually remove its military forces and civilian settlements from all occupied Arab land, with a focus on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Furthermore, he proposed that the 1.1 million Palestinians residing in these areas have the right to decide their governing body.
Begin argued that Israel’s historical and biblical right to the West Bank justified the presence of Israeli troops in the occupied territory for ensuring national security. Additionally, Israel opposed the establishment of a Palestinian area that could potentially become an independent state, although Begin had proposed limited self-governance for Arabs in that region. In order to facilitate the peace process, President Carter held separate meetings with Sadat and Begin. However, Begin’s attitude during these meetings surprised Carter and his negotiating team. While he was willing to compromise on certain matters, he remained steadfast on other issues that were expected to be easily resolved. For example, Begin insisted on maintaining Israel’s existing settlement in the Sinai Desert, but appeared open to discussing Israeli control over the West Bank without waiting for five years to address the issue of sovereignty in the region. (Mideast 26)
Sadat, however, desired a specific agreement that would appease the Arabs who suspected him of betraying their cause. His desired agreement included a stipulated schedule for the restoration of Arab sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Throughout this transition period, the two ethnic regions would enjoy local self-government autonomy, but with a restricted Israeli military presence (Szulc 13).
Despite the deadlock revolving around this main point, Carter continued with his one-on-one meetings which were considered the savior of the summit. With Sadat’s demands for significant decisions and Begin’s thorough investigation of almost every point, the conferences seemed to prolong indefinitely. The American delegates had to revise the compromised proposals multiple times between sessions before gaining agreement from both Sadat and Begin (Mideast 29).
At the end, the agreement that was presented (see attached copy) served as a foundation for further negotiations, aiming to finalize a peace treaty within three months from the signing of this agreement (Camp 43). Consequently, Begin eventually embraced the new terms, despite initially deeming them improbable (Blitzer 48). Given Begin’s strong belief in the impact of words, this agreement posed a challenge to attain. Ultimately, all parties involved sought to ascertain how these words would be implemented in reality in the upcoming months and years (Blitzer 48).
The significance of the meetings at Camp David should be viewed in terms of their accomplishments rather than what was not achieved. The agreement reached by the two leaders went beyond being a mere framework for peace; it marked the first step in a long process. Many doubted that this process would ever happen, but it led to many subsequent discussions that ultimately played a part in the relative peace we see in that region today. In essence, Camp David set the groundwork for starting positive dialogue among people. From praying together to working towards lasting peace, the journey of these three men progressed (Blitzer 48).
Works Cited
- Blitzer, Wolf. Notes on Camp David. Atlas World Press Review Nov. 1978: 48.
- Camp David Accords, The. Current History Jan. 1978: 31,43.
- Israel Map. 1997. The University of Texas at Austin. 19 April 1999 http://www.lib.utexas.edu/Libs/PCL/Map_collection/middle_east_and_asia/ Israel_sm97.gif. Mideast Tangle. U.S. News & World Report 25 Sept. 1978: 26,29.
- Move in the Chess Game, A. Time 21 Aug. 1978: 24-26.
- Szulc, Tad. Fuzzy Frameworks. The New Republic 179 (1978): 12-14,16.
- Three Men on a Mountain. Editorial. The Nation 227 (1978): 227-228. Category: History
