Alexander II introduced a number of reforms that were quite revolutionary for that period of time. Many historians therefore believe that Alexander II deserves the title “Tsar Liberator.” Views of Alexander II do, however, differ to a great extent. When regarding Alexander II, Saunders says, “His enthusiasm for change lasted a mere four years. It may be that his reputation as the ‘Tsar Liberator’ is ill-deserved.”
This strongly suggests that Alexander II was not a liberator. However, as Bideleux says, “Alexander II came to be known as the ‘Tsar Liberator’ on account of his resoluteness in freeing millions of Russian serfs through the 1861 Emancipation Act.” Although Alexander II did free serfs, this does not solely justify the title ‘Tsar Liberator.’ Alexander may have freed the peasants, but it wasn’t complete freedom. Many historians believe that Alexander II cannot be called a “Tsar Liberator” as he did not pass reforms out of a genuine desire to liberate, but to remain in power and keep the peace instead.
Historians also argue that Alexander II remained a very determined autocrat who was not willing to let go of his inherited autocratic powers. There is no doubt that Alexander was not willing to let go of his autocratic powers, and although he made significant reforms in areas such as education and the military, he was not a liberator.
Alexander has been called a liberator due to his reforms of serfdom. It is important to realize that serfdom was an economic institution and an instrument of social control that had been seen as the norm. Therefore, for Alexander II to change this system can be seen as a liberal reform. However, when you look closer at the terms of the emancipation edict, it looks less like liberation. This is due to the fact that the peasants had to pay redemption fees for 49 years and never gained sufficient land for their needs.
Equally, the reasons behind emancipation were not to liberalize the peasantry. Only through emancipation could Russia modernize following the disastrous failure that was the Crimean War. If this was the only reason behind Alexander II’s decision and not to liberate, one may have difficulty in describing Alexander II as a “Tsar Liberator.”
One reason why Alexander II’s title as “Tsar Liberator” is called into question is the controversy regarding redemption payments. The major difficulty was the charging of redemption payments to compensate the nobility for the loss of land and labor, which was part of the emancipation edict. Redemption fees were a major financial burden on the peasants, and critics use this to prove that the Emancipation was a failure. “The sovereign has betrayed the hopes of the people; the freedom he has given them is not real and is not what the people dreamed of.” This implies that Alexander II was not a liberator because they were not fully liberated.
However, Bideleux disputes this and presents statistics that redemption dues came down to about 2% of agricultural output. Bideleux implies that the redemption fees were not as harsh, thus Alexander II may be seen as a liberator. These statistics by Bideleux are somewhat selective as, in the fertile black soil regions of Ukraine, no doubt these figures were feasible, but this was not the case in many other areas where redemption fees were onerous.
Therefore, on balance, redemption fees were a major factor in the Emancipation edict not being a true liberation. Without the means to be financially and economically independent, many peasants could not be called liberated.When considering the extent to which Alexander II was a liberator, historians do not question the liberation of the peasants from landowners.
They question the terms of the Emancipation edict itself. Zaionchkovsky says, “There can be no doubt that the reform defrauded the peasants… the most onerous conditions of all were the terms of redemption… the allotments obtained by the private peasant through the reform were for the most part entirely inadequate…” (3).
Zaionchkovsky wrote this in 1978 as a Soviet historian during Communist rule. He is therefore unlikely to be supportive of reforms undertaken by the Tsarist regime. Bideleux, contradicting this interpretation, says, “Overall, in 43 provinces of Eastern Russia, serfs received 96% of the land that they previously farmed for their use” (1).
This implies that Alexander II was a liberator because the peasants gained land, but he isn’t showing the full picture as he only talks about 43 provinces in Eastern Russia and not Russia as a whole. Bidelux also fails to mention that “the ‘cut offs’ withheld by landlords were particularly large in the fertile ‘black earth’ regions and were a source of intense and lasting bitterness” (2).
Although Bideleux attempts to show Alexander II as a liberator, it can be clearly seen that Alexander II’s emancipation edict was not liberation. As David Saunders says, “peasants nevertheless remained the poorest and the most heavily exploited section of the population” (3). Overall, it appears that a large number of peasants did feel cheated by the Emancipation.
The main problem was the allocation of land, and it could be said that peasants found the land that they were given was insufficient for their needs and many found the redemption fees onerous. Some peasants did noticeably benefit from the Emancipation, such as the Kulaks, but the majority didn’t. It appears that Alexander II’s edict did fall short in many areas, and although ‘free,’ serfs had no economic freedom to allow truly independent lives. Thus, to call Alexander II a liberator on the basis of his emancipation edict does seem to be unjust.
Alexander II has been called a liberator due to the Emancipation edict, which gave freedoms to marry and freedom from ownership. However, these freedoms were undermined by the powers of the Mir. The Mir’s main roles were the collection of taxes, including redemption payment, and also the redistribution of land. Critics say that in some respects, the Mir replaced the landlord in terms of controlling personal freedom, as Watson says, “their personal freedom of movement and choice of occupation were tightly constrained by the commune (Mir)” (1).
Evans and Jenkins say that the commune “replaced the gentry in terms of controlling the lives of peasants and their independence” (1), suggesting that Alexander II was not a liberator.
However, others argue that as it was peasant elders controlling the commune and therefore other peasants, at least peasants were controlling themselves. However, there is no doubt that even with the powers of the Mir, the serfs generally had more personal freedom after Emancipation, although in terms of prosperity, they may not have seen any improvement.
Therefore, aspects of Alexander II’s emancipation edict were liberating, notably the creation of the peasant commune, but only to a certain extent. The emancipation didn’t give economic liberation, which means that Alexander II’s claim as a liberator must be questioned.
When you compare Alexander II’s emancipation edict to the emancipation of the American Negro, the case against calling Alexander II a ‘Tsar liberator’ is however strengthened. This is supported by Seton Watson, who states that the 1861 edict was “a great achievement when compared to the Emancipation of the American Negro.” Seton Watson is writing this comparison favorably, and one can draw comparisons between the two events.
Both emancipations occurred at similar points in the 19th century. However, like Alexander II’s emancipation edict, Abraham Lincoln’s liberation of America’s Negroes perhaps was notional freedom. Although the American Negro was free to marry, to travel, and free from any form of ownership, he was still without freedoms enjoyed by most white Americans. American Negroes were liberated but not given economic and political rights to make this liberation work in practice.
Indeed, when set against the American model, Alexander II’s edict has similarities. Both Russian serfs and American slaves were free but lacking economic independence. Negroes were denied the vote in many cases while serfs lived in an autocracy. But to compare the 1861 edict favorably, as Seton Watson does, is perhaps to miss a vital difference. Lincoln was not liberating American slaves to achieve industrial progress or to keep the lid on unrest, which could overthrow autocratic power. His driving force was one of morality and therefore Lincoln perhaps meets the title ‘Tsar Liberator’ more fully than Alexander II.
A reform that suggests that Alexander does deserve the title ‘Tsar liberator’ was the setting up of Zemstvos. However, there are different interpretations concerning the reform, as W. Mosse describes, “With the Emancipation law, the authority of these hereditary police masters disappeared; measures had to be taken to replace it.” To call the aristocracy “hereditary police masters” is extreme, but the point that there was a need for a decision-making body regionally was very true.
However, as Watson says, “The local knowledge of the Zemstvos enabled them to do a good job,” and was not just replacing the roles of “hereditary police masters.” Mosse says “the new Zemstvo statute was the logical and inevitable outcome… the ‘consolation prize’ offered to the nobility for the losses of 1861.” Although a lot of the previous landowners were a part of the Zemstvos, it is rather critical of Mosse to say that the Zemstvos were created to keep the landowner and aristocracy content with the Tsar.
It is worth noticing the Zemstvos made a number of reforms in education, making it a liberal reform and not just the consolidation prize to the aristocracy after the Emancipation edict. However, this reform could be seen to be less of a liberation because Alexander II declined to create a national assembly based upon the local Zemstvos. “When petitioned by the Moscow Zemstva, the Tsar replied that these were senseless dreams.”
This refers to the case when the Moscow Zemstvo asked for a national Parliament. This shows us the limitations of him being a liberator as he was not willing to let go of his autocratic powers. However, the creation of Zemstvos can be seen as the start of self-government by the people of Russia. What it resulted in was the beginning of liberation, and therefore Alexander II may be called a liberator by some, but due to the unintentional nature of this reform, it does not prove the case that Alexander II was a liberator.
Education reforms were a quite liberal move by Alexander II, as W. Mosse says, “In 1856, elementary schools in the empire numbered about 8,000. By 1880, the number reached 23,000 in European Russia alone.” This statement by Mosse seems to be correct to an extent, as the amount of money that was spent not just on elementary education but on education as a whole increased throughout the reign of Alexander II.
A lot of this money was spent by the regional Zemstvo’s that were set up. But to call Alexander a “Tsar liberator” just because he made liberating reforms in the education system would be an exaggeration, as one may question his purpose. Education reforms were a brave step for the Tsar and the mark of a true liberator because educated people are more dangerous to an autocrat. They can read subversive pamphlets and books by people with different ideas. However, to industrialize, Alexander II needed a literate workforce.
It is worth knowing that post-1866, he also reduced university autonomy to regain control. So, he may be seen as more of an autocrat than a liberator when regarding education reforms. Alexander II maintained control over educational establishments to reduce the threat to his autocracy, which suggests that Alexander II was not a “Tsar liberator.”
In the area of judicial reform, Alexander II can be seen much closer to the idea of a “Tsar liberator.” Hugh Seton Watson says, “…The courtroom was the one place where real freedom existed.” Although judicial reform was still incomplete as it didn’t cover military courts or church courts, judicial reform meant that ordinary people had some means of obtaining independent justice through the new system of a judiciary where previously they didn’t.
On balance, judicial reforms went further in terms of liberation than many of Alexander II’s other measures, as W. Mosse says, “The new courts remained a lasting memorial to Alexander II and a symbol of the new spirit which was beginning to pervade Russian life.”
Thus, Alexander comes closer to the idea of a “Tsar liberator” when looking at his judicial reforms.
The military reforms were also considered a success in terms of liberal reform as the armed forces were humanized and became less brutal. Peasants were also given more freedom within the forces. W. Mosse said, “It was a great humanitarian reform which completely altered the spirit of the Russian army and navy.” W. Mosse is right to claim that the military reforms altered the spirit of the Russian army.
However, as Sidney Harcave puts it, “Impressive as were the efforts to make such changes, they could not transform the Russian army unless the changes were endorsed and pursued cooperatively by all concerned: that was a condition which, unfortunately, did not prevail.” Harcave is saying that these reforms that, according to Mosse, “altered the spirit of the military,” had the ability to transform the military but did not because of a lack of interest in them.
The aristocracy remained dominant in the higher ranks of the army. However, military reforms can be seen as a real achievement for Alexander II. There were indisputable improvements, such as the reduction in years from 26 years to 6 years for a soldier. There was also an improved system of conscription, and there were changes in the equipment used by the Russian army.
Although this was radical change, the system was still not perfect. However, as Alexander II humanized the military and tried to make the system more equal, he comes closer to the “Tsar liberator” ideal in this area than in some other aspects of his reign.
Alexander II could be considered less of a liberator in the case of dealing with Poland, as P. Nevile puts it, “when faced with opposition, Alexander II retreats into repression.” For this reason, it is certainly true to an extent in the case of Poland. There was a Polish uprising which was defeated, and a policy of Russification was imposed upon the state of Poland.
This policy included the imposition of the Russian language in all schools and also banning Polish on the borders of Russia. Harcave says, “It soon became evident that in acquiescing to the new Polish policy, Alexander was taking a significant step to the right.” In what happened in Poland after the Polish uprising, Alexander certainly did move to the right as Harcave suggests, and in doing so was not a liberal and therefore cannot be deemed a ‘tsar liberator’ dealing with Poland.
The Emancipation edict proved that Alexander II was a reformer but lacked the temperament and determination to be a liberator. Alexander II did pass military and judicial reforms that had the potential to liberate, but Alexander II was not a true liberator. “Although Alexander II was prepared to make major changes in some areas to modernize Russia, he was not willing to give up any of his autocratic powers.” This statement made by D. Moon is an accurate statement as throughout his reign, Alexander II upheld his inherited autocratic powers.
Alexander II does deserve credit for his willingness to attempt reform, which sets him apart from most tsars. However, he failed to reform to the extent of a true liberator. “Alexander II in the end succeeded after immense labors in making the new Russia an incomplete and uncomfortable dwelling where friends and opponents of innovation felt almost equally ill at ease.”
This statement by Mosse is certainly true in terms of the Emancipation of the serfs, although it is perhaps not the case with military or judicial reform where these reforms came to be seen as liberating to a certain extent. However, in seeing Alexander II’s entire program of reforms, Mosse is perhaps accurate, as Alexander II intentionally limited his reforms in order to maintain his autocratic power and support from the aristocracy, thus limiting true liberation.
As Georgivna Zakharova says, Alexander II’s reforms were not designed to “improve the lot of the people, develop the principle of elective representation, or lay the foundations of a state ruled by law… but to entrench autocracy, strengthen military power, and expand the empire for the sake of Russia’s greatness as Alexander II and his closest understood it.” This quote is taken from a Soviet historian, and therefore she is unlikely to be supportive of reform undertaken by the Tsarist regime, which may be the reason why she has such a view.
However, the fact that she implies that Alexander II’s reforms were not a liberation, but the reforms were actually carried out in his own interests, is true to an extent. A more accurate statement would be the one by Seton Watson who states, “Alexander II stood at the crossroads between autocracy and liberal reform, having whetted the appetite for the latter he chose the former.” This can be seen as the most appropriate summation to this particular question. Alexander II came close to being a liberator, but in fact only succeeded in beginning reform.
References:
- David Saunders, “Russia in the Age of Reaction and Reform 1801-1881”, page 264.
- Robert Bideleux, “Alexander II and the Emancipation of the Serfs” (article).
- Mikhailov and Shelgunov extract from “To the Younger Generation”, a pamphlet from 1861, taken from P. Oxley, “Russia from Tsars to Commissars 1855-1991”, page 282.
- Zaionchkovsky extract from “The Abolition of Serfdom in Russia” 1978, taken from Peter Oxley, “Russia from Tsars to Commissars”, page 291.
- Robert Bideleux, “Alexander II and the Emancipation of the Serfs” (article).
- Edward Acton, “Russia: The Tsarist Soviet Legacy”, page 663.
- David Saunders, “Russia in the Age of Reaction and Reform 1801-1881”, page 264.
- HS Watson, “The Russian Empire”, page 40.
- David Evans, Jane Jenkins, “Years of Russia and the USSR, 1851-1991”, page 382.
- Seton Watson extract from “European History Morris T 1848-1945”, page 83.
- W. Mosse, “Alexander II and the Modernisation of Russia”, page 92.
- HS Watson, “The Russian Empire”, page 193.
- W. Mosse, “Alexander II and the Modernisation of Russia”, page 90.
- P. Nevile, “Tsar Alexander II: Liberator or Traditionalist?” (article).
- W. Mosse, “Alexander II and the Modernisation of Russia”, page 95.
- In 1866, there was an assassination attempt on the Tsar’s life by a university student. This led to a period of reaction.
- HS Watson, taken from “Years of Russia and the USSR, 1851-1991” by David Evans and Jane Jenkins, page 43.
- Independent justice existed because a western system of a judiciary was put into place, whereby cases would be decided by a group of people and not just by the judge.
- W. Mosse, “Alexander II and the Modernisation of Russia”, page 91.
- W. Mosse, “Alexander II and the Modernisation of Russia”, page 95.
- “Years of the Last Golden Cockerel: The Last Romanov Tsars 1814-1917” by Sidney Harcave, page 190.
- P. Nevile, “Tsar Alexander II: Liberator or Traditionalist?” (article).
- Sidney Harcave, “Years of the Last Golden Cockerel: The Last Romanov Tsars 1814-1917”, page 201.
- D. Moon, “Defeat in War Leads to Rapid Russian Reforms: Benefits Undermined by Restrictions” (article).
- W. Mosse, taken from “David Evans, Jane Jenkins Years of Russia and the USSR, 1851-1991”, page 371.
- Donald J. Raleigh, M. E. Sharpe, taken from “David Evans, Jane Jenkins Years of Russia and the USSR, 1851-1991”, page 252.
- Seton Watson, taken from “Morris T, European History 1848-1945”, page 84.
